Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism

Epistemology: New Essays

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Goldman, Alvin I ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Epistemologists; James pryor; Michael huemer; Peter markie; Richard feldman

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951879975     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0004     Document Type: Chapter

References (23)

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20. Pryor, J. (2005). "There is Immediate Justification", in M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
21. Sosa, E. (1980). "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, Studies in Epistemology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
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23. Sosa, E. (2001). "Goldman's Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology", Philosophical Topics, 29: 383-400.