Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?

Public Choice

Volumn 133, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 269-273

  McGregor, Rob Roy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Federal Open Market Committee; Federal Reserve; Federal Reserve bureaucratic objectives; Federal Reserve transparency; FOMC

Indexed keywords

EID: 35649028455     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9226-1     Document Type: Review

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