Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 166-175

  Colman, Andrew M ^a   Körner, Tom W ^b   Musy, Olivier ^c   Tazdaït, Tarik ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^d CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Altruism; Berge equilibrium; Common interest game; Cooperation; Coordination game; Payoff dominance; Prisoner's dilemma; Social dilemma; Social value orientation; Team reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952816656     PISSN: 00222496     EISSN: 10960880     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmp.2011.02.001     Document Type: Article

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