What drives firms' decisions to lobby and determinants of their lobbying positions: Evidence from firms' comment letter submissions during FASB's stock option expensing proposal in 2004

International Journal of Accounting

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-24

  Koh, Wei Chern ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Lobbying; SFAS 123(R); Stock option expensing

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952440766     PISSN: 00207063     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2010.12.003     Document Type: Article

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