Why Do Firms Bribe?: Insights from Residual Control Theory into Firms' Exposure and Vulnerability to Corruption

Management International Review

Volumn 50, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 775-796

  Lee, Seung Hyun ^a   Oh, Kyeungrae ^b   Eden, Lorraine ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

^c TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bribery; Corruption; Pervasive and arbitrary corruption; Residual control theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 78651063419     PISSN: 09388249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11575-010-0057-9     Document Type: Article

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