Regional powers and their strategies: Empire, hegemony, and leadership

Review of International Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 903-930

  Destradi, Sandra ^a  

^a GIGA GERMAN INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL AND AREA STUDIES   (Germany)

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EID: 79952996430     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210510001361     Document Type: Article

References (195)

1. See, for example, Andrew Hurrell, 'Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?', International Affairs, 82 (2006) pp. 1-19; (Pubitemid 43437496)
2. Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, 'The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism', Third World Quarterly, 26 (2005) pp. 1077-95; (Pubitemid 41711537)
3. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst, 'Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities', International Affairs, 82 (2006) pp. 21-40.
4. See, the special issue, 'Globalising the Regional, Regionalising the Global', Review of International Studies, 35, Supplement S1 (2009). On the notion of 'overlay'
5. see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
6. See Detlef Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte, GIGA Working Paper No. 29 (2006), p. 25.
7. See also, David A. Lake, 'Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order', Review of International Studies, 35 (2009) pp. 35-58.
8. On regional order, see Nadine Godehardt and Oliver W. Lembcke, Regionale Ordnungen in politischen Räumen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie regionaler Ordnungen, GIGA Working Paper No. 124 (2010).
9. In using the term 'strategy', I refer to the integration of political, economic, and military aims for the preservation and realisation of states' long-term interests, that is, what is commonly named 'grand strategy' in order to distinguish it from the purely military art of using battles to win a war. See Paul Kennedy, 'Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition', in Paul Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 1-7.
10. 21991), pp. 321-2.
11. See, for example, Daniel Flemes and Detlef Nolte, 'Introduction', in Daniel Flemes (ed.), Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 1-14.
12. See Øyvind Østerud, 'Regional Great Powers', in Iver B. Neumann (ed.), Regional Great Powers in International Politics (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 12;
13. Stefan A. Schirm, 'Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik Brasiliens', Lateinamerika Analysen, 11 (2005), p. 111;
14. Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien, p. 28, for whom the regional power's influence addresses issues such as the geo-political delimitation and politico-normative construction of the region, regional governance structures, and the determination of the regional security agenda;
15. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers;
16. Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge/New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
17. Flemes and Nolte, 'Introduction'.
18. For a more extensive discussion on the contribution by Buzan and Wæver, especially on their differentiation between great powers and regional powers, see the introduction to this special section by Detlef Nolte.
19. A Regional Security Complex is 'a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another'. Regions are therefore conceptualised in terms of security. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. 44.
20. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. 45.
21. In so-called 'standard' RSCs, polarity is wholly defined by regional states; in this context, a unipolar RSC would imply that the region contains only one regional power, but the structure of the RSC would be anarchic anyway. On the contrary, in 'centred' RSCs the regional security dynamics are either unipolar and dominated by a state which is a great power or a superpower or the RSC is integrated by institutions rather than by a single power. See Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, pp. 55-62.
22. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, p. 49.
23. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, p. 49.
24. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, pp. 38-9. Somehow at the opposite end of the spectrum in theorising about regional dynamics there are authors who, in the context of so-called 'new regionalism' approaches, transcend the focus on nation-states and de-emphasise the role of power capabilities in the shaping of regional order, displaying a low degree of interest in 'regional powers' and in the strategies these states pursue.
25. See, for example, the volume edited by Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003).
26. See Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien.
27. See Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien, p. 28. The notion of cooperative hegemony was developed by Pedersen in his analysis of strategies employed by regional powers in promoting regional institutionalisation.
28. See Thomas Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration', Review of International Studies, 28 (2002) pp. 677-96. On p. 683 Pedersen defines cooperative hegemony as '[...] soft rule within and through cooperative arrangements based on a long-term strategy'.
29. Flemes and Nolte, 'Introduction', p. 6.
30. See Maxi Schoeman, 'South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003', in John Daniel, et al. (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004 (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003), pp. 352-3.
31. Schoeman, 'South Africa', pp. 362 and 364.
32. See Schirm, 'Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen', pp. 110-12.
33. Susanne Gratius, Die Auβenpolitik der Regierung Lula: Brasiliens Aufstieg von einer diskreten Regional-zu einer kooperativen Führungsmacht, SWP-Studie S7 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004).
34. See Sean W. Burges, 'Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War', International Relations, 22 (2008) pp. 65-84.
35. Burges, 'Consensual Hegemony', p. 73.
36. See, for example, Alden and Vieira, 'New Diplomacy of the South', p. 1080;
37. Hurrell, 'Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order';
38. Fuller and Arquilla, 'Intractable Problem', p. 610.
39. See Stefan Schirm, 'Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance', European Journal of International Relations, 16 (2010) pp. 197-221;
40. Daniel Flemes and Thorsten Wojczewski, Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, GIGA Working Paper No. 121 (2010).
41. See Pedersen, Cooperative Hegemony, pp. 681-2.
42. See Miriam Prys, What Makes a Regional Hegemon?, Paper presented at ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki (May 2007);
43. Miriam Prys, Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and 'Quiet Diplomacy', GIGA Working Paper No. 77 (2008).
44. See Derrick Frazier and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, 'Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within Regional Security Complexes', European Journal of International Relations, OnlineFirst (21 April 2010). Another approach, deriving from the German Development Institute, defines 'anchor countries' as states that have a particular economic and political influence in their regional context. This influence can be either positive, a sort of 'locomotive function', or negative, spreading stagnation and crises.
45. See Andreas Stamm, Schwellen-und Ankerländer als Akteure einer globalen Partnerschaft, DIE Discussion Papers, 1/2004 (2004), p. 7.
46. See Andrew Hurrell, 'Regional Powers and the Global System from a Historical Perspective', in Daniel Flemes (ed.), Regional Leadership, p. 25.
47. Hurrell, 'One World? Many Worlds?', pp. 140-1.
48. See Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 34.
49. Similar forms of continuum with two poles and hegemony in the middle have been developed by Heinrich Triepel, Die Hegemonie. Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (Stuttgart: Krauthammer, 1938), p. 140;
50. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd edition (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002) [1977], pp. 207-12;
51. Prys, What Makes a Regional Hegemon?, pp. 3-4.
52. For different perspectives on US hegemony or leadership see among many others, Eric Hobsbawm, 'War, Peace and Hegemony at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century', in Chandra Chari (ed.), War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century (London/New York: Routledge 2008), pp. 15-24;
53. Raymond Hinnebusch, 'The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19 (2006) pp. 451-63;
54. Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Recovering American Leadership', Survival, 50 (2008) pp. 55-68.
55. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2000). See also section 2.1.
56. David A. Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?', International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), p. 469.
57. See also, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
58. See Herfried Münkler, 'Staatengemeinschaft oder Imperium - Alternative Ordnungsmodelle bei der Gestaltung von "Weltinnenpolitik" ', in Sabine Jaberg and Peter Schlotter (eds), Imperiale Weltordung - Trend des 21. Jahrhunderts? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 44.
59. See Robert Kagan, 'The Benevolent Empire', Foreign Policy, 111 (1998) pp. 24-35.
60. See among many others, Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2000);
61. Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (London: Hamilton, 2003).
62. For an overview of the debate see for example, G. John Ikenberry, 'Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order', Foreign Affairs, 83 (2004), pp. 144-54;
63. the Forum on American Empire, Review of International Studies, 0 (2004) pp. 583-653;
64. or the Forum in International Studies Perspectives, 9 (2008) pp. 272-330.
65. See Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30;
66. Ingo Take, ' (Schon) "Empire" oder (noch) "Hegemon"? Was uns die Hegemonietheorie über die gegenwärtige US-Politik zu sagen hat', in Sabine Jaberg and Peter Schlotter (eds), Imperiale Weltordnung - Trend des 21. Jahrhunderts? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 116.
67. Doyle, Empires, p. 19.
68. Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, 'Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State', International Organization, 49 (1995), p. 695.
69. See David A. Lake, 'The Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire: A Theoretical Interpretation', in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 34-5.
70. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Rethinking the Sovereign State Model', Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), p. 19.
71. Lake, who suggests that the distinction between empire and other hierarchical relationships between polities should not be based on the analysis of the instruments of control but rather on the degree of control itself, is not able to deliver a clear demarcation or definition of the 'substantial rights of residual control' necessary to establish informal empire. See Lake, 'Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire', pp. 33-6.
72. See David P. Rapkin, 'Empire and its Discontents', New Political Economy, 10 (2005), p. 393.
73. See Take, ' (Schon) "Empire" oder (noch) "Hegemon"?', p. 117.
74. Krasner, 'Rethinking the Sovereign State Model', p. 18.
75. Wendt and Friedheim, 'Hierarchy under Anarchy', p. 697. Ikenberry proposes a similar understanding of what he calls 'highly imperial hegemonic order' (one more example of terminological ambiguity), which is based on the exercise of 'coercive domination' that the subordinate states cannot counter through a strategy of balancing.
76. See G. John Ikenberry, 'American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy', Review of International Studies, 27 (Special Issue) (2001), p. 196.
77. See Herfried Münkler, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft - vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2005), p. 30.
78. Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1975), p. 10.
79. See Rapkin, 'Empire and its Discontents', pp. 398-400.
80. See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 136-40, 144.
81. John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', International Organization, 44 (1990), p. 289.
82. See Rapkin, 'Empire and its Discontents', p. 396.
83. See Münkler, Imperien, pp. 149, 189-200;
84. Rapkin, 'Empire and its Discontents', p. 396;
85. Doyle, Empires, p. 40. For a discussion on authority, legitimacy, and hierarchy
86. see Lake, 'Regional Hierarchy'.
87. For an identification of hegemony with legitimate leadership see just to cite an example, Ian Clark, 'Bringing Hegemony back in: The US and International Order', International Affairs, 85 (2009) pp. 23-36. The undistinguished usage of hegemony and leadership goes back to the theory of hegemonic stability (see section 2.2.1).
88. Hegemony is used as a synonym for empire, among others, by Wallerstein, Politics of the World-Economy, p. 38;
89. Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy', p. 469.
90. See for example, David P. Rapkin, 'The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership', in David P. Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 3-4;
91. Münkler, Imperien, pp. 11-6.
92. See Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere (Torino: Einaudi, 1975).
93. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, p. 1638.
94. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, p. 1576.
95. Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12 (1983), p. 164.
96. See Triepel, Die Hegemonie.
97. Triepel, Die Hegemonie, p. 140.
98. See Triepel, Die Hegemonie, pp. 39-40; 148-9.
99. The idea of self-restraint with reference to hegemony has been adopted by several authors: the role of institutions in signalling strategic restraint is underlined by Andrew Hurrell, 'Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?', International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 5 (2005), p. 173; for an analysis of the difficult situation of hegemonic states in managing a role conflict between their nature as great powers (and the corresponding inclination towards unilateral action) and as 'responsible' hegemons constrained by the roles they have established ('paradox of hegemony')
100. see Bruce Cronin, 'The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the UN', European Journal of International Relations, 7 (2001), p. 105.
101. See Triepel, Die Hegemonie, p. 144.
102. 'Benevolent' and 'coercive' are normative terms. However, since they have marked a broad debate, I will adopt them: 'If it is impossible [...] to purge concepts of their contested appraisive dimension, it is crucial that this dimension be explicitly acknowledged rather than swept under the illusory carpet of objective neutrality' (
103. David P. Rapkin, 'The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership', in David P. Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 4). But what is really of interest for this study is the question of 'whose goals are pursued by the hegemon, its own ones or those of a group of states?' The answer to this question, as we shall see marks the difference between hegemony and leadership.
104. See Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press).
105. See Duncan Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', International Organization, 39 (1985), p. 581.
106. As Kenneth N. Waltz put it in his Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), p. 198: 'The greater the relative size of a unit the more it identifies its own interests with the interests of the system. [...] Units having a large enough stake in the system will act for its sake, even though they pay unduly in doing so'.
107. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
108. See Snidal, 'Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', p. 587.
109. See Snidal, 'Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory';
110. Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy'.
111. Snidal, 'Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', p. 614.
112. See Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy', pp. 460-2, 469-78.
113. Lake, 'Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy', p. 469.
114. See Margit Bussmann and John R. Oneal, 'Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? A Test of Power-Transition Theory', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (2007), p. 89.
115. Robert W. Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony (1977) ', in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds), Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 421.
116. See John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', in David P. Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 50-1.
117. Gilpin, War and Change, p. 29.
118. Gilpin, War and Change, p. 31.
119. Gilpin, War and Change, p. 36.
120. See the article by Dirk Nabers in this special section.
121. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 286.
122. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', p. 171.
123. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 287.
124. See Cronin, 'Paradox of Hegemony', p. 112;
125. Hurrell, 'Pax Americana', pp. 172-3;
126. Andrew Hurrell, Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas, Global Law Working Paper 05 (2004);
127. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', pp. 285-6.
128. Hurrell, 'Hegemony and Regional Governance', p. xxix.
129. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 55.
130. See Snidal, 'Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', p. 614;
131. Jonathan Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (London/New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), p. 129;
132. Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony', p. 682.
133. Ikenberry argues that three kinds of hegemonic order exist: the first corresponds to what I have defined as empire, since it is based on coercive domination; the second displays a certain, sometimes minimal, convergence of interests and is held together by the provision of useful services to subordinate states (security protection and access to the hegemon's market); the third, defined as 'open hegemony', is more benevolent and acceptable to subordinate states, since the hegemon's power is restrained by rules and institutions.
134. See Ikenberry, 'American Power', pp. 196-7.
135. In his article on 'Cooperative Hegemony', on p. 682-3, Pedersen distinguishes four possible strategies for regional powers: unilateral hegemon (strong realist element and low institutionalisation), cooperative hegemon (soft rule and high degree of institutionalisation), empire (strong realist element and high level of institutionalisation), and concert (division of privileges and responsibilities among a group of great regional powers). In his model of cooperative hegemony, on p. 686 Pedersen identifies two further ideal types: The offensive type is centred around the realisation of advantages of scale (access to markets in the region), advantages of inclusion (access to raw materials), and advantages of diffusion (propagation of the hegemon's ideas). The defensive type of cooperative hegemony, in contrast, primarily aims to stabilise the system. Hurrell identifies three models for the hegemonic diffusion of norms and values: 'progressive enmeshment' (developed by liberalism), based on emulation, learning, and normative persuasion; 'hegemonic imposition' (developed by neo-realism and neo-dependency theories), based on coercion and, as the name says, imposition; and 'coercive socialization', an intermediate model combining coercion and consensus to induce the incorporation and internalisation of the hegemon's ideas, norms, and practices.
136. See Hurrell, 'Hegemony and Regional Governance', pp. xxv-xxvi. Other classifications of hegemony relate, for example, to the actors exercising it (collective, singular, coalitional hegemony).
137. See Clark, 'Bringing Hegemony back in'.
138. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power' and 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power'.
139. Wendt and Friedheim, 'Hierarchy under Anarchy', p. 700.
140. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 56.
141. See Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony', p. 682.
142. Thomas Pedersen, 'State Strategies and Informal Leadership in European Integration: Implications for Denmark', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 91.
143. Thomas Pedersen, 'State Strategies and Informal Leadership in European Integration: Implications for Denmark', in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 91.
144. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 287.
145. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 287.
146. See Pedersen, 'State Strategies and Informal Leadership', p. 91.
147. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 287.
148. Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 7.
149. Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 8.
150. In this case, I will not follow Knorr, who argues that 'Noncoercive influence, no matter how one-sided, can bring about leadership but not hegemonial supremacy'.
151. (Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 24).
152. Since what I have identified as the prominent feature of leadership is the pursuit of common interests and goals (in contrast to the 'one-sidedness' of hegemony), I believe that one-sided non-coercive influence should be subsumed under hegemony, thereby admitting the existence of a cooperative, 'soft' form of hegemony. In his book, Knorr himself later emphasises that the essential features of leadership are non-coercive influence and the 'mutual flow of benefits', thereby excluding the hypothesis of one-sidedness for leadership.
153. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 57.
154. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 57.
155. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 290.
156. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 57.
157. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', pp. 290-2;
158. 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', pp. 57-8, 65-8.
159. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 58.
160. Of course the distinction between these three forms of hegemony is ideal-typical and tentative: in reality dominant states most probably follow strategies lying somewhere between the three kinds outlined above. What will be relevant for analysis, therefore, is a 'prevalence' in the use of coercive/threatening, coopting/rewarding/inducing, or convincing/persuading means.
161. For a critique of this aspect of the theory of hegemonic stability see Jarrod Wiener, Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT: A Study of International Leadership (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995).
162. For an overview on this early literature see Glenn D. Paige, The Scientific Study of Political Leadership (New York, NY/London: The Free Press, 1977), especially chap. 3;
163. Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York, NY/London: The Free Press, 1974);
164. George R. Goethals, Georgia J. Sorenson and MacGregor James Burns (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2004);
165. Peter G. Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997).
166. For an overview, see Northouse, Leadership, pp. 32-73.
167. See James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1978).
168. See Northouse, Leadership, pp. 130-58.
169. Goethals, Sorenson and Burns (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, p. 870.
170. Northouse, Leadership, p. 3.
171. Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 311.
172. Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 311.
173. Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 311.
174. Oran R. Young, 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society', International Organization, 45 (1991), p. 285.
175. On the distinction between 'transactional' and 'transformational' leadership see Goethals, Sorenson and Burns (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, p. 870. The focus on a commonality of gains between leaders and followers could be misleading in defining leadership: in fact, a state following an intermediate - or soft - hegemony strategy might also reap joint gains with its subordinates. As the theory of hegemonic stability tells us, subordinate states take advantage of the collective goods provided by the hegemon - and gain even more than the hegemon itself since they act as free riders. But this does not necessarily mean that they willingly follow the leader in the effort to reach common goals.
176. The theory of hegemonic stability, for example, is focused on the capabilities possessed by the hegemonic power and on the provision of public goods. In this context, the secondary states are merely taken into consideration as free riders or, as Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal point out, 'to ascertain that such states do not possess attributes of power quite like the hegemon and, therefore, can be safely ruled out as "contenders" or "challengers" to the leading state'.
177. See Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, 'Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict', Political Science Quarterly, 106 (1991), p. 394.
178. See Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow?', p. 399.
179. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow?', p. 408. For an interesting analysis on the responses by small regional states to the power of the dominant states (regionally and globally)
180. see Amitav Acharya, 'The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics', World Politics, 59 (2007) pp. 629-52.
181. See also, Schirm, 'Leaders in Need of Followers'.
182. See Jarrod Wiener, 'Hegemonic Leadership: Naked Emperor or the Worship of False Gods?' European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1995) pp. 219-43.
183. Burns, Leadership, p. 19.
184. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Legitimation of Hegemonic Power', p. 57.
185. Instead of endogenous 'learning' we should, however, talk about endogenous 'adaptation'. Learning implies an active, conscious process, while in this case we are dealing with an almost automatic and unconscious reaction to a given situation or context.
186. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow?', p. 398.
187. Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony', p. 683.
188. See Robert C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia, Mo/London: University of Missouri Press, 1981), pp. 15-8.
189. Tucker, Politics as Leadership, p. 15.
190. Wiener, 'Hegemonic Leadership', p. 223.
191. See for example, Wiener, 'Hegemonic Leadership', pp. 225-6;
192. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow?', p. 398;
193. David P. Rapkin, 'Japan and World Leadership?', in David P. Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 196.
194. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 'Bound to Follow?', p. 398.
195. See Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony', p. 683.