Anomalies of measurement: When it works, but should not

Business Performance Measurement: Unifying Theories and Integrating Practice, Second Edition

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 449-476

  Austin, Rob ^a   Gittell, Jody Hoffer ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952630294     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511805097.027     Document Type: Chapter

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