The Retrieval of Ethics

The Retrieval of Ethics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-352

  Brewer, Talbot ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Activity; Agency; Aristotelian ethics; Desire; Friendship; Motivation; Pleasure; Practical reason; Theoretical reason; Understanding; Virtue; Virtue epistemology; Virtue ethics

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751682215     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (113)

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2. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981; first published 1907), 120-1.
3. Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, 197.
4. Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Volume Three: Ethics, Religion and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 26-42; 26.
5. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
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7. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Right and the Good," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997), 273-98.
8. Jamie Dreier, "The Structure of Normative Theories," Monist 76 (1993), 22-40.
9. Richard Kraut, What is Good and Why, chapter 2, especially 81-91.
10. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 114 (2004), 391-424.
11. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value," Ethics 114 (2004), 391-424.
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19. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," 101.
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21. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," 38.
22. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," 103.
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25. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," 39.
26. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 372.
27. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," 44; "Internal and External Reasons," 111; see also Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 371-2.
28. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 33-55 and 363-73.
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34. Smith, The Moral Problem, 111-19;
35. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, 124-5.
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40. Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 93.
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47. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 86.
48. Michael Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Virtue Ethics (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1997), 259.
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50. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem," in The Monist 59 (1976), 204-17.
51. Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961 and 1971), 13-15.
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55. Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 51.
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58. Cora Diamond, "Missing the Adventure: Reply to Martha Nussbaum," in The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 311.
59. John Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," in John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), see especially 497-9.
60. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," 361.
61. Henry Bugbee, "The Moment of Obligation in Experience," 9.
62. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 426.
63. Charles Taylor's essay "Responsibility for Self," in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 111-26.
64. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-13.
65. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, 113-14.
66. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Social Practice: What Holds Them Apart?" in The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2006), 104-24.
67. Gregory Trianosky, "What Is Virtue Ethics All About?" American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (October 1990), 335-44.
68. Gary Watson, "On the Primacy of Character," in Identity, Character and Morality, Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty, eds. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990), 449-69.
69. Dennis Stampe, "The Authority of Desire," 356-7.
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71. Feldman, "Two Questions about Pleasure," 87-8.
72. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 156.
73. Raimond Gaita, "Narrative, Identity and Moral Philosophy," Philosophical Papers 32 (2003), 261-77; 267.
74. W. D. Falk, "Fact, Value and Nonnatural Predication," in Oughts, Reasons and Morality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 117-18.
75. T. M. Scanlon, "Reasons, Responsibility and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh," in Ethics 112 (2002), 507-28.
76. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000), 722-48.
77. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value," Ethics 114 (2004), 391-424.
78. Philip Stratton-Lake in "How to Deal with Evil Demons: Comment on Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen," Ethics 115 (2005), 788-98.
79. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 515-72.
80. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19, 34-48.
81. Simon Blackburn, "Through Thick and Thin," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 66 (1992), 285-99.
82. Ernest Sosa, "Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue," in Knowledge in Perspective:Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 225.
83. John Greco, "Virtues and Rules in Epistemology," in Linda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 137-8.
84. Alvin Goldman, "The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues," in Zagzebski and Fairweather, Virtue Epistemology, 30-48.
85. Robert Audi, "Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief," in Zagzebski and Fairweather, Virtue Epistemology, 82-97.
86. Keith Lehrer, "The Virtue of Knowledge," in Zagzebski and Fairweather, Virtue Epistemology, 200-13.
87. Linda Zagzebski, "Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth," in Linda Zagzebski and Michael DePaul, eds., Intellectual Virtue:Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 135-54.
88. Simon Blackburn, "Reason, Virtue and Knowledge," in Linda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather, eds., Virtue Epistemology, 15-29.
89. Wayne Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue'." See also Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 185-203.
90. Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue'," 220-1.
91. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge, 192-3.
92. Lewis Carroll, "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles," Mind 4 (1895), 278-80.
93. Moravcsik, "Understanding and Knowledge in Plato's Philosophy," 59-66.
94. M. F. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge," in Enrico Berti, ed., Aristotle on Science: The "Posterior Analytics" (Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1981), 97-139.
95. Zagzebski, "Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth," 149-50.
96. Raimond Gaita, "The Personal in Ethics," in D. Z. Phillips and Peter Winch, eds., Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees (1905-89) (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 124-50.
97. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1997), 170.
98. John Greco, "Virtue, Skepticism and Context," in Axtell, Knowledge, Belief and Character, 55-71.
99. Christopher Hookway, "How to Be a Virtue Epistemologist," in Zagzebski and DePaul, Intellectual Virtue, 183-202.
100. David Solomon, "Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?" in Zagzebski and DePaul, Virtue Epistemology, 57-80.
101. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1979).
102. John Cooper, "Friendship and the Good," in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1999), 336-55.
103. Nancy Sherman, "Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (June 1987), 589-613.
104. Dale Jacquette in "Aristotle on the Value of Friendship as a Motivation for Morality," Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001), 371-89.
105. Nancy Sherman, "Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life," 589-613.
106. Whiting, "Impersonal Friends," Monist 74 (1991), 3-29.
107. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
108. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 254.
109. David O. Brink, "Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community," Social Philosophy and Policy (1999), 252-89.
110. Gregory Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," Platonic Studies, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 3-42.
111. Elijah Millgram's thought-provoking essay, "Aristotle on Making Other Selves," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June 1987), 361-76.
112. Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).
113. Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).