Less is more: Command and control advantages of minor nuclear states

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 50-92

  Seng, Jordan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0008569668     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429322     Document Type: Article

References (156)

1. There are numerous sources for the study of the spread of nuclear weapons around the globe, many of them focusing on nuclear weapons development in what I call in this essay "minor" nuclear proliferators. For a general introduction to the phenomenon, see Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder: Westview, 1990).
2. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
3. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
4. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
5. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
6. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
7. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
8. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
9. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
10. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
11. The most important optimistic appraisals of proliferators' command-and-control potentials are those of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). Although there are a number of optimistic appraisals of the strategic potentials of nuclear proliferation, it is rare that proliferation optimists address issues of command and control at any length (for examples, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 [June 1982]: 283-306; Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [New York: Free Press, 1993]). Some qualified optimists, like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, peripherally touch upon issues of nuclear command and control only to moderate their optimistic claims: nuclear proliferation will prove strategically stable, they argue, provided it is "well-managed." See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (summer 1993): 50-66. See also Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 7-57. Other, regionally-oriented optimists, have offered favorable appraisals of selective elements of nuclear command and control within specific nuclear proliferators. See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Peter R. Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994): 79-109. For a discussion of the various schools of thought on proliferation, see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
12. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 21.
13. Important cold-war studies of the challenges and techniques of American control systems include Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Ashton B. Carter, "Assessing Command System Vulnerability," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987): 560-73; John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, no. 45 (winter, 1981/82): 16-28; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
14. Important cold-war studies of the challenges and techniques of American control systems include Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Ashton B. Carter, "Assessing Command System Vulnerability," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987): 560-73; John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, no. 45 (winter, 1981/82): 16-28; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
15. Important cold-war studies of the challenges and techniques of American control systems include Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Ashton B. Carter, "Assessing Command System Vulnerability," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987): 560-73; John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, no. 45 (winter, 1981/82): 16-28; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
16. Important cold-war studies of the challenges and techniques of American control systems include Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Ashton B. Carter, "Assessing Command System Vulnerability," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987): 560-73; John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, no. 45 (winter, 1981/82): 16-28; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
17. Important cold-war studies of the challenges and techniques of American control systems include Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Ashton B. Carter, "Assessing Command System Vulnerability," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987): 560-73; John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, no. 45 (winter, 1981/82): 16-28; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
18. See Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 4; and Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper no. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991); Gregory F. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2, (spring 1993): 173-86; Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, (summer 1993): 67-80; and Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival 35, no. 3 (autumn 1993): 137-53.
19. See Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 4; and Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper no. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991); Gregory F. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2, (spring 1993): 173-86; Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, (summer 1993): 67-80; and Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival 35, no. 3 (autumn 1993): 137-53.
20. See Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 4; and Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper no. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991); Gregory F. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2, (spring 1993): 173-86; Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, (summer 1993): 67-80; and Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival 35, no. 3 (autumn 1993): 137-53.
21. See Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 4; and Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper no. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991); Gregory F. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2, (spring 1993): 173-86; Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, (summer 1993): 67-80; and Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival 35, no. 3 (autumn 1993): 137-53.
22. See Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 4; and Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper no. 263 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991); Gregory F. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2, (spring 1993): 173-86; Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, (summer 1993): 67-80; and Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival 35, no. 3 (autumn 1993): 137-53.
23. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
24. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
25. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
26. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
27. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
28. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
29. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993). For a discussion which locates these three books within the history of the central debates on nuclear issues, see Bradley A. Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93; and the authors' responses in the same issue: Blair, "Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence" (494-500); Feaver, "The Politics of Inadvertence" (501-8); and Sagan, "Organized for Accident" (509-20).
30. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon, chs. 2 and 4; Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, nos. 3/4 (spring /summer 1993): 159-91.
31. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon, chs. 2 and 4; Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, nos. 3/4 (spring /summer 1993): 159-91.
32. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon, chs. 2 and 4; Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, nos. 3/4 (spring /summer 1993): 159-91.
33. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon, chs. 2 and 4; Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, nos. 3/4 (spring /summer 1993): 159-91.
34. See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; also Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent." See also Van Evera, "Primed for Peace."
35. See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; also Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent." See also Van Evera, "Primed for Peace."
36. See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; also Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent." See also Van Evera, "Primed for Peace."
37. See, for examples, Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence; also Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia."
38. See, for examples, Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence; also Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia."
39. Although the arguments presented here are more theoretical and generalizable than those based on specific and narrow historical cases, I have benefited from extensive region-specific analyses. Some of the better ones include: Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20, no. 3 (winter 1995/96): 79-114; George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy, no. 91 (summer 1993): 85-104; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13.
40. Although the arguments presented here are more theoretical and generalizable than those based on specific and narrow historical cases, I have benefited from extensive region-specific analyses. Some of the better ones include: Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20, no. 3 (winter 1995/96): 79-114; George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy, no. 91 (summer 1993): 85-104; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13.
41. Although the arguments presented here are more theoretical and generalizable than those based on specific and narrow historical cases, I have benefited from extensive region-specific analyses. Some of the better ones include: Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20, no. 3 (winter 1995/96): 79-114; George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy, no. 91 (summer 1993): 85-104; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13.
42. In a recent article, David J. Karl also has argued that analysts' focus on similarities between proliferators and the superpowers misses the point. See Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/7): 87-119. Karl's analysis dwells mostly on the misapplication of broad superpower-centric deterrence models to emerging nuclear scenarios, and does not exclusively address itself to issues of command and control. His argument and mine, though, do share several important insights. I will note our agreements and disagreements throughout this essay.
43. For discussion of the terms and conceptualizations of positive and negative control, see John D. Steinbruner, "Choices and Tradeoffs," in Carter, Steinbruner and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, 539.
44. See Feaver's Guarding the Guardians, chap. 1, esp. 12-21.
45. Feaver conceptualizes the tension between peripheral launch capability and central control in terms of an antagonism between delegative control and assertive control (see Guarding the Guardians, 3-12). Political leaders can delegate launch authority to peripheral commanders, thereby maximize automaticity, or they can assert direct control over weapons' launch, thereby maximize central control and caution. I have chosen not to use Feaver's terminology here because I wish to distinguish the periphery-center tension from Feaver's discussion of civilian-military rivalries. In Feaver's description of U.S. command-and-control history, central control is equated with civilian assertiveness, and peripheral launch capability is equated with de facto military control of nuclear weapons. Although this is probably a good characterization of the United States, the tension between peripheral launch capability and central control will obtain regardless of whether it has a civilian vs. military aspect to it. Nevertheless, Feaver's discussion of general center-periphery dynamics is the most extensive to date. The discussion in this essay is informed by it, and I will make extensive mention of it in later sections.
46. The seminal text on the dynamics of organizational routines is James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Among proliferation analysts, Sagan applies such standard organizational theory most directly. See esp. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, and Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2.
47. The seminal text on the dynamics of organizational routines is James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Among proliferation analysts, Sagan applies such standard organizational theory most directly. See esp. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, and Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2.
48. The seminal text on the dynamics of organizational routines is James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1993). Among proliferation analysts, Sagan applies such standard organizational theory most directly. See esp. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, and Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2.
49. For descriptions of the design and history of PALs and related devices, see Robert S. Morris and William Arkin, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control features," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47 (October 1991): 48-49; and Peter Stein and Peter D. Feaver, "Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links," CSIA Occasional Paper no. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1987).
50. For descriptions of the design and history of PALs and related devices, see Robert S. Morris and William Arkin, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control features," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47 (October 1991): 48-49; and Peter Stein and Peter D. Feaver, "Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links," CSIA Occasional Paper no. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1987).
51. For a good description of what is known about the U.S. chain of command, see Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, chap. 2.
52. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, 72.
53. On the dangers and dynamics of decapitation strikes, see Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation"; and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strategic Command and Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers and Remedies," Orbis 4 (winter 1983): 941-63.
54. On the dangers and dynamics of decapitation strikes, see Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation"; and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strategic Command and Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers and Remedies," Orbis 4 (winter 1983): 941-63.
55. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, 72.
56. Organizational theorist Charles Perrow invented the term "tight coupling" to describe situations in which production sequences were highly time-critical, procedurally invariant, and thus dangerously inflexible (see Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies [New York: Basic Books, 1984]). Sagan draws heavily on Perrow's work and terminology in his assessment of SOP inflexibility in command and control. With regard to procedural inflexibility among proliferators, see Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2, 75-78, and 80-83.
57. Organizational theorist Charles Perrow invented the term "tight coupling" to describe situations in which production sequences were highly time-critical, procedurally invariant, and thus dangerously inflexible (see Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies [New York: Basic Books, 1984]). Sagan draws heavily on Perrow's work and terminology in his assessment of SOP inflexibility in command and control. With regard to procedural inflexibility among proliferators, see Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2, 75-78, and 80-83.
58. See Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations."
59. Sagan has done the most to advance this outlook. See his discussion in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 1.
60. See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107. See also Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security 9, no.1 (summer 1984): 108-46.
61. See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107. See also Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security 9, no.1 (summer 1984): 108-46.
62. See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107. See also Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security 9, no.1 (summer 1984): 108-46.
63. See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107. See also Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security 9, no.1 (summer 1984): 108-46.
64. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 82.
65. See Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation."
66. See Lewis A. Dunn, "Military Politics, Nuclear Proliferation, and the 'Nuclear Coup d'état'," Journal of Strategic Studies 1, no. 1 (May 1978): 31-50.
67. Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," 73.
68. Ibid.
69. Sagan seems mostly concerned that organizational oversights will result in neglect of weapons' safety features - poor storage patterns, poor supervision at nuclear sites, etc. These safety factors, however, are also security concerns; for instance, poor supervision of personnel at nuclear storage sites may allow them to get away with unsafe practices, but it may also facilitate illicit activities. See Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 80-85.
70. See Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 180-83; and Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), 290-91.
71. See Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 180-83; and Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), 290-91.
72. Mitchell Reiss reports that U.S. State Department officials estimate India has no more than twenty to twenty-five weapons, and that it might have enough fissile material for fifty weapons by the year 2000. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 185.
73. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 145.
74. I am not alone in making this observation, though even optimistic analysts tend not to explore in depth the reasons which explain size restrictions on minor states' arsenals. Waltz provides a good example (see Waltz, More May be Better, and Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 1).
75. I am not alone in making this observation, though even optimistic analysts tend not to explore in depth the reasons which explain size restrictions on minor states' arsenals. Waltz provides a good example (see Waltz, More May be Better, and Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 1).
76. See Leonard S. Spector, "Repentant Nuclear Proliferators," Foreign Policy, no. 88 (fall 1992): 3-20.
77. See Daniel Poneman, "Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina," Orbis 27, no. 4 (May 1991): 853-80. See also Itty Abraham, Pakistan-India and Argentina-Brazil: Stepping Back from the Nuclear Threshold, Occasional Paper no. 15 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Institute, 1993).
78. See Daniel Poneman, "Nuclear Proliferation Prospects for Argentina," Orbis 27, no. 4 (May 1991): 853-80. See also Itty Abraham, Pakistan-India and Argentina-Brazil: Stepping Back from the Nuclear Threshold, Occasional Paper no. 15 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Institute, 1993).
79. See Abraham, Stepping Back from the Nuclear Threshold.
80. See "Between the Bomb and a Hard Place," Economist, 25 March 1995, 23-25.
81. Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia." For similar arguments with respect to India, see Amitabh Mattoo, "India's Nuclear Status Quo," Survival 38, no. 3 (autumn 1996): 41-57.
82. Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia." For similar arguments with respect to India, see Amitabh Mattoo, "India's Nuclear Status Quo," Survival 38, no. 3 (autumn 1996): 41-57.
83. Hersh, The Samson Option, chap. 10.
84. For a full discussion of nuclear weapons development and military budgetary increases, see my "Nuclear Deterrence Advantages of Minor States" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1997).
85. For similar points on arsenal size restrictions cum counterforce restrictions, see Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
86. Examples include, most notably, Waltz (see More May Be Better), and McGeorge Bundy (see "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences," in The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, ed. Douglas MacLean [Totowa, N.J.: Roman and Allanheld, 1984]: 3-13).
87. Examples include, most notably, Waltz (see More May Be Better), and McGeorge Bundy (see "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences," in The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, ed. Douglas MacLean [Totowa, N.J.: Roman and Allanheld, 1984]: 3-13).
88. See, for example, Brahma Chellaney, "International Implications of the U.S. Counterproliferation Initiative: A View from India," in International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Harold Mueller (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995): 128-29.
89. Hersh, The Samson Option, 127-31.
90. The term "opaque proliferation" was coined by Benjamin Frankel in his "Notes on the Nuclear Underworld," The National Interest, no. 9 (fall 1987): 122-26. For the first full discussion of the characteristics of opaque proliferation, see Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (September 1990): 14-45.
91. The term "opaque proliferation" was coined by Benjamin Frankel in his "Notes on the Nuclear Underworld," The National Interest, no. 9 (fall 1987): 122-26. For the first full discussion of the characteristics of opaque proliferation, see Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 3 (September 1990): 14-45.
92. Thayer made a similar point about the effect of the lack of early warning technologies. See Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence" 450.
93. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 19. See also David M. Rosenbaum, "Nuclear Terror," International Security 1, no. 3 (winter 1977): 140-61; Thomas C. Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," International Security 6. no. 4 (spring 1982): 61-77.
94. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 19. See also David M. Rosenbaum, "Nuclear Terror," International Security 1, no. 3 (winter 1977): 140-61; Thomas C. Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," International Security 6. no. 4 (spring 1982): 61-77.
95. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 19. See also David M. Rosenbaum, "Nuclear Terror," International Security 1, no. 3 (winter 1977): 140-61; Thomas C. Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," International Security 6. no. 4 (spring 1982): 61-77.
96. See "Private Ventures Hope for Profits on Spy Satellites," New York Times, 10 February 1997, 1, 12.
97. See U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 226.
98. Hersh, The Samson Option, esp. chap. 4.
99. David A. Fulghum and Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Israeli Missile Base Hidden in Hill," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 November 1993 (cited in Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence," 474).
100. David A. Fulghum and Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Israeli Missile Base Hidden in Hill," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 November 1993 (cited in Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence," 474).
101. For a rundown of missile capabilities among proliferators and potential proliferators, see Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2.
102. For relevant analysis of delivery capabilities and ranges, see Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull," in New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World, Aspen Study Group (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990): 35-65.
103. For a discussion of the merits of mobile missile basing in the United States, see Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track?: An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security 13, no. 3 (winter 1988/89): 113-41.
104. See Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 67-68.
105. Ibid., 68.
106. On the notion of "organizational essence," see Morton H. Halperin, The Bureaucratic Politics of Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993), 28-29.
107. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 52-53.
108. Feaver's initial and most complete expression of the dynamics of launch delegation is in Guarding the Guardians, chap. 3. For his application of the logic to emerging nuclear scenarios, see "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations."
109. Feaver's initial and most complete expression of the dynamics of launch delegation is in Guarding the Guardians, chap. 3. For his application of the logic to emerging nuclear scenarios, see "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations."
110. This view can be deduced from Feaver's theoretical treatment of delegation in Guarding the Guardians, and it is sketched out in later work on proliferation scenarios (see both "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations" and "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations").
111. This view can be deduced from Feaver's theoretical treatment of delegation in Guarding the Guardians, and it is sketched out in later work on proliferation scenarios (see both "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations" and "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations").
112. For a good example, see Mitchell Reiss's description of South Africa's short-lived nuclear-use doctrine in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 2.
113. See Perrow, Normal Accidents.
114. Feaver has recognized the important role that technological flexibility played in the integration of nuclear options into the various military branches and units in the United States (Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, chap. 7, esp. 150).
115. See Edmund Beard, Developing tht ICBM (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
116. Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), chap. 1.
117. Ibid.
118. See, for example, Feaver's "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," esp. 170-71. See also Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations."
119. See, for example, Feaver's "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," esp. 170-71. See also Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations."
120. See Yair Evron, "Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case," in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 46-47.
121. See Cohen and Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East."
122. See Mattoo, "India's Nuclear Status Quo."
123. See Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 2.
124. See Waltz, More May Be Better; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 1; and Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
125. See Waltz, More May Be Better; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 1; and Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
126. See Waltz, More May Be Better; Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 1; and Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers."
127. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 10.
128. See, for example, Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), 25-32. See also Sagan's comments in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 84-85.
129. See, for example, Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), 25-32. See also Sagan's comments in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 84-85.
130. For a good example, see Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals." See also Sagan's comments in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2.
131. For a good example, see Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals." See also Sagan's comments in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, chap. 2.
132. See Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," 175-78.
133. Ibid., 177.
134. Ibid., 178.
135. See Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," 116.
136. See especially Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia"; and Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia."
137. See especially Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia"; and Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia."
138. See Hersh, The Samson Option, chap. 9; and Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2.
139. See Hersh, The Samson Option, chap. 9; and Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2.
140. On South Africa's nuclear use plans, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 2.
141. See Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations."
142. Hersh, The Samson Option, chap. 17.
143. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," 177.
144. There are some suggestive studies of nuclear decision making in opaque proliferators, though it is understandably difficult for analysis to be definitive. For examples see Mattoo, "India's Nuclear Status Quo"; and Cohen and Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East."
145. There are some suggestive studies of nuclear decision making in opaque proliferators, though it is understandably difficult for analysis to be definitive. For examples see Mattoo, "India's Nuclear Status Quo"; and Cohen and Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East."
146. For discussions of the notion and strategy of "nuclear assistance," see Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?" International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996): 209-34; Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals"; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent."
147. For discussions of the notion and strategy of "nuclear assistance," see Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?" International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996): 209-34; Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals"; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent."
148. For discussions of the notion and strategy of "nuclear assistance," see Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?" International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996): 209-34; Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals"; and Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent."
149. For an interesting discussion of some of the legal tensions involved, see Giles, "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals," 180-82.
150. Feaver and Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation," 210.
151. On the notion of fissile material cutoffs, see Brian G. Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones, The Proposed Fissile-Material Production Cutoff (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995).
152. For a good discussion of the "capping strategy," the battle in Washington and challenges in New Delhi, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 202-6.
153. For representative discussions of the effect of missile proliferation in nuclear regions, see Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2; also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 5, 194-47; Uzi Rubin, "How Much Does Ballistic Missile Proliferation Matter?" Orbis 35, no. 1 (winter 1991): 29-39; and W. Seth Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability, Research Memorandum no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1988).
154. For representative discussions of the effect of missile proliferation in nuclear regions, see Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2; also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 5, 194-47; Uzi Rubin, "How Much Does Ballistic Missile Proliferation Matter?" Orbis 35, no. 1 (winter 1991): 29-39; and W. Seth Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability, Research Memorandum no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1988).
155. For representative discussions of the effect of missile proliferation in nuclear regions, see Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2; also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 5, 194-47; Uzi Rubin, "How Much Does Ballistic Missile Proliferation Matter?" Orbis 35, no. 1 (winter 1991): 29-39; and W. Seth Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability, Research Memorandum no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1988).
156. For representative discussions of the effect of missile proliferation in nuclear regions, see Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, chap. 2; also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chap. 5, 194-47; Uzi Rubin, "How Much Does Ballistic Missile Proliferation Matter?" Orbis 35, no. 1 (winter 1991): 29-39; and W. Seth Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability, Research Memorandum no. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1988).