Proportionality and principled balancing

Law and Ethics of Human Rights

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2010, Pages

  Barak, Aharon ^a  

^a INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

balancing rule; principled balancing approach; principled balancing test; proportionality

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955661852     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19382545     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1938-2545.1041     Document Type: Article

References (147)

1. See GERHARD VAN DER SCHYFF, LIMITATION OF RIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 151 (2005).
2. See also Peter Kempees, "Legitimate Aims" in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 659 (Paul Mahoney, Franz Matscher, Herbert Petzold, & Luzius Wildhaber eds., 2000);
3. SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAW 101 (Raymond Youngs ed., 2002);
4. Jacco Bomhoff, The Rights and Freedoms of Others: The ECHR and its Peculiar Category of Conflicts between Individual Fundamental Rights, in CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 619, 669 (Eva Brems ed., 2008).
5. See Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE, 1789-1907, at 59-61 (Frank Maloy Anderson ed., 1908);
6. see also supra note 1.
7. VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 1, at 141, 145, 183, 246.
8. See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law) arts. 1 (1) & 79 (3).
9. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 arts. 7 & 36.
10. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, art. 1 A, 1992, S. H. 150 amended S. H. 90. An English translation of the law is available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/eng.htm.
11. Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structures of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 141 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007).
12. Compare Richard Mullender, Theorizing the Third Way: Qualified Consequentialism, the Proportionality Principle, and the New Social Democracy, 27 J. L. & SOC'Y 493 (2000).
13. "Law" means either statutory law or common law: see VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 1, at 136;
14. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H. R. Rep. 245 (1980);
15. R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S. C. R. 613;
16. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 83 S. C. R. 573;
17. B. C. G. E. U. v. British Columbia, [1988] 2 S. C. R. 214;
18. Minister of Transport v. Noort, [1992] 3 NZLR 260;
19. PAUL RISHWORTH, GRANT HUSCROFT, SCOTT OPTICAN & RICHARD MAHONEY, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS (2003);
20. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 122 (5th ed. 2007).
21. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981);
22. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89 (1982);
23. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001); (Pubitemid 33648820)
24. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005);
25. Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2007);
26. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391 (2008).
27. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah-The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights v. The Minister of Interior [May 14, 2006] (unpublished) (President Barak), an English translation, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/03/520/070/a47/ 03070520.a47.pdf.
28. See VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 1, at 125.
29. This approach is controversial see, e.g., 2 PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 152 (5th ed. 2007).
30. See, e.g., THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armand de Mestral et al. ed., 1986);
31. Marc-Andre Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (Ronald MacDonald et al. eds., 1993);
32. NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW (1996);
33. PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evalyn Ellis ed., 1999);
34. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY PROPORTIONALITY AND THE use OF FORCE BY STATES (2004);
35. WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2008);
36. A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008);
37. CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Eva Brems ed., 2008).
38. See also VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 1;
39. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., OUP, 2002) (1985);
40. DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 170 (2004);
41. Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11 EUR. L. J. 262 (2005);
42. Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 174, 200 (2006);
43. CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (2007);
44. Julian Rivers, Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 167 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007);
45. Mattias Kumm, What Do You Have In Virtue Of Having A Constitutional Right? On The Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY, supra at 131.
46. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S. C. R. 103.
47. See Stuart Woolman & Henk Botha, Limitations, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA ch. 34, at 94 (Stuart Woolman et al. eds., 2006);
48. S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (S. Afr.);
49. Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 631, 656 (S. Afr.);
50. R. v. Oakes, supra note 14;
51. JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 313 (2000);
52. NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW 23 (1996);
53. Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, App. No. 7151/75, 5 Eur. H. R. Rep. 35, para. 69 (1982).
54. See HCJ 14/86 La'or v. The Israel Film and Theater Council [1987] IsrSC 41 (1) 421;
55. see also Frank Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N. Y. U. L. REV. 16, 19 (1988);
56. Richard Fallon, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993);
57. William Winslade, Adjudication and Balancing Metaphor, in LEGAL REASONING 403 (Hubert Hubien ed., 1971) (discussing the virtues and disadvantages of the balancing metaphor);
58. Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L. J. 1727 (1987);
59. Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1398 (2006);
60. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (examining metaphoric speech).
61. See Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L. J 383, 396 (2007);
62. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 70 (2008).
63. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58 (5) 807, an English translation, available at 38 ISR. L. REV. 83 (2005) and http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
64. Cf. BEATTY, supra note 13, at 170.
65. HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. The Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51 (4) 1, at 197-98, para. 53, an English translation, available at http://elyon1.court.gov. il/files-eng/96/160/050/A01/96050160.a01.htm;
66. see also Adalah v. The Minister of Interior, supra note 10, at 81, para. 63.
67. See ALEXY, supra note 13, at 394;
68. Rivers, Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing, supra note 13.
69. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36 (1) (a).
70. See Woolman & Botha, supra note 15, at 70.
71. See Grimm, supra note 17, at 395.
72. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S. C. R. 835;
73. Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S. C. R. 772;
74. Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S. C. R. 769;
75. R. v. Brown, [2002] 2 S. C. R. 185;
76. Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36. [2002] 4 S. C. R. 710;
77. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S. C. R. 698;
78. Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S. C. R. 238;
79. WIC Radio Ltd. V. Simpson, [2008] S. C. J. 41.
80. See Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, supra note 18, at 850, para. 40;
81. Adalah v. The Minister of Interior, supra note 10, at 93-95, para. 74.
82. Horev v. The Minister of Transportation, supra note 20, at para. 32.
83. This rule was influenced substantially by Prof. Alexy's "Law and Balancing" (ALEXY, supra note 13, at 102).
84. See Philip Sales & Ben Hooper, Proportionality and the Form of Law, 119 L. Q. REV. 426 (2003).
85. A classic example a basic balancing rule is the Law of Balancing, formulated by Robert Alexy: "The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater the importance of satisfying the other." See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 102 (2002).
86. See STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 218 (2006).
87. See ALEXY, supra note 13, at 405.
88. Id. at 406.
89. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968).
90. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990);
91. NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1995);
92. CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998);
93. Lorraine Weinrib, The Supreme Court of Canada in the Age of Rights: Constitutional Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights under Canada's Constitution, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 699 (2001).
94. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality, Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (2009);
95. see also A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 13.
96. See THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2007).
97. See Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1997);
98. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 44 (2001);
99. Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structures of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007);
100. Vicki Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 63 (2010);
101. Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994);
102. David Dyzenhaus, Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik's Conception of Legal Culture, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 11, 27 (1998);
103. Andrew Butler, Limiting Rights, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 113, 116 (2002);
104. Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Deference and Human Rights: A Question of Competence, in LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CAROL HARLOW 67, 69 (Paul P. Craig & Richard Rawlings eds., 2003);
105. Michael Taggart, Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury, JUDICIAL REV. 23, 48 (2007).
106. See BEATTY, supra note 13, at 172;
107. Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 174, 176 (2006);
108. Lorraine Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 96 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006);
109. PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 637 (6th ed. 2008).
110. Frank Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986);
111. Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1997);
112. MICHAEL SACHS, GG VERFASUNGSRECHT II GRUNDRECHTE 71 (2003);
113. Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional about Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT 803, 830 (2004) (reviewing David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004));
114. Coffin, supra note 16, at 25;
115. Thomas Poole, Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in the Political Constitution, 70 MOD. L. REV. 250, 268 (2007);
116. Wojciech Sadurski, 'Reasonableness' and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 129 (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Sartor Giovanni, & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009).
117. For criticism on that approach, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on 'Proportionality', Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 621 (1999).
118. On the dialog metaphor, see AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 376 (2004);
119. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government-The Supreme Court 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986);
120. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75 (1997);
121. Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 513 (1999);
122. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, Reply to Six Degrees of Dialogue, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 529 (1999);
123. KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001);
124. Carissima Mathen, Constitutional Dialogue in Canada and the United States, 14 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 403 (2003);
125. Richard Clayton, Judicial Deference and Democratic Dialogue: The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998, PUB. L. 33 (2004);
126. Tom Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998, PUB. L. 306 (2005);
127. Kent Roach, Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the United States, 4 INT'L J. CONS. L. 347 (2006);
128. Christopher P. Manfredi, The Day the Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauvé v. Canada, 45 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 105 (2007);
129. Julie Debeljak, Parliamentary Sovereignty and Dialogue Under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Drawing the Line Between Judicial Interpretation and Judicial Law-Making, 33 MONASH U. L. REV. 9 (2007);
130. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31 (2008).
131. Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1963);
132. LORENZO ZUCCA, CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS: CONFLICTS OF FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE AND THE USA 85 (2007);
133. Louis Henkin, Infallibility under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978);
134. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 972 (1987);
135. GRÉGOIRE WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 89 (2009).
136. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 259 (trans. William Rehg, Polity Press, 1996) (1992).
137. See also BODO PIEROTH & BERNARD SCHLINK, GRUNDRECHTE, STAATSRECHT II, 66 (2006).
138. For analysis of this argument and its answers see CARLOS BERNAL PUILIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 163 (2007).
139. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968);
140. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1972).
141. See also Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B. C. L. REV. 585, 636 (1988);
142. GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 89 (2009).
143. Richard H. Fallon, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 362 (1993).
144. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42.
145. Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, supra note 18, at 846.
146. Adalah v. The Minister of Interior, supra note 10, at 109-10, para. 93.
147. HCJ 5100/94 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53 (4) 817, 845, para. 39.