The evolution of the Maine lobster V-notch practice: Cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game

Ecology and Society

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2011, Pages

  Acheson, James ^a   Gardner, Roy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DU MAINE   (France)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Evolutionary game theory; Lobster; Maine; Prisoner's dilemma; V notch program

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; GAME THEORY; LOBSTER FISHERY; PRISONER DILEMMA;

LOBSTER;

EID: 79954560853     PISSN: None     EISSN: 17083087     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5751/ES-04004-160141     Document Type: Article

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