Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 52-74

  Duggan, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249046114     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.004     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Aliprantis C., and Border K. Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker's Guide. second ed (1999), Springer-Verlag, New York
2. Ball R. Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model. Soc. Choice Welfare 16 (1999) 533-556
3. Banks J. Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model. J. Math. Econ. 24 (1995) 523-536
4. Banks J., and Duggan J. Probabilistic voting in the spatial model of elections: The theory of office-motivated candidates. In: Austen-Smith D., and Duggan J. (Eds). Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks (2005), Springer, New York
5. Banks J., Duggan J., and Le Breton M. Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections. J. Econ. Theory 103 (2002) 88-105
6. Black D. Theory of Committees and Elections (1958), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge
7. Borel E. The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels. Econometrica 21 (1953) 97-100
8. Calvert R. Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 29 (1985) 69-95
9. Dasgupta P., and Maskin E. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 1-26
10. Downs A. An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Harper and Row, New York
11. Duggan, J., Jackson, M., 2005. Mixed strategy equilibrium and deep covering in multidimensional political competition. Mimeo
12. Gale D. The Theory of Linear Economic Models (1960), Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago
13. Glicksberg I. A further generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium. Proc. AMS 3 (1952) 170-174
14. Gross, O., Wagner, R., 1950. A continuous Colonel Blotto Game. Research memorandum RM-408. RAND
15. Hirsch M. Differential Topology (1976), Springer-Verlag, New York
16. Hotelling H. Stability in competition. Econ. J. 39 (1929) 41-57
17. Kramer G. Existence of electoral equilibrium. In: Ordeshook P. (Ed). Game Theory and Political Science (1978), NYU Press, New York
18. Laffond G., Laslier J.-F., and Le Breton M. The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993) 182-201
19. Laslier J.-F., and Picard N. Distributive politics and electoral competition. J. Econ. Theory 103 (2002) 106-130
20. Mertens J.-F. The minmax theorem for U.S.C.-L.S.C. payoff functions. Int. J. Game Theory 15 (1986) 237-250
21. McKelvey R. Covering, dominance, and the institution-free properties of social choice. Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 30 (1986) 283-314
22. Plott C. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. Amer. Econ. Rev. 57 (1967) 787-806
23. Reny P. On the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. Econometrica 67 (1999) 1029-1056
24. Rudin W. Real and Complex Analysis. third ed (1987), WCB/McGraw-Hill, New York
25. Saari D. The generic existence of a core for q-rules. Econ. Theory 9 (1997) 219-260
26. Schofield N. Generic instability of majority rule. Rev. Econ. Stud. 50 (1983) 695-705
27. Simon L. Games with discontinuous payoffs. Rev. Econ. Stud. 54 (1987) 569-597
28. Sion M. On general minimax theorems. Pacific J. Math. 8 (1958) 171-176
29. Sion M., and Wolfe P. On a game without a value. Contributions to the Theory of Games, III. Ann. Math. Stud. vol. 39 (1957) 299-306 Princeton