Neooptimists and the enduring problem of nuclear proliferation

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 93-125

  Feaver, Peter D ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 5644243055     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429323     Document Type: Article

References (143)

1. David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Jordan Seng, "Less Is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 49-91. One may also include Bradley Thayer as a fellow-traveler, although his conclusions about command and control in emerging nuclear nations are considerably more guarded, if not somewhat pessimistic. See Bradley Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93.
2. David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Jordan Seng, "Less Is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 49-91. One may also include Bradley Thayer as a fellow-traveler, although his conclusions about command and control in emerging nuclear nations are considerably more guarded, if not somewhat pessimistic. See Bradley Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93.
3. David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97): 87-119; Jordan Seng, "Less Is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 49-91. One may also include Bradley Thayer as a fellow-traveler, although his conclusions about command and control in emerging nuclear nations are considerably more guarded, if not somewhat pessimistic. See Bradley Thayer, "The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 428-93.
4. Thus the "original" pessimists would include Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage, 1984). The debate, in fact, is much older, as is explained in Peter Lavoy's excellent review of the literature: Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
5. Thus the "original" pessimists would include Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage, 1984). The debate, in fact, is much older, as is explained in Peter Lavoy's excellent review of the literature: Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
6. Thus the "original" pessimists would include Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage, 1984). The debate, in fact, is much older, as is explained in Peter Lavoy's excellent review of the literature: Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 695-753.
7. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45. As Lavoy demonstrated, Waltz's argument was largely derivative of the work of an earlier generation of strategic analysts, especially Pierre Gallois. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). At about the same time Waltz published his more famous optimist manifesto, other scholars were advancing similar arguments: Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of Nuclear War," Public Choice 37, no. 2 (1981): 247-59; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982): 283-306.
8. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45. As Lavoy demonstrated, Waltz's argument was largely derivative of the work of an earlier generation of strategic analysts, especially Pierre Gallois. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). At about the same time Waltz published his more famous optimist manifesto, other scholars were advancing similar arguments: Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of Nuclear War," Public Choice 37, no. 2 (1981): 247-59; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982): 283-306.
9. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45. As Lavoy demonstrated, Waltz's argument was largely derivative of the work of an earlier generation of strategic analysts, especially Pierre Gallois. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). At about the same time Waltz published his more famous optimist manifesto, other scholars were advancing similar arguments: Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of Nuclear War," Public Choice 37, no. 2 (1981): 247-59; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982): 283-306.
10. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45. As Lavoy demonstrated, Waltz's argument was largely derivative of the work of an earlier generation of strategic analysts, especially Pierre Gallois. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). At about the same time Waltz published his more famous optimist manifesto, other scholars were advancing similar arguments: Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of Nuclear War," Public Choice 37, no. 2 (1981): 247-59; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982): 283-306.
11. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45. As Lavoy demonstrated, Waltz's argument was largely derivative of the work of an earlier generation of strategic analysts, especially Pierre Gallois. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). At about the same time Waltz published his more famous optimist manifesto, other scholars were advancing similar arguments: Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of Nuclear War," Public Choice 37, no. 2 (1981): 247-59; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982): 283-306.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 38; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 54.
13. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 38; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 54.
14. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
15. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
16. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
17. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
18. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
19. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zracket, Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
20. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
21. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
22. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
23. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
24. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
25. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
26. Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/93): 160-87; Peter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies 2, no. 3/4 (spring/summer 1993): 160-65; Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 66-107; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995); Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 773-78; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and New Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-45.
27. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 94. Karl is not so explicit on how his critique of neopessimism applies a fortiori to paleooptimism. He rather skims over the obvious point that nuclear optimism is entirely dependent on the two things he apparently docs not like: (1) deduction from axioms, and (2) extrapolation from the superpower case.
28. Seng, "Less Is More," 52-53.
29. Waltz argues: "Hiding nuclear weapons and keeping them under control are tasks for which the ingenuity of numerous states is adequate" (in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 20 ). See also the discussion in ibid., 19-26, 96-99, and 109-10.
30. Waltz argues: "Hiding nuclear weapons and keeping them under control are tasks for which the ingenuity of numerous states is adequate" (in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 20 ). See also the discussion in ibid., 19-26, 96-99, and 109-10.
31. In Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 21. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, explicitly limited his endorsement of nuclear proliferation to those cases where the state had adequate resources to maintain a sophisticated arsenal (Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 37-38).
32. In Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 21. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, explicitly limited his endorsement of nuclear proliferation to those cases where the state had adequate resources to maintain a sophisticated arsenal (Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 37-38).
33. Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?," International Studies Quarterly 40 (June 1996): 209-34.
34. I have repeatedly stressed a fourth point, one which has not been challenged by neooptimists and so does not require further discussion: even if new nuclear states have the same lucky record that the superpowers had - successfully avoiding a truly catastrophic command-and-control failure - there is reason to oppose nuclear proliferation as a matter of U.S. policy. A nuclear-armed adversary is a more capable foe, better able to thwart U.S. interests.
35. Seng, "Less Is More," 90.
36. Sagan draws primarily on insights from organizational theory, while Blair and myself use an amalgam of rational actor and organizational theory approaches. Among proliferation pessimists, James Blight and David Welch make the most extensive use of political-psychological arguments.
37. Karl only cites the organizational theory-based arguments Blight and Welch make, while ignoring the rest of their psychological critique of proliferation optimism. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 114 n. 101. Seng does not cite Blight and Welch; neither does Thayer, whose contribution to the proliferation debate preceded that of Blight and Welch.
38. Seng "Less Is More," 63-66; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 103-15.
39. Seng "Less Is More," 63-66; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 103-15.
40. To my knowledge, no one has challenged the empirical validity of the pessimists' critique of superpower nuclear behavior. "The only matter in dispute is the significance of these findings: are they mortal or venal sins?
41. Of course, smaller arsenals are easier to target and destroy in a preventive or preemptive attack, but neooptimists have an answer for this: small arsenals are easier to hide. I will address this argument later in the text.
42. Seng, "Less Is More," 63, cites Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 180-83. Jailed Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu released information suggesting that Israel had produced enough weapons-grade material for an arsenal as high as 200 weapons ("Between the Bomb and a Hard Place," Economist, 25 March 1995, 23-25).
43. Seng, "Less Is More," 63, cites Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 180-83. Jailed Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu released information suggesting that Israel had produced enough weapons-grade material for an arsenal as high as 200 weapons ("Between the Bomb and a Hard Place," Economist, 25 March 1995, 23-25).
44. Seng, "Less Is More," 63, cites Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 180-83. Jailed Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu released information suggesting that Israel had produced enough weapons-grade material for an arsenal as high as 200 weapons ("Between the Bomb and a Hard Place," Economist, 25 March 1995, 23-25).
45. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 105.
46. Seng, "Less Is More," 63 and 68; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 113.
47. Seng, "Less Is More," 63 and 68; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 113.
48. Seng, "Less Is More," 69; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 109.
49. Seng, "Less Is More," 69; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 109.
50. Gary Milhollin, "Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb," New York Times Magazine, 8 March 1992, 32.
51. Seng, "Less Is More," 73.
52. Ibid.
53. This is unlikely to be the case because of decapitation concerns. Although decapitation concerns should militate against excessively assertive code management, some states may accept a system that will be fail-impotent. South Africa evidently adopted such a system. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 13. To be sure, South Africa, perhaps alone among plausible proliferators, faced the least daunting strategic environment, at least insofar as needing to protect an arsenal against a preemptive strikes goes.
54. Seng, "Less Is More," 74.
55. Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations and Warfare in the Developing World," Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 2 (June 1996): 171-212. For instance, they document that poor discipline and inadequate training rendered Iraq's state-of-the-art air-defense system virtually useless against coalition forces during the Gulf War. The coalition's victory in the air derived as much from superior exploitation of technology as from superior technology, per se. Far from "spinning on a dime," Biddle and Zirkle concluded that "the Iraqi air defense system...demonstrated little or no capacity to adapt during either 'Desert Storm' or the Iran-Iraq War" (186). For a careful analysis of the role skill and doctrinal virtuosity (vice technology) played in determining Iraqi performance in the Gulf War, see Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 139-79.
56. Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations and Warfare in the Developing World," Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 2 (June 1996): 171-212. For instance, they document that poor discipline and inadequate training rendered Iraq's state-of-the-art air-defense system virtually useless against coalition forces during the Gulf War. The coalition's victory in the air derived as much from superior exploitation of technology as from superior technology, per se. Far from "spinning on a dime," Biddle and Zirkle concluded that "the Iraqi air defense system...demonstrated little or no capacity to adapt during either 'Desert Storm' or the Iran-Iraq War" (186). For a careful analysis of the role skill and doctrinal virtuosity (vice technology) played in determining Iraqi performance in the Gulf War, see Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 139-79.
57. As the N gets smaller (that is, since there are so few examples of nuclear proliferation on which to base this causal argument), the standard error around the estimated coefficient gets larger. Thus, we cannot be confident about just how large an effect the explanatory variable (size of arsenal) has on our dependent variable (assertiveness of command and control system).
58. Neooptimists do not make much use of the distinction between preventive war and preemption. They argue that the same basic factor - the doubtfulness of the success of a first strike - will inhibit both. Traditionally, of course, strategic analysts have emphasized that a higher level of doubt was needed to deter preemption since some inhibitions on going to war would be lifted in the context of a crisis.
59. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 95-103; Seng, "Less Is More," 89.
60. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 95-103; Seng, "Less Is More," 89.
61. I am not entirely persuaded that the small size of a new arsenal enhances hiding, as neooptimists claim. It may be easier to hide an entire small arsenal than it is to hide an entire large arsenal. In either case, however, the number of weapons that survive through hiding, and thus the efficacy of such a strategy, is determined entirely by the availability of good hiding spots, not the size of the arsenal. Of course, smaller weapons (as distinct from a smaller arsenal) are easier to hide, but they are also very costly to develop and involve precisely the kind of extensive testing regimen that optimists say is not necessary for an adequate nuclear deterrent.
62. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 104. Of course, most minor proliferators also have missile programs - indeed, Seng thinks that financial constraints will push them to rely on missile delivery - but Karl dismisses these programs as themselves constrained by tight budgets and dependence on foreign technology, and thus unlikely to be destabilizing. Why dependence on foreign technology makes the missiles less destabilizing is not explained. Nevertheless, Karl's hunch may find some support in India's apparent decision to cut back on its Agni/Prithvi missile program, although this decision is still hotly debated in India and the government has been at pains to stress that the missile program is still ongoing. See Kenneth J. Cooper, "India Halts Development of Medium-Range Missile; Project Had Long Been Opposed by U.S.," Washington Post, 6 December 1996, A46; Sanjeev Miglani, "Empty-Handed Missile Rhetoric Leaves India Without a Credible Deterrent," Asia Times, 16 January 1997, 8; and "India's PM Backs Troubled Agni Missile Project," Reuters North American Wire, 4 March 1997.
63. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 104. Of course, most minor proliferators also have missile programs - indeed, Seng thinks that financial constraints will push them to rely on missile delivery - but Karl dismisses these programs as themselves constrained by tight budgets and dependence on foreign technology, and thus unlikely to be destabilizing. Why dependence on foreign technology makes the missiles less destabilizing is not explained. Nevertheless, Karl's hunch may find some support in India's apparent decision to cut back on its Agni/Prithvi missile program, although this decision is still hotly debated in India and the government has been at pains to stress that the missile program is still ongoing. See Kenneth J. Cooper, "India Halts Development of Medium-Range Missile; Project Had Long Been Opposed by U.S.," Washington Post, 6 December 1996, A46; Sanjeev Miglani, "Empty-Handed Missile Rhetoric Leaves India Without a Credible Deterrent," Asia Times, 16 January 1997, 8; and "India's PM Backs Troubled Agni Missile Project," Reuters North American Wire, 4 March 1997.
64. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 104. Of course, most minor proliferators also have missile programs - indeed, Seng thinks that financial constraints will push them to rely on missile delivery - but Karl dismisses these programs as themselves constrained by tight budgets and dependence on foreign technology, and thus unlikely to be destabilizing. Why dependence on foreign technology makes the missiles less destabilizing is not explained. Nevertheless, Karl's hunch may find some support in India's apparent decision to cut back on its Agni/Prithvi missile program, although this decision is still hotly debated in India and the government has been at pains to stress that the missile program is still ongoing. See Kenneth J. Cooper, "India Halts Development of Medium-Range Missile; Project Had Long Been Opposed by U.S.," Washington Post, 6 December 1996, A46; Sanjeev Miglani, "Empty-Handed Missile Rhetoric Leaves India Without a Credible Deterrent," Asia Times, 16 January 1997, 8; and "India's PM Backs Troubled Agni Missile Project," Reuters North American Wire, 4 March 1997.
65. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 104. Of course, most minor proliferators also have missile programs - indeed, Seng thinks that financial constraints will push them to rely on missile delivery - but Karl dismisses these programs as themselves constrained by tight budgets and dependence on foreign technology, and thus unlikely to be destabilizing. Why dependence on foreign technology makes the missiles less destabilizing is not explained. Nevertheless, Karl's hunch may find some support in India's apparent decision to cut back on its Agni/Prithvi missile program, although this decision is still hotly debated in India and the government has been at pains to stress that the missile program is still ongoing. See Kenneth J. Cooper, "India Halts Development of Medium-Range Missile; Project Had Long Been Opposed by U.S.," Washington Post, 6 December 1996, A46; Sanjeev Miglani, "Empty-Handed Missile Rhetoric Leaves India Without a Credible Deterrent," Asia Times, 16 January 1997, 8; and "India's PM Backs Troubled Agni Missile Project," Reuters North American Wire, 4 March 1997.
66. Both France and China developed a full triad - bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles - although France has indicated that it will stand-down its land-based missiles. "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November/December 1996): 64-67.
67. See Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 194-99;
68. and Isser Harel, The Crisis of the German Scientists (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1982). I am indebted to Benjamin Frankel for directing my attention to this example.
69. In addition to the cases that are already well known - U.S. planning against the Soviet Union, Soviet planning against China, U.S. planning against North Korea - there is also intriguing evidence that Egypt seriously planned for a preventive war to destroy Israel's nascent nuclear program at Dimona. Though it may have been only public posturing, President Gamal Abdul Nasser publicly warned as much in 1966. Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966 , as cited in Avner Cohen, "Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War," Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (spring 1996): 197. Cohen concludes that Dimona played only a marginal role in precipitating the 1967 war. At the very least, however, Cohen documents that the United States was preoccupied with the possibility that Egypt might launch a preventive war over Israel's nuclear program, and he argues persuasively that Israel's nuclear program figured more prominently in the war than has been generally believed.
70. In addition to the cases that are already well known - U.S. planning against the Soviet Union, Soviet planning against China, U.S. planning against North Korea - there is also intriguing evidence that Egypt seriously planned for a preventive war to destroy Israel's nascent nuclear program at Dimona. Though it may have been only public posturing, President Gamal Abdul Nasser publicly warned as much in 1966. Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser," New York Times, 21 February 1966 , as cited in Avner Cohen, "Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War," Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (spring 1996): 197. Cohen concludes that Dimona played only a marginal role in precipitating the 1967 war. At the very least, however, Cohen documents that the United States was preoccupied with the possibility that Egypt might launch a preventive war over Israel's nuclear program, and he argues persuasively that Israel's nuclear program figured more prominently in the war than has been generally believed.
71. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 105; Seng, "Less Is More," 65.
72. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 105; Seng, "Less Is More," 65.
73. Seng, "Less Is More," 88-89.
74. As part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States has committed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear signatory to the NPT. The pledge implicitly reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against (and therefore to target) those states that do hold nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Clinton administration appears to have expanded the category of targetable states to include those with any chemical or biological weapons as well. George Bunn, "Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?" Arms Control Today (May/June 1996): 7-10.
75. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, April 1996), 52. After considerable bureaucratic infighting over what material to include, the final report only discusses the proliferation programs of "problem" states; for instance, Israel's nuclear arsenal is rather prominently missing from the "Middle East and North Africa" chapter.
76. See discussion in Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 258-60.
77. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 20-36.
78. I develop this argument in greater detail in Peter D. Feaver, "Correspondence," International Security 22, no. 3 (winter 1997/98, forthcoming).
79. Earl Lane, "No Chemicals: Yet Analysts Warn of Iraqi Guard's Capability," Newsday, 26 February 1991, 15. See also William M. Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," Washington Quarterly 19, no. 4 (autumn 1996): 7.
80. Earl Lane, "No Chemicals: Yet Analysts Warn of Iraqi Guard's Capability," Newsday, 26 February 1991, 15. See also William M. Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," Washington Quarterly 19, no. 4 (autumn 1996): 7.
81. Rick Atkinson, "No Chemical Arms Found on Battlefields," Washington Post, 7 March 1991, 1. I cited this preliminary evidence elsewhere when I concluded that Hussein's rigid command structure had impeded his ability to make effective use of his weapons of mass destruction, but in light of further evidence I withdraw that conclusion. See Peter Feaver, "Lessons From Desert Storm: Iraqi Style," IUS Newsletter (winter 1996): 15-16.
82. Rick Atkinson, "No Chemical Arms Found on Battlefields," Washington Post, 7 March 1991, 1. I cited this preliminary evidence elsewhere when I concluded that Hussein's rigid command structure had impeded his ability to make effective use of his weapons of mass destruction, but in light of further evidence I withdraw that conclusion. See Peter Feaver, "Lessons From Desert Storm: Iraqi Style," IUS Newsletter (winter 1996): 15-16.
83. Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission's Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance With Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) (New York: United Nations Publications), 11 October 1995, 28.
84. Arkin cites this view, although he does not endorse it, in "Calculated Ambiguity," 8-9.
85. Seng, "Less Is More," 78. He does not discuss how this admission cuts against his general claim that minor proliferators will be so sure of their retaliatory capability that they will not have to take unsafe measures.
86. Seng, "Less Is More," 78-80.
87. Seng, "Less Is More," 78.
88. There are tantalizing reports that Iraq accepted tremendous safety risks in order to continue to use its one politically effective terror weapon, Scud missile strikes on Israel. David Welch speculates that Hussein must have held the Scud crews at gunpoint to force them to continue firing because, "in order to minimize the time during which a mobile launcher had to reveal itself in order to fire, Iraqi crews fueled the missiles before transporting and erecting them. Given the volatility of the Scud's liquid fuel and the extreme danger of explosion, no knowledgeable crew would have done this willingly" (David A. Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint: Israeli Decision-Making in the Gulf War," in Choosing to Cooperate: How States Avoid Loss, ed. Janice Gross Stein and Lewis. W. Pauly [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993], 140 n. 29).
89. Seng does recognize that information dominance poses a problem for his theory. His solution, presented as a policy recommendation, is a nonstarter. "A focus on concealment potentials suggests that far-sighted limitations on satellite and high-altitude reconnaissance technologies may be more crucial to strategic accords than many other elements of arms control" ("Less Is More," 90). Such an arms-control proposal works against the other kinds of transparency and confidence-building measures that promote regional stability. Moreover, one should always be skeptical about the viability of proposals that rely on a country, in this case the United States, unilaterally abandoning one of the central priorities of its military establishment, in this case enhanced Information Warfare capabilities. Since the United States is unlikely to make such a unilateral gesture, we cannot expect much more from other states with nascent IW programs.
90. For instance, Sagan has documented how, because they possessed the predelegated authority to scramble interceptor aircraft, NORAD overreacted to a false warning generated by a faulty message format. See Sagan, Limits of Safety, 240-43.
91. Seng, "Less Is More," 35.
92. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 231-35 . See also Desmond Ball, et al., Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1987), 76.
93. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 231-35 . See also Desmond Ball, et al., Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1987), 76.
94. The work of the commission, called the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Fail-Safe and Risk Reduction and chaired by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, is described in '"Crimson Tide' Roils Navy; Military, Nuclear Weapons Experts Disagree on Danger Armed Subs Pose," Rocky Mountain News 28 May 1995, 32A . The Navy decision to place coded-control devices aboard submarines is reported in "U.S. 'Boomers' to be Equipped with PALs," Armed Forces Newswire Service, 4 January 1995.
95. The work of the commission, called the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Fail-Safe and Risk Reduction and chaired by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, is described in '"Crimson Tide' Roils Navy; Military, Nuclear Weapons Experts Disagree on Danger Armed Subs Pose," Rocky Mountain News 28 May 1995, 32A . The Navy decision to place coded-control devices aboard submarines is reported in "U.S. 'Boomers' to be Equipped with PALs," Armed Forces Newswire Service, 4 January 1995.
96. Presumably, this concern caused Hussein to predeploy chemicals to the battlefield.
97. Seng, "Less Is More," 80.
98. Seng argues, for instance, that, "if, as pessimists worry, minor proliferators will tend to suffer from domestic instabilities, then central leaders are likely to keep nuclear control organizations as insulated and tightly held as possible" (75-76).
99. Certainly, if the public statements of Igor Rodionov, then Russian minister of defense, can be believed, there is ample reason to worry about the security of the nuclear arsenal in the face of enduring domestic instability. Of course, neooptimists dismiss the Russian case as irrelevant because minor proliferators are unlikely to build an arsenal as large and complex as did the Soviet Union. See David Hoffman, "Russia Warned of Crisis Over Scant Military Funding," Washington Post, 26 October 1996, 24.
100. Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," 177-78.
101. Leonard Spector, Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1986-1987 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), 28-32.
102. Seng "Less Is More" 81-82. The issue here, however, may be one offset, not interpretation. It is not at all clear that the nuclear custodians were insulated as Seng claims. Spector alleges that the test-site commander, General Thiry, reported to the regular joint services commander, General Mentre. Moreover, General Mentre sided with the coupplotters, at least for part of the crisis. It is true that loyalist forces were at pains to secure control of the nuclear weapon once the crisis started. It is by no means certain, however, that prudent measures taken before the crisis began contributed to the benign outcome, as neooptimists claim. Spector, Going Nuclear, 30.
103. Seng "Less Is More" 81-82. The issue here, however, may be one offset, not interpretation. It is not at all clear that the nuclear custodians were insulated as Seng claims. Spector alleges that the test-site commander, General Thiry, reported to the regular joint services commander, General Mentre. Moreover, General Mentre sided with the coupplotters, at least for part of the crisis. It is true that loyalist forces were at pains to secure control of the nuclear weapon once the crisis started. It is by no means certain, however, that prudent measures taken before the crisis began contributed to the benign outcome, as neooptimists claim. Spector, Going Nuclear, 30.
104. This particular part of the debate may be fundamentally unresolvable. Everyone agrees and knows that there has been no catastrophic unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, yet. Most participants in the debate also know that there have been incidents where safety and security measures were compromised, to some extent. Optimists see the compromises and lapses and point to the fact that none has produced the catastrophe pessimists fear. Pessimists point to the lapses and say the system is not perfect and can fail. Both are correct. The half-full glass is also half-empty.
105. Seng, "Less Is More," 81.
106. Peter D. Feaver, "Social Sources of Inadvertent Nuclear Use in the Former Soviet Union: Civil-Military Relations and the Black Market," in Implications of the Dissolution of the Soviet Union for Accidental/Inadvertent Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ed. Carin Atterling Wedar, Michael Intriligator, and Peeter Vares (Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1992).
107. Maureen O'Connor, "Out to Crack Addiction," Independent, 6 April 1995, 30.
108. Benjamin Frankel coined the term "opaque proliferation" in "Notes on the Nuclear Underworld," The National Interest, no. 9 (fall 1987): 122-26.
109. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 115-16. At one end of the weaponization continuum is the most nascent of nuclear research programs (Algeria); at the other end is a large, fully developed arsenal openly deployed aboard a complex mix of appropriate delivery systems (the United States).
110. The empirical evidence supporting permanent nonweaponized status for minor proliferators is certainly ambiguous. Karl claims rather confidently that India and Pakistan have no plans to weaponize beyond their current status. There is at least some evidence to suggest otherwise, however, and the evidence is not limited to the bombast of a few former Indian generals as Karl implies. India has apparently tried to purchase use-control technology. Although these efforts offer some solace in the form of Indian nuclear learning about command and control issues, they also raise serious doubts about India's commitment to nonweaponized status. Why purchase use-controls if one never intends to weaponize? Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 108 and 99, respectively. Blair alludes to Indian efforts to purchase missile safeguards technology from Russia in Bruce Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), 9 n. 9.
111. The empirical evidence supporting permanent nonweaponized status for minor proliferators is certainly ambiguous. Karl claims rather confidently that India and Pakistan have no plans to weaponize beyond their current status. There is at least some evidence to suggest otherwise, however, and the evidence is not limited to the bombast of a few former Indian generals as Karl implies. India has apparently tried to purchase use-control technology. Although these efforts offer some solace in the form of Indian nuclear learning about command and control issues, they also raise serious doubts about India's commitment to nonweaponized status. Why purchase use-controls if one never intends to weaponize? Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 108 and 99, respectively. Blair alludes to Indian efforts to purchase missile safeguards technology from Russia in Bruce Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), 9 n. 9.
112. This is the only way to make sense out of Karl's curious argument about the desirability of a weak or nonexistent strategic debate. He must be assuming that opaque proliferators never weaponize because he offers no solutions to the other problems of opacity. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 115-16.
113. Seng, "Less Is More," 83-88.
114. Ibid., 86-87.
115. Neooptimists are probably correct in stressing that a determined proliferator can hide a considerable portion of its nuclear program from the outside world. The further along the weaponization continuum the state goes, however, the more difficult such a deception campaign gets. For a disturbing review of Iraq's remarkably successful effort in deceiving foreign inspectors for over a decade, see David A. Kay, "Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond," Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (winter 1995): 85-105.
116. Moreover, Seng's rosy assessment of opacity depends in part on the proliferators never making their arsenal more complicated. In this light, it is curious that Seng correctly chastises Karl for assuming that states will remain nonweaponized, while he himself assumes that the lack of complexity is immutable. Karl says countries can resist pressures to weaponize. Seng says they will not be able to resist the weaponization in the beginning, but once they have a small arsenal they will resist all further weaponization pressures. Neither justifies his confident prediction about where minor proliferators will stop along the weaponization continuum. Seng, "Less Is More," 85-86.
117. The kind of opacity Seng envisions would also probably rule out a robust arms control regime. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 110-13.
118. Joseph C. Anselmo, "NRO Lost Track of S4 Billion," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 May 1996. All this, in an organizational setting that had formalized and stringent procedures for review and oversight. Intelligence oversight in the United States is opaque compared to other national security issues. It is far less opaque than the nuclear programs of interest to this debate.
119. Seng, "Less Is More" 72-73; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 109. I agree; indeed, I make essentially the same point. Feaver, "Command and Control," 172. This benefit must be weighed against the increased danger that with a small and opaque arsenal the custodians and the authorizer/enablers are the same. Under conditions of extreme domestic instability, as was demonstrated during the abortive Soviet coup of 1991, nuclear adventurism can be inhibited if custody, enabling ability, and authority are all kept separate.
120. Seng, "Less Is More" 72-73; Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 109. I agree; indeed, I make essentially the same point. Feaver, "Command and Control," 172. This benefit must be weighed against the increased danger that with a small and opaque arsenal the custodians and the authorizer/enablers are the same. Under conditions of extreme domestic instability, as was demonstrated during the abortive Soviet coup of 1991, nuclear adventurism can be inhibited if custody, enabling ability, and authority are all kept separate.
121. A case in point is Brazil's secret nuclear program, allegedly pursued without the cognizance of the senior political leadership. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 48-52.
122. Seng seems to suggest that Israel has not weaponized further, at least insofar as Israel has chosen to maintain "the insulation of nuclear operations throughout their nuclear history to the present" ("Less Is More," 76). In support of this position, he cites Cohen and Miller, but they are rather more equivocal on this point than Seng's citation admits. They do assert, contra Seymour Hersh, for example, that Israel has not developed any nuclear use doctrine more involved than the ultimate "psychological insurance policy for last resort contingencies," but they cannot provide any evidence to prove this negative. Moreover, they also appear to concede that the Israeli arsenal probably includes advanced low-yield weapons tailored for battlefield use. They further argue that technological and bureaucratic momentum pressures to expand the arsenal and the nuclear options are surely stronger in opaque countries like Israel than in the United States. These concessions cut more sharply against the neooptimists' claim than Seng acknowledges. Cohen and Miller, "How to Think," 107-10.
123. Seng seems to suggest that Israel has not weaponized further, at least insofar as Israel has chosen to maintain "the insulation of nuclear operations throughout their nuclear history to the present" ("Less Is More," 76). In support of this position, he cites Cohen and Miller, but they are rather more equivocal on this point than Seng's citation admits. They do assert, contra Seymour Hersh, for example, that Israel has not developed any nuclear use doctrine more involved than the ultimate "psychological insurance policy for last resort contingencies," but they cannot provide any evidence to prove this negative. Moreover, they also appear to concede that the Israeli arsenal probably includes advanced low-yield weapons tailored for battlefield use. They further argue that technological and bureaucratic momentum pressures to expand the arsenal and the nuclear options are surely stronger in opaque countries like Israel than in the United States. These concessions cut more sharply against the neooptimists' claim than Seng acknowledges. Cohen and Miller, "How to Think," 107-10.
124. Seng claims this, "Less Is More," 81-82.
125. Seng, "Less Is More," 87-88.
126. Seymour Hersh, Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 225-40.
127. Sagan, Limits of Safely, 53-155; James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "Risking 'The Destruction of Nations': Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1994): 811-50.
128. Sagan, Limits of Safely, 53-155; James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "Risking 'The Destruction of Nations': Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1994): 811-50.
129. See the intriguing discussion in Cohen, "Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War," 208-10.
130. Moreover, in evaluating determinist arguments, one must distinguish between vertical proliferation, that is, growth in the size and complexity of the arsenal, and horizontal proliferation, that is, the spread of nuclear weapons. Waltz adopted a determinist argument about horizontal proliferation, comparing it to the inexorable advance of the tides in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 112. In fact, however, horizontal proliferation is anything but inevitable, as the examples of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, not to mention Germany and most other Western countries, clearly demonstrate. Vertical proliferation, however, is probably harder to resist. Proliferation can be reversed, even when there are apparent security reasons for developing nuclear weapons, as in the case of Ukraine. Once a state has made a decision to develop nuclear weapons, however, then the security imperative becomes that much harder to resist. Part of this is a selection effect: states that have developed nuclear weapons in spite of a strong norm against the development of nuclear weapons have already shown a strong imperative for nuclear weapons. If anything, the burden of proof should be on neooptimists who say that the urge to develop opaque arsenals may prove too great to resist but then the urge to develop beyond opacity can be easily resisted.
131. See Frankel's concise summary: Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): ix-xx.
132. This is why Jervis, among others, was particularly apoplectic about the size and deployment patterns of the superpower nuclear arsenals. Robert Jervis, Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
133. In the famous debate about relative gains, one striking fact went underappreciated; though it is economically irrational to feel this way, a remarkable percentage of the American public prefer scenarios where both the United States and Japan grow at slow but similar rates to a scenario where the U.S. growth is faster while the Japanese growth is faster still. See Michael Mastunduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 250-51. This viewpoint is not limited to the mass public. Ole Holsti has found evidence of similar views among the foreign policy opinion leaders. In his 1992 survey of more than 2,300 members of the foreign policy elite, 42 percent said that they preferred a world where the American economy grew at a 1 percent rate if the Japanese grew at 1.1 percent, to a world where the American economy would grow at 2.5 percent and the Japanese would grow at 6.5 percent, compared to 49 percent with the opposite preference. The gap narrowed in the 1996 survey, with 35 percent favoring slower growth, 36 percent favoring fast growth, and a remarkable 29 percent unsure. Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Leadership Project," survey results, Duke University, 1992 and 1996.
134. In the famous debate about relative gains, one striking fact went underappreciated; though it is economically irrational to feel this way, a remarkable percentage of the American public prefer scenarios where both the United States and Japan grow at slow but similar rates to a scenario where the U.S. growth is faster while the Japanese growth is faster still. See Michael Mastunduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 250-51. This viewpoint is not limited to the mass public. Ole Holsti has found evidence of similar views among the foreign policy opinion leaders. In his 1992 survey of more than 2,300 members of the foreign policy elite, 42 percent said that they preferred a world where the American economy grew at a 1 percent rate if the Japanese grew at 1.1 percent, to a world where the American economy would grow at 2.5 percent and the Japanese would grow at 6.5 percent, compared to 49 percent with the opposite preference. The gap narrowed in the 1996 survey, with 35 percent favoring slower growth, 36 percent favoring fast growth, and a remarkable 29 percent unsure. Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Leadership Project," survey results, Duke University, 1992 and 1996.
135. Surely some of the most egregious examples are the U.S. Army's planning exercises for a war with Great Britain and Canada which were ongoing as late as 1935. See "War Plan Red," in Records of the Joint Board, 1903-1947, Roll 10, J.B. 325, Serial 435-641, National Archives, as cited in Richard Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 213-33, and 277.
136. Surely some of the most egregious examples are the U.S. Army's planning exercises for a war with Great Britain and Canada which were ongoing as late as 1935. See "War Plan Red," in Records of the Joint Board, 1903-1947, Roll 10, J.B. 325, Serial 435-641, National Archives, as cited in Richard Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 213-33, and 277.
137. This is, in a sense, a claim that Jervis' spiral model is a better predictor of the doctrinal and operational choices of the military than is the deterrence model. Jervis frames the problem in terms of how states will respond to external challenges; the deterrence model predicts that a strong threat will deter another state, the spiral model predicts that a strong threat will antagonize another state. Jervis argued that the historical record supported both models - the First World War appeared to match the expectations of the spiral model, while the Second World War appeared to confirm the expectations of the deterrence model. I frame the issue in terms of what doctrinal and operational responses a military is likely to make in the face of an external threat and argue that the empirical record generally supports the spiral model. Even when the state makes a concession at the level of foreign policy (as predicted by the deterrence model), the military establishment of that state is likely to make doctrinal or operational adjustments in order not to be vulnerable to such coercion in the future. Paradoxically, the military is more likely to be persuaded by the logic of the deterrence model and so behave in a way expected by the spiral model. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58-113.
138. Seng, "Less Is More," 62.
139. A perennial concern in medical professional journals is the need to prevent nocosomial (that is, hospital-acquired) infections. One review article evaluated the findings of over 91 articles written between January 1986 and June 1993 each examining the possible link between inadequate hand washing and nocosomial infections. The review concluded, "It seems clear, based on the marginal success of many interventions in influencing hand washing behavior, that the hand washing practices of health care professionals will continue to be suboptimal without stronger mandates and monitoring" (Jacalyn L. Bryan et al., "Hand Washing: A Ritual Revisited," Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North America: Infection and Control in Critical Care 7, no. 4 [December 1995]: 617-25). See also, Steven T. Dorsey et al., "Is Handwashing Teachable?: Failure to Improve Handwashing Behavior in an Urban Emergency Department," Academic Emergency Medicine 3, no. 4 (April 1996): 360-65; Howard Hall, "Handwashing in Medicine: Infrequent Use of an Ancient Practice," International Journal of Psychosomatics 42, no. 1-4 (1995): 44-47; and Rozila Horton, "Handwashing: The Fundamental Infection Control Principle," British Journal of Nursing 4, no. 16 (1995): 926-32. It is generally accepted that rates of compliance are lower among doctors than among nurses. See Robert C. Pritchard and Raymond F. Raper, "Doctors and Handwashing: Instilling Semmelweis' Message," Medical Journal of Australia 164 (1 April 1996): 389-90. I am indebted to Andrew Barton for suggesting this point to me.
140. A perennial concern in medical professional journals is the need to prevent nocosomial (that is, hospital-acquired) infections. One review article evaluated the findings of over 91 articles written between January 1986 and June 1993 each examining the possible link between inadequate hand washing and nocosomial infections. The review concluded, "It seems clear, based on the marginal success of many interventions in influencing hand washing behavior, that the hand washing practices of health care professionals will continue to be suboptimal without stronger mandates and monitoring" (Jacalyn L. Bryan et al., "Hand Washing: A Ritual Revisited," Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North America: Infection and Control in Critical Care 7, no. 4 [December 1995]: 617-25). See also, Steven T. Dorsey et al., "Is Handwashing Teachable?: Failure to Improve Handwashing Behavior in an Urban Emergency Department," Academic Emergency Medicine 3, no. 4 (April 1996): 360-65; Howard Hall, "Handwashing in Medicine: Infrequent Use of an Ancient Practice," International Journal of Psychosomatics 42, no. 1-4 (1995): 44-47; and Rozila Horton, "Handwashing: The Fundamental Infection Control Principle," British Journal of Nursing 4, no. 16 (1995): 926-32. It is generally accepted that rates of compliance are lower among doctors than among nurses. See Robert C. Pritchard and Raymond F. Raper, "Doctors and Handwashing: Instilling Semmelweis' Message," Medical Journal of Australia 164 (1 April 1996): 389-90. I am indebted to Andrew Barton for suggesting this point to me.
141. A perennial concern in medical professional journals is the need to prevent nocosomial (that is, hospital-acquired) infections. One review article evaluated the findings of over 91 articles written between January 1986 and June 1993 each examining the possible link between inadequate hand washing and nocosomial infections. The review concluded, "It seems clear, based on the marginal success of many interventions in influencing hand washing behavior, that the hand washing practices of health care professionals will continue to be suboptimal without stronger mandates and monitoring" (Jacalyn L. Bryan et al., "Hand Washing: A Ritual Revisited," Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North America: Infection and Control in Critical Care 7, no. 4 [December 1995]: 617-25). See also, Steven T. Dorsey et al., "Is Handwashing Teachable?: Failure to Improve Handwashing Behavior in an Urban Emergency Department," Academic Emergency Medicine 3, no. 4 (April 1996): 360-65; Howard Hall, "Handwashing in Medicine: Infrequent Use of an Ancient Practice," International Journal of Psychosomatics 42, no. 1-4 (1995): 44-47; and Rozila Horton, "Handwashing: The Fundamental Infection Control Principle," British Journal of Nursing 4, no. 16 (1995): 926-32. It is generally accepted that rates of compliance are lower among doctors than among nurses. See Robert C. Pritchard and Raymond F. Raper, "Doctors and Handwashing: Instilling Semmelweis' Message," Medical Journal of Australia 164 (1 April 1996): 389-90. I am indebted to Andrew Barton for suggesting this point to me.
142. A perennial concern in medical professional journals is the need to prevent nocosomial (that is, hospital-acquired) infections. One review article evaluated the findings of over 91 articles written between January 1986 and June 1993 each examining the possible link between inadequate hand washing and nocosomial infections. The review concluded, "It seems clear, based on the marginal success of many interventions in influencing hand washing behavior, that the hand washing practices of health care professionals will continue to be suboptimal without stronger mandates and monitoring" (Jacalyn L. Bryan et al., "Hand Washing: A Ritual Revisited," Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North America: Infection and Control in Critical Care 7, no. 4 [December 1995]: 617-25). See also, Steven T. Dorsey et al., "Is Handwashing Teachable?: Failure to Improve Handwashing Behavior in an Urban Emergency Department," Academic Emergency Medicine 3, no. 4 (April 1996): 360-65; Howard Hall, "Handwashing in Medicine: Infrequent Use of an Ancient Practice," International Journal of Psychosomatics 42, no. 1-4 (1995): 44-47; and Rozila Horton, "Handwashing: The Fundamental Infection Control Principle," British Journal of Nursing 4, no. 16 (1995): 926-32. It is generally accepted that rates of compliance are lower among doctors than among nurses. See Robert C. Pritchard and Raymond F. Raper, "Doctors and Handwashing: Instilling Semmelweis' Message," Medical Journal of Australia 164 (1 April 1996): 389-90. I am indebted to Andrew Barton for suggesting this point to me.
143. A perennial concern in medical professional journals is the need to prevent nocosomial (that is, hospital-acquired) infections. One review article evaluated the findings of over 91 articles written between January 1986 and June 1993 each examining the possible link between inadequate hand washing and nocosomial infections. The review concluded, "It seems clear, based on the marginal success of many interventions in influencing hand washing behavior, that the hand washing practices of health care professionals will continue to be suboptimal without stronger mandates and monitoring" (Jacalyn L. Bryan et al., "Hand Washing: A Ritual Revisited," Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North America: Infection and Control in Critical Care 7, no. 4 [December 1995]: 617-25). See also, Steven T. Dorsey et al., "Is Handwashing Teachable?: Failure to Improve Handwashing Behavior in an Urban Emergency Department," Academic Emergency Medicine 3, no. 4 (April 1996): 360-65; Howard Hall, "Handwashing in Medicine: Infrequent Use of an Ancient Practice," International Journal of Psychosomatics 42, no. 1-4 (1995): 44-47; and Rozila Horton, "Handwashing: The Fundamental Infection Control Principle," British Journal of Nursing 4, no. 16 (1995): 926-32. It is generally accepted that rates of compliance are lower among doctors than among nurses. See Robert C. Pritchard and Raymond F. Raper, "Doctors and Handwashing: Instilling Semmelweis' Message," Medical Journal of Australia 164 (1 April 1996): 389-90. I am indebted to Andrew Barton for suggesting this point to me.