Rethinking Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations: Condemned to nuclear confrontation?

Asian Survey

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 1996, Pages 561-573

  Carranza, Mario E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040744155     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645791     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. See "Pakistani Is Rebuked on A-Bomb Remark," New York Times, 25 August 1994, p. A7.
2. It is estimated that by the end of 1995 India had 425 kg of weapons grade plutonium free from non-proliferation controls, enough for 85 nuclear weapons. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 160-61. On the other hand, Pakistan is believed to have sufficient highly enriched uranium to produce between 15 and 25 nuclear weapons "in a relatively short timeframe." See Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 97.
3. It is estimated that by the end of 1995 India had 425 kg of weapons grade plutonium free from non-proliferation controls, enough for 85 nuclear weapons. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 160-61. On the other hand, Pakistan is believed to have sufficient highly enriched uranium to produce between 15 and 25 nuclear weapons "in a relatively short timeframe." See Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 97.
4. Leonard Spector, personal communication.
5. China's application to become a full dialogue partner of ASEAN, approved by senior ASEAN officials on April 10, 1996, is subject to full approval by ASEAN leaders at an informal summit due to be held in Jakarta in December. See "Regional Briefing," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 April 1996, p. 13.
6. For Pakistan, see PPNN Newsbrief, no. 24, Fourth Quarter 1993, pp. 19-20. For India, see the joint statement between Prime Minister Rao and President Clinton, in PPNN Newsbrief, no. 26, 2nd Quarter 1994, p. 18.
7. Pakistan's regional non-proliferation proposals include offers to: (1) sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if India does; (2) place its nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards if India also does so; (3) create a regime of mutual inspections of each other's nuclear installations; (4) negotiate the establishment of a South Asia nuclear weapons-free zone, and (5) a five-nation regional nuclear nonproliferation conference consisting of the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan (the Sharif proposal).
8. India could join the NPT making it clear that it would exercise its sovereign right to withdraw under Article X if there is no progress on the global disarmament agenda in a certain period of time (e.g., five years).
9. See among others, Gowher Rizvi, "Arms Control and Indo-Pakistani Relations," in G. Segal, ed., Arms Control in Asia (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 116-43; Raju G. C. Thomas, "India and the NPT After the Cold War," in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds., 1995: A New Beginning for the NPT? (New York: Plenum Press, 1995); Nazir Kamal, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation in South Asia," in P. J. Garrity and S. A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), pp. 181-98.
10. See among others, Gowher Rizvi, "Arms Control and Indo-Pakistani Relations," in G. Segal, ed., Arms Control in Asia (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 116-43; Raju G. C. Thomas, "India and the NPT After the Cold War," in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds., 1995: A New Beginning for the NPT? (New York: Plenum Press, 1995); Nazir Kamal, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation in South Asia," in P. J. Garrity and S. A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), pp. 181-98.
11. See among others, Gowher Rizvi, "Arms Control and Indo-Pakistani Relations," in G. Segal, ed., Arms Control in Asia (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 116-43; Raju G. C. Thomas, "India and the NPT After the Cold War," in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds., 1995: A New Beginning for the NPT? (New York: Plenum Press, 1995); Nazir Kamal, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation in South Asia," in P. J. Garrity and S. A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), pp. 181-98.
12. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan, India, and Kashmir: A Historical Review," in Raju Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, p. 101.
13. The election in May 1996 of the minority Hindu nationalist government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in India reinforced the conventional wisdom that India will "never" give up on Kashmir. The new Defense minister, Pramod Mahajan, has said that military spending will be increased and that India's 350,000-member force in Indian-held Kashmir will be given "proper powers" to deal with the Kashmiri Muslim insurgency. See John F. Burns, "Indian Leaders Try to Calm Fears of a Pakistani Clash," New York Times, 18 May 1996, p. 3. Prime Minister Vajpayee, a moderate member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seemed to accept the constitutional principle of secularism when he declared that all Indian citizens will be treated "on an equal footing, and there will be no discrimination on the basis of religion, region, class or caste." John F. Burns, "Hindu Party Head Chosen for Post of India's Premier," New York Times, 16 May 1996, p. A6.
14. The election in May 1996 of the minority Hindu nationalist government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in India reinforced the conventional wisdom that India will "never" give up on Kashmir. The new Defense minister, Pramod Mahajan, has said that military spending will be increased and that India's 350,000-member force in Indian-held Kashmir will be given "proper powers" to deal with the Kashmiri Muslim insurgency. See John F. Burns, "Indian Leaders Try to Calm Fears of a Pakistani Clash," New York Times, 18 May 1996, p. 3. Prime Minister Vajpayee, a moderate member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seemed to accept the constitutional principle of secularism when he declared that all Indian citizens will be treated "on an equal footing, and there will be no discrimination on the basis of religion, region, class or caste." John F. Burns, "Hindu Party Head Chosen for Post of India's Premier," New York Times, 16 May 1996, p. A6.
15. See, e.g., former CIA Director James Woolsey's testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 24, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).
16. This seems to outweigh any possible benefits for Pakistan from a proliferation decision, except, perhaps, to prompt India to slow down its nuclear weapons program, while offering to do likewise as a preliminary step for the establishment of a bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament regime.
17. See, e.g., Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79-114; Raju G. C. Thomas, "Reflections on the Kashmir Problem," in Raju Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 28-29; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 184-85.
18. See, e.g., Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79-114; Raju G. C. Thomas, "Reflections on the Kashmir Problem," in Raju Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 28-29; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 184-85.
19. See, e.g., Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79-114; Raju G. C. Thomas, "Reflections on the Kashmir Problem," in Raju Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 28-29; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 184-85.
20. The first quote is from Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 151; the second, from Stephen P. Cohen, "A Note on Stability in South Asia," Swords and Ploughshares, 9:1 (Fall 1994), p. 3.
21. Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Nuclear Weapons Programs: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey, July 1994, p. 664. The big shortcoming of the "capping" strategy is that it is closely related to a global fissile material cutoff, which as presently envisaged would legitimize the nuclear weapons programs of the de facto nuclear-weapon states (India, Pakistan, and Israel) thus undermining the NPT regime. Under a cut-off convention, nuclear material previously produced by threshold nuclear powers would not be subject to IAEA safeguards. See Frans Berkhout et al., "A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material," International Security, 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 197-98
22. Sandy Gordon, "Capping South Asia's Nuclear Weapons Programs: A Window of Opportunity?" Asian Survey, July 1994, p. 664. The big shortcoming of the "capping" strategy is that it is closely related to a global fissile material cutoff, which as presently envisaged would legitimize the nuclear weapons programs of the de facto nuclear-weapon states (India, Pakistan, and Israel) thus undermining the NPT regime. Under a cut-off convention, nuclear material previously produced by threshold nuclear powers would not be subject to IAEA safeguards. See Frans Berkhout et al., "A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material," International Security, 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 197-98
23. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's declaration that his minority Hindu nationalist government would stick by the Bharatiya Janata Party's longstanding promise to declare openly India a nuclear weapons state shows the urgency of achieving a verifiable nuclear arms control regime in South Asia, even before a comprehensive resolution of the Kashmir dispute. See John F. Burns, "Hindu Party Head Chosen for Post of India's Premier," p. A6.
24. See K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indo-Pak Nuclear Restraint Regime: Parts 1 and 2," Economic Times (New Delhi), September 30 and October 1, 1992. The vulnerability of incipient small nuclear forces in most regional situations has been mentioned in a number of studies. See e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 88.
25. See K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indo-Pak Nuclear Restraint Regime: Parts 1 and 2," Economic Times (New Delhi), September 30 and October 1, 1992. The vulnerability of incipient small nuclear forces in most regional situations has been mentioned in a number of studies. See e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 88.
26. Among a set of proposals sent by India to Pakistan early in 1994 to ease border tensions was the assurance that in the event of war, India would not use nuclear weapons first. See Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, PPNN Newsbrief, no. 25, First Quarter 1994, p. 5.
27. Although the nuclear weapon states did not make concessions on a deadline for the provision of negative security assurances at the 1995 NPT extension conference, they did accept the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban deadline, thus at least partly locking in a Chinese commitment to a NWFZ in South Asia. In August 1995, the Indian government agreed to explore the feasibility of a U.S. proposal to establish such a zone. See PPNN Newsbrief, no. 31, 3rd Quarter 1995, p. 19.