Motives for non-compliance: A study among business entrepreneurs;Motieven voor regelovertreding: Een onderzoek onder ondernemers

Gedrag en Organisatie

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 3-22

  Goslinga, Sjoerd ^a   Denkers, Adriaan ^b  

^a Centrum voor Proces en Productontwikkeling   (Netherlands)

^b Belastingdienst/FIOD ECD ^*  (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Business entrepreneurs; Law enforcement; Motives; Non compliance

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955860220     PISSN: 09215077     EISSN: 18757235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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