An integrated approach to the analysis of incident causes

Safety Science

Volumn 49, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 886-905

  Ferjencik, Milos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PARDUBICE   (Czech Republic)

Author keywords

Analysis of incident causes; Root causes; STAMP; System safety archetypes; Walkerton tragedy

Indexed keywords

ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT CAUSES; ROOT CAUSE; STAMP; SYSTEM SAFETY ARCHETYPES; WALKERTON TRAGEDY;

INTEGRATED CONTROL; STRESS INTENSITY FACTORS;

INTEGRATION;

ARTICLE; BIOSAFETY; COMBUSTION; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HUMAN; INFORMATION SYSTEM; INTEGRATED PROCEDURE OF INCIDENT CAUSE ANALYSIS; LIMIT OF DETECTION; NONLINEAR SYSTEM; PRIORITY JOURNAL; ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS; SHOCK WAVE; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIALIZATION; STIMULUS RESPONSE;

EID: 79955654403     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2011.02.005     Document Type: Article

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