Taboo or tradition? the non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics

Review of International Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 853-863

  Paul, T V ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953000000     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210510001336     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. More details on my position in favour of the tradition can be found in, T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), chaps 1-2.
2. Her earlier works include: Nina Tannenwald, 'Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo', International Security, 29 (Spring 2005), pp. 5-49; (Pubitemid 40976992)
3. Nina Tannenwald, 'The Nuclear Taboo: The US and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-use', International Organization, 53 (Summer 1999), pp. 433-68;
4. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 'Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 137.
5. Previous publications on this subject include: Thomas C. Schelling, 'The Role of Nuclear Weapons', in Benjamin L. Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr (eds), Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 110;
6. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 260;
7. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Nuclear Weapons, the End of the Cold War, and the Future of the International System', in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen (eds) Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World (New York: Plenum Press, 1992);
8. Peter Gizewski, 'From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of the World: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics', International Journal, 51 (Summer 1996), pp. 397-419; (Pubitemid 126123058)
9. T. V. Paul, 'Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation: Nuclear Weapons in Regional Conflicts', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (December 1995), pp. 696-717; (Pubitemid 126139859)
10. George Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
11. These are covered extensively in Paul, Tradition of Non-Use
12. chaps 3 and 4, as well as Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
13. For these see, Paul, Tradition of Non-Use.
14. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p. 14.
15. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p. 15.
16. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p. 16.
17. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p. 17.
18. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 'Tradition', {http://mw1.m-w.com/ dictionary/tradition}.
19. Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 12.
20. Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 14-5. This is only one take on traditions. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, considers tradition to be much more rigid than custom. My view of tradition is accordingly closer to Hobsbawm's conception.
21. See, Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 2-3.
22. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p. 11.
23. For these policy changes, see US President, 'The National Security Strategy of the US of America', Washington, DC, (17 September 2002), p. 15;
24. US White House, 'National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction', Washington, DC (December 2002), p. 3.
25. See also, James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, 'US Policy on Preventive War and Preemption', The Nonproliferation Review, 10 (Spring 2003), pp. 113-23.
26. For the other nuclear powers, see Yuri Fedorov, 'Russia's Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons', working paper, Columbia International Affairs Online (November 2002), {http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/fey02};
27. BBC News Online, 'UK "Prepared to Use Nuclear Weapons'" (20 March 2002), {http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/1883258.stm};
28. Michael Evans and David Brown, 'Britain's Nuclear Warning to Saddam', The Times (London) (21 March 2002);
29. John Lichfield, 'Chirac Threatens Nuclear Attack on States Sponsoring Terrorism', The Independent, online edition (20 January 2006)
30. David S. Yost, 'New Approached to Deterrence in Britain, France, and the US', International Affairs, 81 (2005), p. 106.
31. Harsh V. Pant, 'India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for India and the World', Comparative Strategy, 24 (July 2005), p. 282.
32. In a Washington Post-ABC News Poll prior to the War, six in ten Americans surveyed found a US nuclear response acceptable 'if Hussein orders use of chemical or biological weapons on US troops'. Richard Morin, 'Most Favor Nuclear Option against Iraq', Washington Post (18 December 2002), p. A18.
33. Asher Arian, 'Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons', Strategic Assessment, 1 (October 1998), {http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=25&incat= &read=603}.
34. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.
35. On this, see Paul, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons;
36. Bruce Cumings, 'On the Strategy and Morality of American Nuclear Policy in Korea, 1950 to the Present', Social Science Japan Journal, 1:1 (1998), p. 59;
37. Rosemary J. Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-53 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 114-5, 126-7.
38. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Inside Story of the Eisenhower Administration (London: Hutchinson, 1962), p. 55.
39. Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 120;
40. Scott C. Sagan, 'The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969' International Security, 27:4 (Spring 2003), pp. 150-83.
41. William M. Arkin, 'Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War', The Washington Quarterly, 19:4 (1996), p. 4.
42. William M. Arkin, 'The Nuclear Option in Iraq', Los Angeles Times (26 January 2003), p. M1.
43. James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, 'US Policy on Preventive War and Preemption', The Nonproliferation Review, 10:1 (Spring 2003), pp. 113-23.
44. Avner Cohen, 'The Last Nuclear Moment', New York Times (6 October 2003), p. A17.
45. Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What that Means for the World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 324.
46. The New Statesman, 'Falklands: All Out War' (24 August 1984), pp. 8-9.
47. For the official versions, see Lawrence Freedman, 'The Official History of the Falklands Campaign', War and Diplomacy, 2 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 58-9.
48. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
49. Quoted in Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 537.
50. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p. 4.
51. For instance, see Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, pp. 22-3;
52. 'The Nuclear Taboo';
53. Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and Deterrence'.
54. For more details see Paul, Tradition of Non-Use, chap. 5.
55. A study by Alexander Downes convincingly shows that democracies are historically proven to target civilian populations in desperate military circumstances. He argues that 'leaders in democracies pay little if any price for inflicting large-scale harm on civilians in a costly or protracted war. The public is far more likely to turn against a war if they believe it is unwinnable than because it kills significant numbers of non-combatants'.
56. Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 248.
57. Democracies can engage in high intensity wars with non-democracies, as they tend to consider those states 'unreasonable' and 'potentially dangerous'. John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19 (Autumn 1994), pp. 87-125;
58. see also Christian Reus-Smit, 'Liberal Hierarchy and the License to Use Force', Review of International Studies, 31, suppl. S1 (December 2005), pp. 71-92. (Pubitemid 43429730)