Islamic capital/Anatolian Tigers: Past and present

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 343-360

  Hosgör, Evren ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL HISTORY; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; ISLAMISM; RELIGION;

ANATOLIA; TURKEY;

EID: 79952474044     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: 17437881     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2011.534336     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. See Ş. Özdemir, 'MŨSÍAD ve HAK-İS' i Birlikte Anlamak' [To Understand MÜSİAD and HAK-İŞ Together], in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamci{dotless}li{dotless}k [Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Islamism], Vol.6 (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp.837-44.
2. Özdemir also argues Islamic capital can be regarded as the real 'domestic/national capital' that has been sought since the 1900s in Turkey (p.838).
3. See B. Koyuncu, 'Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD: Eklemlenme mi, Çatisma mi{dotless}?' [Globalization and MÜSİAD: Articulation or Conflict], in F. Keyman (ed.), Liberalism, Devlet, Hegemonya [Liberalism, State and Hegemony] (Istanbul: Everest, 2002).
4. See also Ş. Özdemir, 'Religious and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey: the Case of the MÜSIAD' (PhD thesis, Ankara: METU, 2001).
5. O. Demir, M. Acar and M. Toprak, 'Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.6 (2004), pp.166-88;
6. Ö. Sandi{dotless}kçi{dotless} and G., Ger, 'Fundamental Fashions: The Cultural Politics of the Turban and the Lev', Advances in Consumer Research, Vol.28 (2001), pp.146-50.
7. See Z. Onis and U. Türem, 'Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations', Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2001), pp.94-120.
8. Z. Onis and U. Türem, 'Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations', Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2001), pp.94-120.
9. For such an attempt see K. Can, 'Yeşil Sermaye Laik Sisteme Ne Yapti{dotless}? [What did Green Capital do to the Secular System?], Birikim, Vol.99 (1997), pp.59-65.
10. H.W. Overbeek, 'Global Capitalism and Britain's Decline' (PhD thesis, Amsterdam, 1988), p.22.
11. See A. Buǧra, 'Class, Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Association', Interest Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.30, No.4 (1998), pp.521-39;
12. see also A. Buǧra, Islam in Economic Organizations (Istanbul: TESEV, 1999)
13. and G.B. Özcan and M. Çokgezen, 'Trusted Markets: The Exchanges of Islamic Companies', Comparative Economic Studies, Vol.48 (2006), pp.132-55.
14. Özcan and Çokgezen, 'Limits to Alternative Forms of Capitalization: The Case of Anatolian Holding Companies', World Development, Vol. 31, No. 12 (2003), pp.2061-84.
15. E.B. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet: Culture and Politics of Islamic Entrepreneurs in Turkey' (PhD thesis, Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois, 2003), p.42.
16. For detailed examples, see ESI (European Stability Initiative), Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia (Berlin: ESI, 2005).
17. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet', pp.71-2.
18. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet', pp.71-2.;
19. see also T. Kuran, 'Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.9, No.4 (1995), pp.155-73.
20. It is worth noting that there is an ongoing debate as to whether the interest-free returns made through the IFBs essentially correspond to the interest-based returns of the Western banks. It has often been repeated that the IFBs are now avoiding providing capital for risky and long-term investments, instead directing their funds towards secure, short-term projects and mainly in non-productive sectors such as commerce, distribution and services; even in the case of productive activities these were generally limited to consumer goods.
21. F. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi II: Islamci Sirketler Nereye? [Islamic Capital II: Where do Islamic Firms Go?] (Istanbul: Su, 1999), pp.4, 7.
22. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet'; Demir et al., 'Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital'.
23. B.A. Yeşilada, 'The Virtue Party', Turkish Studies, Vol. 3 No.1 (2002), p.78.
24. The interest-rate competition among and within the banks and bankers skyrocketed the interest rates and later some 250 listed bankers and another 1,000 institutions were bankrupted when thousands of depositors lost confidence in the system and rushed to brokers to collect their savings. Note that high interest rates were intended to encourage savings and to (re-)direct them into productive investments.
25. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet', p.80.
26. Özcan and Çokgezen, Limits to Alternative Forms of Capitalization.
27. Özcan and Çokgezen, Limits to Alternative Forms of Capitalization
28. See also Demir et al., 'Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital'.
29. F. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi I: Islam Ekonomisinin Eleştirisi [Islamic Capital: the Critique of Islam Economy] (Istanbul: Su, 1999).
30. See also Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi II.
31. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet'.
32. H.M. Yavuz, 'Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey', Comparative Politics, Vol.30, No.1 (1997), pp.63-82.
33. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi II, p.45.
34. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi I, p.256.
35. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi I, pp.256-9, 267.
36. See Koyuncu, 'Küreselleşme ve MŨSİAD', for such accounts.
37. See also Özdemir, 'Religious and SocioEconomic Transformation of Turkey'.
38. TÜSIAD is a business association founded by the large conglomerates of Turkey.
39. See Onis and Türem, 'Business, Globalization and Democracy', for further comparison of two associations.
40. Adas, 'Profit and the Prophet', pp.42-3.
41. Adas, 'Profit and the Prophet', p.50.
42. A. Bugra, 'Labour, Capital, and Religion: Harmony and Conflict among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.38, No.2 (2002), pp.187-204.
43. Özdemir, 'Religious and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey'.
44. MÜSİAD is not the only representatives of such business interests. Apart from various Chambers of Industry and Commerce, other business organizations were established in the 1990s: the CŨSIAD (founded by Alevite businessmen), the İSHAD (founded by the Gülen sect) etc.
45. MÜSİAD, İs Hayati{dotless}nda İslam İnsani{dotless} (Homo Islamicus) (Istanbul: MÜSİAD, 1994).
46. Kuran, 'Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy', pp.155-73.
47. ESI, Islamic Calvinists, p.24.
48. Adas, 'Profit and the Prophet', p.162.
49. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi II.
50. A. Eraydi{dotless}n, 'Di{dotless}ş Pazarlara Eklemlenmeye Çali{dotless}san Konfeksiyon Sanayiinde Üretimin Örgütlenmesi ve Emek Süreçleri' [The Organization of Production and Labour Process in Export Oriented Textile Industry], ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, Vol.27, No.1/2 (2000), pp.91-117;
51. A. Köse and A. Öncü, 'Dünya ve Türkiye ekonomisinde Anadolu imalat sanayii: Zenginleşmenin mi yoksa yoksullaşmani{dotless}n mi{dotless} esiǧindeyiz?' [Anatolian Manufacturing Industry in the World and Turkish Economy: Are we at Threshold of Prosperity or Poverty?], Toplum ve Bilim, Vol.77 (Summer 1998), pp.135-58.
52. Ü. Cizre-Sakalli{dotless}oǧlu and E. Yeldan, 'Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s', Development and Change, Vol.31 (2000), pp.481-508.
53. The chairman of Konya Chamber of Commerce in Özdemir, 'Religious and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey'.
54. Koyuncu, 'Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD', p.366 (my translation).
55. Buǧra, 'Labour, Capital, and Religion'.
56. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet', p.162.
57. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet', p.164.
58. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamic movement, explained his party's (Refah Partisi) economic programme in two booklets.
59. See N. Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Ankara: Refah Partisi, 1991)
60. and Adil Düzen (Ankara: Refah Partisi, 1993).
61. M. Çi{dotless}nar, Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamci{dotless}li{dotless}k [Islamism as a Political Problem] (Ankara: Dipnot, 2005).
62. Buǧra, 'Labour, Capital, and Religion', p.116.
63. C. Dinç, 'The Welfare Party, Turkish Nationalism and Its Vision of a New World Order', Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.5, No.3 (2006), http://www. alternativesjournal.net/volume5/number3/dinc.pdf
64. At the National Security Council meeting held on 28 February 1997, the military members expressed their concern about the growing religious reactionarism and handed over a list of policy 'recommendations' to the Erbakan-led coalition government to halt the tide of radical Islam in Turkey. Thus, a string of 'pro-secular' measures were introduced to weaken the organizational strength of the Islamic movement. February 28 is often referred as a 'soft coup', 'post-modern coup,' 'covert coup' or 'civil coup'. These terms point to two peculiar characteristics of the military intervention: (a) the cooperation among the armed and 'unarmed/civil' forces; (b) the a typical/unusual character of the intervention, i.e. the absence of a governmental takeover.
65. Z. Önis, 'Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence', Contemporary Politics, Vol.7, No.4 (2001), pp. 281-98.
66. J.H. Jang, 'The Politics of Islamic Banks in Turkey: Taming Political Islamists by Islamic Capital', paper prepared for the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, IL, 2003), pp.5-6.
67. Adaş, 'Profit and the Prophet', p.172.
68. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi I, p.167.
69. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi II, p.81.
70. C. Keyder, 'The Turkish Bell Jar', New Left Review, Vol.28 (2004), pp.65-84.
71. Onis and Türem, 'Business, Globalization and Democracy', p.101.
72. U. Tekin, AK Partinin Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimliǧi [The Conservative-Democrat Identity of AK Party] (Istanbul: Orient, 2004).
73. F. Gülen, 'AKP'nin İktidarda Olduǧu Dönemde Kabul Edilen Yasalar Hakki{dotless}nda Deǧerlendirme' [An Analysis of the Laws Passed during AKP Governments], Mülkiye Dergisi, Vol.30, No.252 (2006), pp.154-5.
74. B. Rubin, 'The Case against Turkey's Ruling Party', The American (20 June 2008).
75. M. Parker, 'Islamic Banking Sector in Turkey Emerges Much Stronger', Arab News (29 March 2004).
76. AKP, 'Urgent Action Plan', AKP (2002).
77. Tekin, AK Partinin Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimliǧi, p.224.
78. B. Rubin, 'Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey', Middle East Quarterly (22 Feb. 2005).
79. B. Rubin, 'Will Turkey Have an Islamist President', AEI Online (Feb. 2007), p.3.
80. A.E. Doǧan, 'Siyasal Yansimalari ile Islamci Sermayenin Gelişme Dinamikleri ve 28 Subat Sureci' [The Growth Dynamics of Islamic Capital, their Reflections on the Political Plane and February 28 Process], Mülkiye Dergisi, Vol.30, No.252 (2006), pp.47-69.
81. Özcan and Çokgezen, 'Trusted Markets'.
82. Jang, 'The Politics of Islamic Banks in Turkey', p.12.
83. Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi II, p.54.
84. F. Ercan, 'The Contradictory Continuity of the Turkish Capital Accumulation', in N. Balkan and S. Savran (eds.), The Ravages of Neo-Liberalism: Economy, Society and State in Turkey (New York: Nova, 2004).
85. Koyuncu, 'Küreselleşme ve MÜsİAD'.
86. M. Peköz, 'Islami Sermayenin Ekonomik Gelişme Düzeyi' [The Development of Islamic Capital], Sendika (20 Jan. 2006).
87. Although municipalities and certain bureaucracies were staffed by Islamists throughout the 1990s, the AKP not only perfected this process, but also focused on those areas which had previously been ignored and/or could not be penetrated: long-term Islamic activists were appointed to significant posts in important ministries and state corporations. Key positions in state-owned banks and financial institutions were occupied by Islamist bankers. The AKP also tried, though failed, to replace the head of the Central Bank with an (loosely) affiliated figure. Those secular-oriented mid-level bureaucrats were either pushed out of their posts and transferred to rural areas or were forced to undertake meaningless tasks to encourage early retirement. Examples can be multiplied.
88. See F. Ercan and Ş. Oǧuz, 'Rescaling as a Class Relationship and Process: The Case of Public Procurement Law in Turkey', Political Geography, Vol.25 (2006), pp.641-'56. This article not only exemplifies these 'multiple-power relationships' well, but also provides the main theoretical framework for the arguments presented above.
89. Ercan and Oguz 'Rescaling as a Class Relationship and Process: The Case of Public Procurement Law in Turkey', Political Geography, Vol.25 (2006), pp.641-'56 also note that since contradictions among these fractions are already internationalized, state intervention in favour of a certain fraction against others amounts to an indirect intervention in favour of a certain fraction/section of global capital. The power bloc can hardly be located on a purely national level since it appears as a part of the class configuration of the country (and thus can be considered as the fourth fraction).
90. F. Ercan, 'Alternatif Baki{dotless}şlari{dotless} Sorgulamak: Türkiye'de Sermaye Gruplari{dotless}ni{dotless}n Küresel Kapitalizmle Bütünleşmelerindeki Rolleri' [The Role of Capital Groups in Articulating with Global Capitalism in Turkey], International Conference: 'Acts of Resistance from the South against Globalisation', 5-7 Sept. 2005, Ankara.