The evolution of fairness in a biological market

Evolution

Volumn 65, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1447-1456

  André, Jean Baptiste ^a   Baumard, Nicolas ^b,c  

^a ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c INSTITUT JEAN NICOD   (France)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Game theory; Moral psychology; Mutualism; Partner choice; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; GAME THEORY; MUTUALISM; PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ARTICLE; ATTITUDE; DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; SYMBIOSIS;

ATTITUDE; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SYMBIOSIS;

EID: 79955139722     PISSN: 00143820     EISSN: 15585646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01232.x     Document Type: Article

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