Proportionality and variable intensity of review

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 174-207

  Rivers, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85010089442     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008197306007082     Document Type: Article

References (148)

1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, s. 1.
2. New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990, s. 5.
3. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s. 36.
4. Handyside v. United Kingdom A.24 1 E.H.R.R. 737 at 754.
5. The fullest treatment is now Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Oxford 2002).
6. D. Pannick, [1998] P.L. 545
7. A. Lester and D. Pannick (eds.), Human Rights Law and Practice (1999), para. 3.26
8. as approved in R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 A.C. 326
9. Brown v. Stott [2003] 1 A.C. 681.
10. The judgements in R. (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 A.C. 295 also imply the existence of discretion on the part of the executive which can co-exist with proportionality review.
11. P. Mahoney, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism” (1998) 19 H.R.L.J. 1.
12. Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353.
13. J.W.F. Allison, “Fuller's Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication” [1994] C.L.J. 367 contains a critical discussion and refers to the “need to demarcate rights satisfactorily in a more-polycentric setting” (p. 382).
14. From the literature, see particularly Michael Supperstone and Jason Coppel, “Judicial review after the Human Rights Act” (1999) 3 E.H.R.L.R. 301
15. Richard A. Edwards, “Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 859
16. Jeffrey Jowell, “Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity” [2003] P.L. 592.
17. Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UWCA Civ 105, para. [49] (footnotes removed).
18. De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Land and Housing [1999] 1 A.C. 69.
19. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Land and Housing, p. 80.
20. E.g. Lord Bingham in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 at 106.
21. E.g. Lord Steyn in R. (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 A.C. 532 at 547.
22. A. Lester and D. Pannick, Human Rights: Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (London 2004), p. 89.
23. R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford 2000), p.278
24. citing Halsbury, Laws of England (4th reissue), vol. 1(1) para. 78.
25. Laws of England, p. 298.
26. P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (London 2003), p. 622.
27. Elsewhere Craig (correctly) reverses the first two criteria. See, e.g., “Judicial Review, Intensity and Deference in EU Law” in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Oxford 2004), 335.
28. H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th ed. (Oxford 2004), p. 366.
29. See de Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Land and Housing [1999] 1 A.C. 69.
30. Although the Canadian case law provides authority for a four-stage test similar to the European conception as set out below, in practice the final stage is not relied on, and the court does all the work under the rubric of “necessity”, which has been rendered more flexible than at first sight appears. See R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, pp. 293–295. Section 36(1)(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 also gives the impression that necessity is the final stage of proportionality review.
31. Aileen McHarg, “Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (1999) 62 M.L.R. 671.
32. Taking Rights Seriously (London 1977), ch.7.
33. Tom R. Hickman has recently drawn an instructive parallel with Robert Bork in this respect in “Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998” [2005] P.L. 306 at 313–315.
34. Dworkin's hostility to qualified rights can be found in “Does Britain need a Bill of Rights?”, in R. Gordon and R. Wilmot-Smith (eds.), Human Rights in the United Kingdom (Oxford 1996), 59.
35. See, e.g., E. Orücü, “The Core of Human Rights and Freedoms: the Limit of Limits” in T. Campbell et al. (eds.), Human Rights (Oxford 1986).
36. R. Edwards (above note 11), at p.879, does not note that there is a vigorous discussion in Germany as to whether the absolute core can be defined without reference to proportionality.
37. Ian Leigh, “Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human Rights Act and Strasbourg” [2002] P.L. 265 represents a clear example of this approach.
38. J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (London 1992), ch. 5
39. for a helpful brief account see Walter van Gerven, “The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the European Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe” in E. Ellis (ed.) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford 1999), 37.
40. The Israeli Security Fence decision is a fine example of a “necessary” decision being found disproportionate. A lower level of security had to be tolerated given the immense additional cost to rights: Beit Sourit Village Council v. Govt. of Israel HCJ 2056/04 (30 June 2004).
41. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (tr. Julian Rivers, Oxford 2002), pp.66–69.
42. “Identifying the Principles of Proportionality”, in Jeffrey Jowell and Jonathan Cooper (eds.), Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford 2001).
43. Understanding Human Rights Principles, p. 83.
44. McCann and others v. United Kingdom (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 97.
45. Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439.
46. Kröcher and Möller v. Switzerland (1982) 34 D.R. 24.
47. Elements of balancing admittedly do not often arise in article 3 cases. They are nevertheless present both in the reference to the nature and context of treatment in determining whether the “threshold of severity” has been surpassed and in the often repeated requirement that the “suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment” (my emphasis). Kudla v. Poland (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 11 is a tolerably clear and recent example of balancing in this context.
48. Van der Mussele v. Belgium (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. 163.
49. (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 33.
50. (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 157.
51. See also in relation to article 5, Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979–1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 387
52. Van Droogenbroeck v. Netherlands (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 443
53. Caprino v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 97.
54. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 528.
55. Salabiaku v. France (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 379 at 388.
56. (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 31.
57. F v. Switzerland (1988) 10 E.H.R.R. 411.
58. Belgian Linguistic Case (1979–1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 252 at 293 and subsequent case law.
59. Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 35.
60. Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark (1979–1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 711.
61. Matthieu-Mohin v. Belgium (1988) 10 E.H.R.R. 1.
62. Simon Atrill “Keeping the Executive in the Picture: a reply to Professor Leigh” [2003] P.L. 41 makes this point well.
63. Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979–1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 387
64. Brand v. Netherlands (49902/99).
65. Sahin v. Germany (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 43, dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis and Tulkens.
66. Larissis v. Greece (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 329, concurring opinion of Judge de Meyer.
67. Sigurdur Sigurjonssen v. Iceland (16130/90).
68. Orhan v. Turkey (25656/94); Tanrikulu v. Turkey (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 950.
69. See, e.g., Müller v. Switzerland (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 212
70. Barthold v. Germany (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 383
71. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (35014/97), Schirmer v. Poland (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 47.
72. (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 56.
73. (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18.
74. (1988) 10 E.H.R.R. 411.
75. Matthieu-Mohin v. Belgium (1988) 10 E.H.R.R. 1 at p.16.
76. E.g. Gitonas v. Greece (1998) 26 EHR 691
77. Ahmed v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 1;
78. Labita v. Italy (26772/95)
79. Podkolzina v. Latvia (46726/99)
80. Hirst v. United Kingdom (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 40.
81. Selim Sadak v. Turkey (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 23
82. Zdanoka v. Latvia (58278/00).
83. Matthews v. United Kingdom (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 36
84. Aziz v. Cyprus (69949/01).
85. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 528.
86. A v. United Kingdom (35373/97).
87. Fayed v. United Kingdom (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 393.
88. E.g. Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France (12964/87)
89. Philis v. Greece (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 417.
90. Alexy makes this point in the German context: A Theory of Constitutional Rights, pp. 193–6.
91. (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 35 at 52.
92. [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87.
93. See Lord Bingham at 106.
94. 2 W.L.R.
95. 2 W.L.R., p. 145.
96. D. Galligan, Discretionary Powers (Oxford 1986), especially ch. 1.
97. See, for example, R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 A.C. 326, per Lord Hope at 381.
98. R. (Mahmood) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840 at 857.
99. R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 A.C. 532, per Lord Steyn at 547.
100. [1996] Q.B. 517.
101. See, in particular, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Bugdaycay [1987] A.C. 514
102. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Leech [1994] Q.B. 198.
103. (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493.
104. Lord Nicholls comes close to resurrecting a reasonableness conception of Convention rights in R. (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 W.L.R. 290
105. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department: “Parliament must be regarded as having attached insufficient weight to the human rights of non-nationals…” [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 at 131.
106. See R. (Szuluk) v. Governor of HMP Full Sutton [2004] EWCA Civ 1426, at para. [26].
107. Lord Hoffmann expresses concern about the servile connotations of deference in R. (Pro-Life Alliance) v. BBC [2004] 1 A.C. 185 at 240, but the word should be read as related to the practice of deferring rather than the attitude of being deferential.
108. [2003] 2 A.C. 558.
109. This fear clearly lay behind the rejection of proportionality in R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696 especially on the part of Lords Roskill and Lowry.
110. Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford 2004), at pp. 119–120, similarly distinguishes deference to authority (in his example an Act of Parliament) from restraint deriving from competence as in “areas where the executive is rightly the lead agent (e.g. foreign policy).”
111. R. (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 A.C. 295, per Lord Clyde at 355.
112. [2004] EWHC 2493 (Admin).
113. R. (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 W.L.R. 590.
114. [2003] 1 A.C. 153.
115. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, at 191.
116. Lord Steyn has recently questioned Lord Hoffmann's approach on these grounds in “Deference: a tangled story” [2005] P.L. 346.
117. Murray Hunt also criticises spatial metaphors, as in the “discretionary area of judgement”, for similar reasons: “Sovereignty's Blight”, in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution (Oxford 2003), 337.
118. T.R.S. Allan, “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.) The Unity of Public Law (Oxford 2004), 295.
119. The Unity of Public Law, pp. 305–6.
120. The Court has started to use the idea of a hierarchy of rights: Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 31 at p. 785.
121. It would seem that Canadian courts take a subjective approach. See Edwards (above note 11) at 861–862. A good example is provided by Canadian restrictions on Sunday trading, which were enacted to encourage people to attend church. See R v. Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
122. Edwards (above note 11), p. 862.
123. The European Court points in this direction when it states in Hirst v. United Kingdom (no. 2) (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 40 at p. 841: “The Court would observe that there is no evidence that the legislature in the United Kingdom has ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of the ban as it affects convicted prisoners.”
124. The question raises complex Pepper v. Hart issues, discussed-with a clear preference for an objective approach-in Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd. (no. 2) [2004] 1 A.C. 816.
125. R v. Lichniak [2003] 1 A.C. 903.
126. [2005] 2 W.L.R. 590.
127. The Unity of Public Law, at 604.
128. The Unity of Public Law, at 617.
129. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 105 n. 222 and pp. 398–9.
130. Ullah v. Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 A.C. 323.
131. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, pp. 102–9.
132. This can be represented graphically by superimposing an indifference curve (balance) onto an efficiency curve (necessity). Where the former is above the latter, the state of legal regulation is desirable but impossible. See further J. Rivers, “Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing”, in G. Pavlakos and S. Paulson (eds.), forthcoming.
133. R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 A.C. 532, per Lord Steyn at 547–548.
134. Lord Bingham makes a similar point in A v. Home Secretary [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 at 115 when he states that proportionality requires “greater intensity of review.”
135. Runa Begum v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] 2 W.L.R. 388
136. per Lord Hoffmann at 404. See the discussion of Carnwath L.J. in Office of Fair Trading and Others v. IBA Heathcare Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 142, paras. [88]-[100].
137. As in A v. Home Secretary [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87.
138. As in R. (Fisher) v. English Nature [2005] 1 W.L.R. 147.
139. [2001] 2 A.C. 532 at 548.
140. E.g. R (on the application of British American Tobacco UK Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 2493 (Admin), per McCombe J. at paras. [26]-[37].
141. Michael Supperstone and Jason Coppel, “Judicial review after the Human Rights Act” (1999) 3 E.H.R.L.R. 301 at 315.
142. International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] Q.B. 728 at 765–767.
143. A. Lester and D. Pannick, Human Rights: Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (London 2004), p. 97.
144. This perplexity is clearly expressed in the judgment of Lord Nicholls [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 at 131.
145. Laws L.J. appears to conflate the two doctrines in R. (Mahmood) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840 at 849.
146. Lord Bingham seems to make the same mistake in taking the seriousness of the rights-infringement in A v. Home Secretary merely as a reason for engaging in intensive review, not as setting a substantive requirement of overwhelming competing public interest. The shift from substance to form appears between paragraphs 36 and 37 at 110. This judicial tendency is also noted and deplored by Mark Elliott, “The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review” [2002] J.R. 97.
147. This also shows how it is possible to maintain a “priority of rights” approach that mediates between “rights as trumps” and collectivist models. See Steven Greer, “Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 405 at 410–413.
148. [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1403.