Archetypes for organizational safety

Safety Science

Volumn 44, Issue 7, 2006, Pages 565-582

  Marais, Karen ^a   Saleh, Joseph H ^a   Leveson, Nancy G ^a  

^a Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge   (United States)

Author keywords

Accident model; Organizational behaviour; Risk dynamics; Root cause analysis

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; RISK MANAGEMENT; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

ACCIDENT MODEL; ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR; RISK DYNAMICS; ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS;

ACCIDENT PREVENTION;

ACCIDENT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE; CONSCIOUSNESS; DECISION MAKING; ORGANIZATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK ASSESSMENT; SAFETY; SOCIAL ASPECT; SPACE;

EID: 33745850107     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2005.12.004     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Adler P.S., and Borys B. Two types of bureaucracy: enabling and coercive. Administrative Science Quarterly 41 1 (1996) 61-89
2. Albee, A. et al., 2000. Report on the Loss of the Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space 2 Missions, JPL Special Review Board, JPL D-18709, March 29.
3. Amalberti R. The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety Science 37 (2001) 109-126
4. Argyris C., and Schön D.A. Organizational Learning (1978), Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Reading, MA
5. Braun, W., 2002. The system archetypes. Available from: .
6. Carroll J.S. Organizational learning activities in high-hazard industries: the logics underlying self-analysis. Journal of Management Studies 35 6 (1998) 699-717
7. Carroll, J.S., Rudolph, J.W., Hatakenaka, S., 2002. Organizational learning from experience in high-hazard industries: problem investigations as off-line reflective practice. MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4359-02, April 2002. Available from: .
8. Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, 1993. An assessment of space shuttle flight software development processes, Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes. Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Research Council, National Academies Press. Available from: .
9. Kemeny, J.G., 1979. Chairman, Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, October, 1979. Available from: .
10. Leveson N.G. Safeware: System Safety and Computers (1995), Addison Wesley, Reading, MA
11. Leveson N.G. A new accident model for engineering safety systems. Safety Science 42 4 (2004) 237-270
12. Leveson N.G. Role of software in spacecraft accidents. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 41 4 (2004) 564-575
13. Levitt R.E., and Parker H.W. Reducing construction accidents-top management's role. ASCE Journal of the Construction Division 102 CO3 (1976) 465-478
14. Masuch M. Vicious circles in organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 30 1 (1985) 14-33
15. Merton R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure (1968), Free Press, New York
16. Miller D., and Friesen P. Archetypes of organizational transition. Administrative Science Quarterly 25 2 (1980) 268-299
17. Press Release 88-01-05. Available from: .
18. Rasmussen J. Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Safety Science 27 2/3 (1997) 183-213
19. Repenning N.P., and Sterman J.D. Nobody ever gets credit for fixing problems that never happened: creating and sustaining process improvement. California Management Review 43 4 (2001) 64-88
20. Rogers, W.P., 1986. Chairman, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Government Printing Office, Washington DC.
21. Shrivastava P. Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis. second ed. (1992), P. Chapman, London
22. Sitkin S.B. Learning through failure: the strategy of small losses. Research in Organizational Behavior 14 (1992) 231-266
23. Sterman J.D. Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (2000), Irwin McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA
24. Sterman, J.D., 2002. System dynamics: systems thinking and modelling for a complex world. In: Proceedings of the ESD Internal Symposium, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
25. Tamuz, M., 1994. Developing organizational safety information systems. In: Apostolakis, G.E., Wu, J.S. (Eds.), Proceedings of PSAM II, vol. 2, University of California, Los Angeles, pp. 71, 7-12.
26. Winsor D.A. Communication failures contributing to the Challenger accident: an example for technical communicators. IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication 31 3 (1988) 101-107
27. Wolstenholme E.F. Toward the definition and use of a core set of archetypal structures in system dynamics. System Dynamics Review 19 1 (2003) 7-26