From winning weapon to destroyer of worlds: The nuclear taboo in international politics

International Journal

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 397-419

  Gizewski, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039924779     PISSN: 00207020     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002070209605100301     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. On rational deterrence theory, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, 'Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies,' World Politics 41 (January 1989), 143-69; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills CA: Sage 1977).
2. On rational deterrence theory, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, 'Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies,' World Politics 41 (January 1989), 143-69; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills CA: Sage 1977).
3. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence: the nuclear and chemical weapons taboos,' in Peter Katzenstein, ed, The Construction of International Security (forthcoming 1996).
4. See, for instance, Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1991).
5. For some exceptions, see Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence'; Thomas Schelling, 'The role of nuclear weapons,' in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds, Turning Point: The Gulf War and United States Military Strategy (Boulder CO: Westview 1994), 105-15; and T.V. Paul, 'Nuclear taboo and war: initiation of regional conflicts,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(December 1995), 696-717.
6. For some exceptions, see Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence'; Thomas Schelling, 'The role of nuclear weapons,' in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds, Turning Point: The Gulf War and United States Military Strategy (Boulder CO: Westview 1994), 105-15; and T.V. Paul, 'Nuclear taboo and war: initiation of regional conflicts,' Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(December 1995), 696-717.
7. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics (New York: Vintage Books 1946), 26.
8. Hutton Webster, Taboo: A Sociological Study (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 1942), 17.
9. Freud, Totem and Taboo, 29, 31.
10. T.V. Paul, 'Nuclear taboo and war,' 701, 702.
11. See Schelling, 'The role of nuclear weapons,' 108.
12. Ibid, 110.
13. Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press 1985); Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence,' 33.
14. Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press 1985); Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence,' 33.
15. Barton J. Bernstein, 'Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: early thinking about tactical nuclear weapons,' International Security 15(spring 1991), 149-73.
16. For an excellent study on early opposition to nuclear weapons, see Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None? A History of the World Disarmament Movement Through 1953. I: The Struggle Against the Bomb (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 1993).
17. Peter Feaver notes that 'the United States did not have a comprehensive doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons from 1945-47.' Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 1993), 87.
18. Quoted in Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1987), 27.
19. Quoted in Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 125.
20. Wittner, One World or None, 172-84.
21. For instance, careful censorship was imposed on various media. An article defending the decision to drop the bomb, by former secretary of war, Henry Stimson, appeared in Harper's. Presidential directives advised all officials that their public stance on nuclear weapons was to be 'the less said the better' (Wittner, One World or None?, 263-74). Analysis of the Stimson article and its rationale is provided in Barton J. Bernstein, 'Seizing the contested terrain of early nuclear history: Stimson, Conant, and their allies explain the decision to use the bomb,' Diplomatic History 17(winter 1993), 35-72.
22. For instance, careful censorship was imposed on various media. An article defending the decision to drop the bomb, by former secretary of war, Henry Stimson, appeared in Harper's. Presidential directives advised all officials that their public stance on nuclear weapons was to be 'the less said the better' (Wittner, One World or None?, 263-74). Analysis of the Stimson article and its rationale is provided in Barton J. Bernstein, 'Seizing the contested terrain of early nuclear history: Stimson, Conant, and their allies explain the decision to use the bomb,' Diplomatic History 17(winter 1993), 35-72.
23. Schaffer, Wings of Judgement, 194.
24. Ibid, 199.
25. Wittner, One World or None?, 274.
26. In January 1952 Truman and the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, nevertheless agreed that no nuclear strike would be launched from bases in Britain without the consent of the British government. David Alan Rosenberg, 'Nuclear war planning,' in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds, The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven CT: Yale University Press 1994), 170.
27. For a discussion of the restraints facing the use of nuclear weapons in early Cold War crises, see John Lewis Caddis, 'The origins of self-deterrence: the United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons, 1945-1958,' in Caddis, ed, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press 1987), 104-46.
28. Emmerson memorandum, 8 November 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS). VII: Korea (Washington DC: Government Printing Office 1976), 1078-9.
29. Quoted in Wittner, One World or None?, 274.
30. 'Memorandum of the discussion of the 13 ist meeting of the National Security Council,' 11 February 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954. xv: Korea, pt 1 (Washington 1976), 769-72.
31. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Chaires About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House 1988), 249.
32. Ibid, 246, 256.
33. Dwight D. Elsenhower, The White House Years: Mandate For Change, 1953-56 (Garden City NY: Doubleday 1965), 477.
34. See 'Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith),' 30 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954. XIII: Indochina, pt 2 (Washington 1982), 1447. The French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, claimed that Dulles offered him two A-bombs for use at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles denied making the gesture. See 'Secretary of State to the Embassy in France,' 9 August 1954, ibid, 1928.
35. See 'Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith),' 30 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954. XIII: Indochina, pt 2 (Washington 1982), 1447. The French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, claimed that Dulles offered him two A-bombs for use at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles denied making the gesture. See 'Secretary of State to the Embassy in France,' 9 August 1954, ibid, 1928.
36. See Dulles's comments to the annual Department of Defense Secretaries' Conference, Quantico, Virginia, as reported in FRUS, 1955-1957. XIX: National Security Policy (Washington 1990), 527.
37. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, 14 June 14, FRUS, 1955-1957. II: The China Area (Washington 1986), 595.
38. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press 1992), 71. Under Elsenhower the National Security Council wrote into national policy that the president should consult with allies before using nuclear weapons - although only if time permitted. See Rosenberg, 'Nuclear war planning,' 170.
39. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press 1992), 71. Under Elsenhower the National Security Council wrote into national policy that the president should consult with allies before using nuclear weapons - although only if time permitted. See Rosenberg, 'Nuclear war planning,' 170.
40. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 280.
41. Ibid, 444-5. As a participant, Bundy provides a cogent analysis and perhaps the best memoir of the crisis to date.
42. Quoted in Schelling, 'The role of nuclear weapons,' 109.
43. These examples are noted in Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence,' 45.
44. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 536, 539-40.
45. Schelling, 'The role of nuclear weapons,' 110. One example of the backlash which such methods can produce involved Chelovek, Tekhnologie, Kapital (CHETEK), an organization reportedly established under the auspices of the USSR'S Ministry of Atomic Energy. During the early 1990s, CHETEK achieved international notoriety when it proposed to destroy Moscow's large chemical weapons arsenal by a series of underground nuclear explosions. Although it was advanced as an efficient and cost-effective means of addressing compliance with a chemical weapons accord, the idea met with considerable scorn, in part because of the 'legitimacy' it might have given to nuclear explosions.
46. One should nevertheless keep in mind that Eisenhower claimed to have opposed the use of atomic weapons against Japan. For a critical review of the evidence, see Barton J. Bernstein, 'Ike and Hiroshima: did he oppose it?' Journal of Strategic Studies 10(September 1987), 337-49.
47. Tannenwald makes a similar point, noting that 'gradually American leaders came to define nuclear use as contrary to Americans' conception of themselves.' This self-image was strongly informed by a belief in the United States as a 'moral country.' See Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence,' 12, 38, 40.
48. For an intriguing discussion of the implications for deterrence in particular and international relations theory in general, see ibid.
49. Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993). A more general discussion of these and other new dangers, from a United States perspective, can be found in Les Aspin, 'From deterrence to de-nuking: dealing with proliferation in the 1990s,' in Senate Armed Services Committee, Shaping Nuclear Policy in the 1990s: A Compendium of Views (Washington DC: Defense Policy Panel, House Armed Services Committee, Committee Print, 17 December 1992), 547-64.
50. Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1993). A more general discussion of these and other new dangers, from a United States perspective, can be found in Les Aspin, 'From deterrence to de-nuking: dealing with proliferation in the 1990s,' in Senate Armed Services Committee, Shaping Nuclear Policy in the 1990s: A Compendium of Views (Washington DC: Defense Policy Panel, House Armed Services Committee, Committee Print, 17 December 1992), 547-64.
51. Schelling, 'The role of nuclear weapons,' 114.
52. Ibid, 114-15.
53. See Price and Tannenwald, 'Norms and deterrence,' 41-3.
54. See T.V. Paul, 'The nuclear taboo,' 706-11.