The new diplomacy of the south: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 26, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 1077-1095

  Alden, Chris ^a   Vieira, Marco Antonio ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING WORLD; DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; FOREIGN POLICY; TERRORISM;

AFRICA; ASIA; BRAZIL; EURASIA; INDIA; SOUTH AFRICA; SOUTH AMERICA; SOUTH ASIA; SOUTHERN AFRICA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA;

EID: 28244446676     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436590500235678     Document Type: Review

References (76)

1. L Gruber, Ruling the World: Politics and the Rise of Supernational Institutions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000, p 4.
2. See, for example, D Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Powers in International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967;
3. and M Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, London: Macmillan, 1972.
4. A Cooper, R Higgott & K Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993, pp 24-25.
5. Ibid, p 19.
6. Ibid, pp 20-21.
7. In addition to ibid, see C Pratt (ed), Internationalism Under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
8. Cooper et al, Relocating Middle Powers; and A Cooper, J English & R Thakur (eds), Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002.
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12. A Knight, A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p 96.
13. R Biel, The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradictions in North/South Relations, London: Zed, 2000, p 121.
14. These efforts all build upon the seminal work of the Brandt Commission in 1980.
15. South Commission, The Challenge of the South: The Report of the South Commission, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
16. B Urquhart & E Childers, Towards a More Effective United Nations, Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1992;
17. Urquhart & Childers, Renewing the United Nations System, Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1994.
18. J Joffe, 'How America does it', Foreign Affairs, 76(5), 1997, p 21.
19. See J Garten, The Big Ten: The Ten Emerging Markets and How they will Change our Lives, New York: Basic Books, 1997.
20. See R Rosecrance (ed), The New Great Power Coalition; Toward a World Concert of Nations, Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, pp 311-364.
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22. See I Taylor, Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.
23. South Africa's claim of regional leadership is based upon its economic, military and population supremacy over its neighbours in southern Africa. Economically South Africa's GDP of US$113 billion is much larger than that of all the other southern African countries combined. On the military side the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has 55750 active military personnel, and 70 000 reservists, while countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana have 29 000 and 9000, respectively. IMF website; UNDP reports; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
24. A de Waal, 'What's new in the New Partnership for Africa's Development?', International Affairs, 78(3), 2002, pp 463-475.
25. The fact that Nigeria participated in this process as well, striking a different note on the contentious issue of Zimbabwe, for example, highlights the continuing inability of South Africa to exercise hegemonic influence over the continent, despite claims by some analysts of a 'Pretoria-Abuja Axis'. A Adebajo & C Landsberg, 'Obasanjo, Mbcki as thick as thieves', Mail and Guardian, 13-19 February 2004.
26. S Hanival & D van Seventer, Trade and Industrial Policy (TIPS), 'Manufacturing lifts SA exports', Business Day, 28 October 2003.
27. Department of Trade and Industry, 'Industrial Strategy for the Republic of South Africa', at www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/discuss/industrat2/pdf, p 15.
28. J Daniel, V Naidoo & S Naidu, The South Africans have arrived: post-apartheid corporate expansion into Africa', in J Daniel et al (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa, 2003-2004, Pretoria: HSRC, 2003, pp 368-389.
29. R Suttner, 'A brief review of South Africa's foreign policy since 1994', Umrabulo, 4th quarter, 1996;
30. and M Rupiyah, 'Eight years of tension, misperception and dependence from April 1994 to December 2002: Zimbabwe-South Africa Foreign Relations: a Zimbabwean perspective', Turkish Journal of International Relations, 1(4), 2002, at www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number4/rupiya.htm.
31. See also the interviews in 'South African Left discusses the way forward', Green Left Weekly, at www.grecnleft.org.au/back/2000/431/431p16.htm.
32. See, for example, the public critique of government policy (including NEPAD) by Z Vavi, General Secretary of COSATU, 'We still lack a common vision on development', Business Report, 12 October 2004.
33. L Nathan, The absence of common values and the failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2002', Working Paper No 50, Crisis States Programme, London School of Economics, p 3.
34. Daniel et al, 'The South Africans have arrived'.
35. Although NEPAD is already more than three years old, it is still not well known or understood in many parts of Africa. Some leaders go to continental or regional meetings on NEPAD, but then fail to speak about it to their own citizens once they return home. Few African parliaments have discussed the plan in any detail.
36. J Hamill & D Lee, 'A middle power paradox? South African diplomacy in the post-apartheid era', International Relations, XV(4), p 51.
37. 2, and represents nearly half South America's overall population. It has the largest military, with 287600 active military staff and another 1 115000 trained reservists. In 2003 Brazilian GDP was US$497.85 billion, while Argentina's, the second largest economy in South America, was $129.74 billion. IMF website; UNDP reports; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.
38. Ibid.
39. R Ricupero, Visions of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1995, pp 325-326.
40. For example, the disputes over the region of Palmas with Argentina in 1895, and the Acre Issue with Bolivia in 1903.
41. V Bulmer-Thomas (ed), Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism, London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001.
42. B Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
43. MRS de Lima, 'Foreign policy analytical approaches: the Brazilian case', in R Russel (ed), Theoretical and Methodological Approaches for the Study of Foreign Policy, Buenos Aires: GEL, 1992.
44. 'Brazil's foreign policy: a giant stirs, The Economist, 12 June 2004, pp 52-53.
45. MA Vieira, 'Ideas and institutions: a reflection on the Brazilian foreign policy in the early 1990s', Contexto International, 23(2), 2001, pp 245-293.
46. Using Ricupero's terminology, it could be defined as a third axis of foreign policy action and thus the first clear policy outcome resulting from a new interpretation of the post-cold war international environment.
47. 'Empresarios atacam politica do governo', O Estado de Sao Paulo, 5 October 2004.
48. Ibid.
49. 2 and a population of over one billion. Economically India has a vibrant internal market and a highly skilled working force. Its GDP in 2003 was US$477.3 billion. In military terms India has 1 325 000 active military staff and another 535 000 as reserve forces. It is a nuclear power and is in the process of developing ICBMS. UNDP, Human Development Report, 2003;
50. and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance.
51. N Jetly, India's Foreign Policy: Challenges and Prospects, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1999, esp ch 3;
52. and KN Jha, Domestic Imperatives in India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2002, p 132.
53. The Cold War actually became 'hot' in the three rounds of Indo-Pakistani wars in 1948, 1964-65 and 1971.
54. BR Naya & TV Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 2.
55. RW Brandock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971, London: Pinter, 1990, p 27.
56. For an account of the decline of the Congress Party, see R Hardgrave & S Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, New York: Harcourt-Brace, 2000, pp 244-286.
57. S Dutt, 'Identities and the Indian state: an overview', Third World Quarterly, 19(3), pp 413-414.
58. On SAARC, see P Ghosh, Co-operation and Contact in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 1989.
59. Hardgrave & Kochanck, India, pp 431-432.
60. K Sridharan, 'Commercial diplomacy and statecraft in the context of economic reform: the Indian experience', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13(2), 2002, pp 64-67.
61. BR Nayar, Globalisation and Nationalism: The Changing Balance in India's Economic Policy, 1950-2000, New Delhi: Sage 2001, pp 223-258.
62. Cited in Nayar, Globalisation and Nationalism, p 251.
63. See also Brandock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971, p 23.
64. Hardgrave & Kochanek, India, pp 413-414.
65. India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum: New Delhi Agenda for Co-operation, Joint Communiqué on IBSA, New Delhi, 5 March 2004.
66. L White, 'IBSA: South-South co-operation with a difference?', Global Insight (Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa), 36, 2004, pp 1-2.
67. South Africa has equivocated on this position recently, although it is likely that this has more to do with positioning between other African rivals than with a lack of interest in the post.
68. Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders', p 115, emphasis added.
69. A Cooper, The making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: a case of complex multilateralism', International Studies Perspectives, 5(1), 2004.
70. Joffe, 'How America does it', p 21.
71. R Rothstein, 'Regime-creation by a coalition of the weak: lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities', International Studies Quarterly, 28, 1984, pp 311-312.
72. AW Singham & S Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, London: Zed, 1986, pp 229-230;
73. and Rothstein, 'Regime-creation by a coalition of the weak', p 318.
74. Rothstein, 'Regime-creation by a coalition of the weak', p 320.
75. M Stern & C Stevens, 'FTAS with India and Brazil: an initial analysis', Working Paper No 10, Johannesburg: TIPS, 2000, p 21.
76. See C Alden & G Freer, 'La tentation du grand large: 1'Indian Ocean Rim', Afrique Contemporaine, 184, 1997, pp 199-207.