Effects of financial incentives on the breakdown of mutual trust

Psychological Science

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 292-297

  Parco, James E ^a,c   Rapoport, Amnon ^a   Stein, William E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBABILITY; REIMBURSEMENT;

ADULT; DECISION MAKING; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; PROBABILITY; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE;

EID: 0036583394     PISSN: 09567976     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9280.00454     Document Type: Article

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