Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 391-411

  Hovi, Jon ^a,b   Underdal, Arild ^a   Ward, Hugh ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Environmental economics; Ideas; Institutions; Political science; Power

Indexed keywords

SOCIAL SCIENCES; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

CORE COMPONENTS; ECONOMIC MODELS; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; IDEAS; POLITICAL SCIENCE; POWER; RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES;

ECONOMICS;

ECONOMETRICS; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY; POLITICAL POWER;

EID: 79952700402     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9453-7     Document Type: Review

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