The influence of firms on government

B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2011, Pages

  MacHer, Jeffrey T ^a   Mayo, John W ^a   Schiffer, Mirjam ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

government; influence; interest groups; legal origins

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951530355     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351682     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2153     Document Type: Article

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