An impossible game: Stable nuclear deterrence after the indian and pakistani tests

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 11-24

  Carranza, Mario E ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY KINGSVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952931022     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736709908436761     Document Type: Article

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