Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 12-29

  Bade, Sophie ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

Author keywords

Electoral competition over many issues; Median voter; Multiple priors; Uncertainty aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953307230     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.001     Document Type: Article

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