The quest for policy space in a new generation of international investment agreements

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1037-1075

  Spears, Suzanne A ^a  

^a WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 78650828293     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: 14643758     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgq048     Document Type: Article

References (402)

1. By the end of 2009, there were nearly 2,750 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 295 other international economic agreements with investment provisions (collectively international investment agreements or IIAs). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report (WIR), 81 (2010). By the end of 2009, the total number of known investor-state dispute settlement cases filed under IIAs was 357 and the total number of known concluded cases was 164. Ibid, at 83.
2. On international lawyers' anxiety about competing normative orders generally, see Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties' 15 Leiden Journal International Law (2002), at 553-79;
3. International Law Commission (ILC), Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, II Yearbook of the ILC, Part 2 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v Canada, Jurisdiction Award (24 June 1998), 38 ILM 708 (1999) (proposed ban on ethyl as a carcinogenic substance); Metalclad Corp. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)97/1, Award (30 August 2000) (refusal to issue a waste disposal permit and an order establishing an ecological park);
5. S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, Merits, 8 ICSID Report 4, (13 November 2000) (ban on hazardous waste exports); Methanex Corp. v United States, Award, 44 ILM 1345, 17(6) (3 August 2005) (measures to protect public water supplies);
6. Grand River Enterp. Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Decision on Jurisdiction (20 July 2006) (tobacco settlement legislation);
7. Glamis Gold v United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award (8 June 2009) (measures to protect indigenous peoples' culture and health).
8. On cases involving claims by US investors in Argentina's gas transportation and distribution utilities, see José E. Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, 'The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors', in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009 (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009), 379.
9. See, e.g., Occidental v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Award (1 July 2004) (value-added tax on oil profits);
10. Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (21 October 2005) (measures to protect water services);
11. Azurix Corp. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/1/12, Award (14 July 2006) (measures to protect water services);
12. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008) (measures to protect water services);
13. Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and Others v Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Registered (8 January 2007) (legislation to address the legacy of apartheid-era discrimination);
14. Vattenfall et al v Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Registered (17 April 2009) (environmental measures).
15. Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework, A/HRC/11/13, para 30 (2009).
16. See also, Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Towards the Operationalization of the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework, A/HRC/14/27, paras 20-23 (2010).
17. See, e.g., UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Flexibility for Development (2000);
18. Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais, 'The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine', 78 New York University Law Review 30 (2003);
19. UNCTAD, World Investment Report (WIR), xvii (2003);
20. Public Citizen, NAFTA's Threat to Sovereignty and Democracy; The Record of NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases 1994-2005 (2005);
21. Jeswald W. Salacuse and Nicholas P. Sullivan, 'Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of BITs and Their Grand Bargain', 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67 (2005), 77;
22. Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 67;
23. Kate Miles, 'International Investment Law and Climate Change', Society of International Economic Law, Working Paper No. 27/08, 22-6 (2008);
24. International Law Association (ILA), Report of the Rio de Janeiro Conference on International Law on Sustainable Development (2008); UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 81-90.
25. Susan D. Franck, 'Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration', 86 North Carolina Law Review 1 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Jeff Waincymer, 'Balancing Property Rights and Human Rights in Expropriation', in Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 275, 306-7.
27. See e.g., Susan D. Franck, 'The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions', 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 (2005); the collection Michael Waibel et al. (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Austin, Tex.: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2010);
28. James Crawford, 'Forward', in Zachary Douglas (ed), The International Law of Claims (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xxi;
29. Charles N. Brower, Michael Ottolgenhi and Peter Prows, 'The Saga of CMS: Res Judicata, Precedent, and Legitimacy of ICSID Arbitration', in Christina Binder et al. (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century - Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 519;
30. Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 472;
31. Charles H. Brower II, 'Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes', (2009) in Sauvant, above n 4, at 356.
32. Some foresaw the possibility of a backlash against the invest ment law regime even before the recent reappraisals began. See e.g., Jan Paulsson, 'Arbitration Without Privity', 10 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 232 (1995), at 257.
33. See e.g., the collection Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International isputes (2008) 39, 51, 73-74;
34. Van Harten (2008), above n 7; Waibel et al. (eds), above n 10;
35. Dupuy et al. (eds), above n 9;
36. Campbell McLachlan, 'The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(c) of the Vienna Convention', 54 International & Comparative
37. Law Quartely 279 (2005); Campbell McLachlan, 'Investment Treaties and General International Law', 57 International & Comparative Law Quartely 361 (2008).
38. A total of 1,471 of the approximately 2,700 BITs in existence today were signed during the 1990s. UNCTAD, BITs Database, available at http://www.unctad.org/templates/WebFlyer .asp?intItemID=3150〈=1 (visited 16 June 2010). On the economic theories identified with IIAs
39. see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 75-115;
40. Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises & The Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 89;
41. José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, Address at Juris Conference on Investment Treaty Arbitration: Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (30 April 2009);
42. Daniel Kalderimis, Investment Treaties and Public Goods, Paper presented at the Inaugural Asian International Economic Law Network Conference, Tokyo (3 August 2009);
43. Daniel Kalderimis, 'IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis', 13 Social and Legal Studies 104 (2004). Some claim that a mistrust of government characterized all forms of international law during the 20th century.
44. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Ideology of International Adjudication, Address at The Hague Academy of International Law at the 100th Anniversary of the Second Hague International Peace Conference of 1907 (7-8 September 2007).
45. Market failures include the under-supply of public goods (e.g., water services), inefficiencies caused by externalities (e.g., environmental harm) and the need to restore market access when it is threatened by anti-competitive conduct (e.g., to enact laws against monopolies). On neo-liberalism and the regulatory state, see Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 92;
46. Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 4-5;
47. David Kennedy, 'The Rule of Law, Political Choices, and Development Common-Sense', in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 95, 128-50;
48. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism (London: Little, Brown, 1998).
49. The clearest example of this was the failure of negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998.
50. See Catherine Lalumiere, Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (September 1998); The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 18: Multilateral Agreement on Investment (March 1999);
51. UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI (1999). On the backlash against the investment law regime, see also the collection by Waibel et al. (eds), above n 10;
52. Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 69-74;
53. Muchlinksi (2007), above n 12, at 96-99.
54. On the backlash against neo-liberalism (often mis-labelled a backlash against globalization), see Ethan B. Kapstein, Workers and the World Economy, 75(3) Foreign Affairs 16, (May/June 1996);
55. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Fear Not, New Republic 36 (19 May 1997);
56. Daniel Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997);
57. Amartya Sen, 'If It's Fair, It's Good: 10 Truths About Globalization', International Herald Tribunal, 14-15 July 2001; and those cited above n 13.
58. The term 'embedded liberalism' was coined by the SRSG more than a decade ago in his work as a political scientist. See John Gerald Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', 36 (2) International Organization (1982), 195-231, reprinted in John Gerald Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998), 62-84.
59. It has been picked up by economists concerned about the backlash against globalization, including those cited above n 12, and by other notable critics of neo-liberalism, including geographer David Harvey. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). It has been picked up more recently by mmentators on the investment law regime. See Kalderimis (2009), above n 12.
60. See Kennedy, above n 13, at 150-66.
61. Ibid. See also, Ruggie (1982), above n 15;
62. Kalderimis (2009), above n 12, at 5-6;
63. Muchlinksi (2007), above n 12, at 98.
64. See William S. Dodge, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement', 39 Vanderbilt Journal Transnational Law 1 (2006), at 3;
65. Alvarez (2009), above n 12, at 3.
66. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), UN Doc. A/9559 (1 May 1974), 12 ILM 715 (1974);
67. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/9631 (12 December 1974), 14 ILM 251 (1975).
68. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, in Sauvant ed. (2009), above n 4, at 285-7;
69. Philippe Sands, Lawless World (London: Allen Lane, 2005), at 141;
70. Alvarez (2009), above n 12, at 18.
71. Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, 'The Global Financial Crisis: Will State Emergency Measures Trigger International Investment Disputes?', Columbia FDI Perspectives (2009).
72. By the end of 2008, approximately 26% of all BITs were between developing countries. UNCTAD, World Investment Report (WIR), 32 (2009). 23% of the BITs signed in 2009 were between developing countries. UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 82. Developing country transnational corporations now account for a quarter of global foreign direct invest ment (FDI) outflows. Ibid, at xix.
73. The bulk of regulatory changes around the world facilitated FDI during the period 2005-2009,although the period saw trends towards more scrutiny of FDI for national security reasons and restrictions on FDI in extractive industries. UNCTAD, WIR 2009, above n 22, at 30-31; UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 18-20.
74. See also, outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development, UN Gen. Ass., A/RES/63/303 (13 July 2009); Andrew Newcombe, 'Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law', 8 Journal of World Investment and Trade 357 (2007).
75. See Bolivia Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, Investment Treaty News, 9 May 2007;
76. Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 386;
77. Fernando Carbrera Diaz, Ecuador continues exit from ICSID, Investment Treaty News, 8 June 2009
78. Ecuador to denounce remaining BITs, Global Arbitration Review, 30 October 2009; UNCTAD, WIR 2010,above n 1, at 85-6.
79. Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait for a Payout, Law.com (25 June 2009), available at http://justinvestment.org/2009/07/argentine- crisis-arbitration-awards-pile-up- but-investors-still-wait-for-a-payout/(visited 16 June 2010);
80. Luke Eric Peterson, Another Argentine crisis award is annulled; ICSID committee strikes down $100+ Million verdict in favor of Enron Corporation, IA Reporter, 2 August 2010, available at http://www.iareporter.com/ articles/20100802-1 (visited 10 August 2010).
81. The review of the US Model BIT follows on President Obama's campaign pledge: 'I will ensure that foreign investor rights are strictly limited and will fully exempt any law or regu lation written to protect public safety or promote the public interest'. Barack Obama, Pennsylvania Fair Trade Coalition 2008 Presidential Candidate Questionnaire (2 April 2008).
82. See also, US Department of State, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Public Notice 6693, 74 Fed. Reg. (14 July 2009); Damon Vis-Dunbar, United States Reviews its Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Investment Treaty News, 5 June 2009.
83. Norway's review responded to the government's desire to conclude future IIAs that give security to investors while safeguarding the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest. See Luke Eric Peterson, Norway proposes significant reforms to its investment treaty practices, Investment Treaty News, 27 March 2008. Norway's very progressive draft Model BIT was withdrawn in 2009 when it failed to gain parliamentary approval.
84. See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Investment Treaty
85. News, 8 June 2009; Draft Agreement Between The Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (12 December 2007), on file with WCPHD.
86. The South African Department of Trade and Industry explained that it is undertaking an official policy review of the country's BITs because 'the Executive had not been fully apprised of all the possible consequences of BITs', including for human rights, when the young post-apartheid government began entering into them in 1994. South African Department of Trade and Industry, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review (June 2009).
87. Other countries are also in the process of developing new model BITs (Argentina, Venezuela, cuador, Morocco, Bolivia and Turkey) or are planning a review process (Thailand and India). UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 85.
88. See Sections II and III subsequently. See also, Vandevelde (2009), above n 20, at 288-89; Stephen M. Schwebel, 'The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and Denial of Justice', in Christina Binder et al. (eds), above n 10, at 519;
89. Peter Muchlinski, 'Trends in International Investment Agreements: Balancing Investor Rights and the Right to Regulate: The Issue of National Security', in Sauvant (ed) (2009), above n 4, at 37-45
90. See above n 12.
91. See Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 92;
92. Kennedy, above n 13, at 153;
93. Stiglitz (2002), above n 13, at 73;
94. Trebilcock and Daniels, above n 13, at 4.
95. This so-called 'grand bargain' is described in the preambles of 1990s era IIAs. See e.g., UK-Argentina BIT, preamble (1990) (the protection of investments 'will increase prosperity') (emphasis added); Germany-Cambodia BIT (1999) ('the encouragement and contractual protection of such investments are apt. . . to increase the prosperity of both nations') (emphasis added).
96. See also, Salacuse and Sullivan, above n 7; Asha Kaushal, 'Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime', 50 Harvard International Law Journal 491 (2009), 502-10;
97. Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, in M. Waibel et al. (eds), above n 10, at 369;
98. UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries 23 (2009).
99. NAFTA is unusual among older IIAs, as the parties expressly preserve their right to regulate in its preamble. See NAFTA, preamble (1994) (the parties 'preserve their flexibility to safe guard the public welfare'). However, NAFTA also provides that the parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of the agreement not as set out in its preamble, but rather as set out in a separate Objectives provision that does not mention regulatory flexibility.
100. See NAFTA, Article 102. The substantive provisions of NAFTA also indicate that regulation should be consistent with investment disciplines. See e.g., NAFTA, Article 1114(1).
101. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 31(3)(c), 1155 UNTS 331 (1969); ICSID Convention, Article 42(1). Some IIAs expressly incorporate international law. See e.g., US-Argentina BIT, Article II(2)(a) and Article X (1991). Some investor-state de cisions have explicitly recognized that IIAs are governed by international law.
102. See e.g., Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v Republic of Sri Lanka v Sri Lanka, 106 ILR 440, para 41 (1990);
103. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v Chile, Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 (2007).
104. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2008), at 292-93 (noting, however, that the idea that there is a reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction under general international law is a tautology and that the extent of this domain varies according to the development of international law); Andrew Newcombe and Luis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) 321, 358-62 (noting that international law mediates between principles that preserve the domestic domain and principles that limit it).
105. Simply put, 'police powers' refer to a state's right 'to establish and enforce laws protecting the public's health, safety and general welfare'. Black's Law Dictionary: Pocket Edition (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1996), at 486.
106. Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (2007) at 67; Campbell McLachlan (2008), above n 11, at 395-98;
107. Brower II (2009), above n 10, at 374-75. Arbitrators may only have recourse to competing rules of international law that are 'applicable between the parties' under Article 31(2) of the VCLT, however, which means that only customary international law rules and rules found in treaties between the parties may be considered.
108. See Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 466.
109. See Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 449
110. (citing Louis B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter, 'Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens', 55 American Journal of International Law 561 (1961);
111. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 712(g) (1986)); McLachlan et al., above n 37, 21-23
112. (citing R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim's International Law (Harlow: Longman, 1996) at 933)
113. See Alec Stone Sweet, 'Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier', 4 Law
114. 2 Ethics of Human Rights 47 (2010) at 63-64
115. McLachlan et al., above n 37, 22-23;
116. Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, 447-49;
117. Brower II (2009), above n 10, at 356-64.
118. See e.g., Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, 'A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration', in Sauvant (ed) (2008)
119. Above n 11; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, 'The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration', in Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 199, 278, 293;
120. Van Harten (2007), above n 7, 136-43.
121. See e.g., José E. Alvarez, 'Book Review of Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law', 102 American Journal of International Law 909 (2008);
122. Alvarez (2009), above n 12, at 11, and above n 29;
123. Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 414.
124. See e.g., Brower II (2009), above n 10, at 375.
125. See Sections II:A 1-3 below. See also, McLachlan et al., above n 37, at 21-3;
126. Brower II (2009), above n 10, 356-65;
127. Sornarajah (2008), above n 40, 51-73;
128. Sornarajah (2009), above n 40, 283-91;
129. Van Harten (2007), above n 7, 138-9.
130. Ibid. See also, Michael Waibel et al., above n 10, at xxxviii.
131. See e.g., International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) & World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA's Controversial Chapter on Investment Rights 46 (2001);
132. Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William W. Park, 'The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11', 28 Yale Journal of International Law 365 (2003);
133. UNCTAD, WIR 2008, above n 7, at xvii; IISD, Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (2005).
134. See above n 12;
135. Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 92.
136. Kennedy, above n 13, 151-53.
137. Ibid. See also, Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 92;
138. Trebilcock and Daniels (2008), above n 13, 5-12.
139. While the findings of earlier econometric studies measuring the impact of IIAs were ambiguous, more recent studies concur that IIAs do have some influence on FDI inflows, although other determinants of FDI are as important. See UNCTAD (2009), above n 33;
140. Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009);
141. Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, 90-120.
142. Ibid.
143. William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, 'Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties', 48 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 307 (2008), at 348;
144. Muchlinski (2009), above n 30, at 35, 75;
145. Stone Sweet, above n 39, at 48.
146. Burke-White and von Staden, above n 51, at 346.
147. Ibid, at 374.
148. Muchlinski (2009), above n 30, at 76. This analysis is similar to the 'least restrictive alter native' approach developed by the WTO Appellate Body.
149. See Stone Sweet, above n 39, at 71.
150. Stone Sweet, above n 39, at 63.
151. Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, 'Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?', 102 American Journal of International Law 48 (2008), at 77.
152. See generally the sections on 'Judicial "Balancing" of Economic Law and Human Rights in Regional Courts' and 'Case Studies on Protection Standards and Specific Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration', in Dupuy, Francioni and Petersmann (eds), above n 9.
153. See Been and Beauvais, above n 7;
154. Miles, above n 7, 11-19;
155. Sornarajah (2009), above n 40, 283-7;
156. Van Harten (2007), above n 7, 90-3; OECD, International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape (2005), at 43-71.
157. See e.g., NAFTA, Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation ('1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an invest ment (" expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6').
158. McLachlan et al., above n 37, at 306. See also, OECD, above n 58, 50-53
159. (citing European Convention of Human Rights, Article 1 of Protocol 1 (1952);
160. Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injury to Aliens, Article 10(5) (1961);
161. OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Commentary to Article 3 (1967);
162. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, section 712, Comment g).
163. Occidental v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, paras 85, 92 (1 July 2004).
164. Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada, Merits, Phase 1, 7 ICSID Report 69, 85-6 (26 June 2000), followed by Feldman v United Mexican States, Award, 7 ICSID Report 341, 366 (16 December 2002).
165. See Sornarajah (2009), above n 40, at 287.
166. SD Myers Inc. v Government of Canada, Merits, 8 ICSID Report 4, 58 (13 November 2000) (Separate Opinion by Schwarz).
167. See OECD, above n 58, 62-4; Howard Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities, IISD Report for the UN SRSG, 22 (2008).
168. Metalclad Corp. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)97/1, Award, paras 103, 111 (30 August 2000).
169. See also, Azurix Corp. v Republic of Argentina, Award, ARB/01/12 77, para 310 (14 July 2006);
170. Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED, SA v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/00/2 (29 May 2003); Siemens Corp. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, para 270 (17 January 2007);
171. Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1 (17 February 2000).
172. See Brower II (2009), above n 10, 363-4.
173. Methanex Corp. v United States, Award 44 ILM 1345, 17(6) (3 August 2005).
174. Ibid, at 278.
175. See also, Chemtura Corp. v Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 266 (2 August 2010).
176. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Reciprocal Protection of Investment (US Model BIT), Article 6(1) and Annex B(4), (2004);
177. Agreement Between Canada and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada Model BIT), Article 13 and Annex B.13(1) (2004).
178. Penn Central Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104, 123-5 (1978).
179. US Model BIT, Article 6 and Annex B (4)(b) (2004); Canadian Model BIT, Article 13 and Annex B(13)(1(c) (2004).
180. See Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Republic of Singapore, Annex 3 (2005).
181. See Alvarez (2009), above n 12, at 11 and n 29.
182. See e.g., Robert Stumberg, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Ways & Means, Subcommittee on Trade (14 May 2009).
183. See e.g., Linda Menghetti, Vice President, Emergency Committee for American Trade, Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Ways & Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Statement 6 (14 May 2009).
184. COMESA Common Investment Area Agreement (COMESA CIAA) (2007), Article 20(8).
185. ASEAN CIA, Annex 2 (2009).
186. See Miles, above n 7, 19-22;
187. Van Harten (2007), above n 7, 86-90;
188. Sornarajah (2009), above n 40, 289-90;
189. OECD, above n 58, 73-125.
190. Different IIAs formulate FET differently. The standard US and Canadian FET provisions mention customary international law. See e.g., NAFTA, Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment (1994) ('1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment. . . '). The standard European FET provisions (Dutch, German, Swedish, among others) do not mention customary international law.
191. See e.g., Sweden-Czech Republic BIT, Article 2(1) (1990) ('Each Contracting Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment of the investments by investors of the other Contracting Party. . . ').
192. Arif H. Ali and Kassi Tallent, 'The Effect of BITs on the International Body of Investment Law: The Significance of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions', in Rogers and Alford (eds), above n 40, at 213.
193. Miles, above n 7, 21-22.
194. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. (TECMED) v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/00/2, para 154 (29 May 2003) (emphasis added).
195. See also, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, Section 4 (25 May 2004);
196. Occidental v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Award (1 July 2004);
197. PSEG Global Inc. v Republic of Turkey ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007);
198. CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic 14(3) World Trade and Arb, Mat. 109 (13 September 2001);
199. Enron v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007).
200. Parkerings-Compagniet v Lithuania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, para 332 (11 September 2007).
201. Ibid at 333. See also, Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award 18(3) World Trade and Arb, Mat. 166, para 305 (17 March 2006).
202. US Model BIT, Article 5(2)(a) (2004).
203. ASEAN CIA, Article 11. The ASEAN-China Investment Agreement (2009) includes a similar provision. UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 87.
204. Compare Alvarez (2009), above n 12, at 10 with Menghetti, above n 77, at 4.
205. Muchlinski (2009), above n 30, at 42.
206. Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada, Merits, Phase 2, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 110 (10 April 2001).
207. See also Sempra Energy Int'l v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 Award (28 September 2007);
208. Siemens A.G. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (3 August 2004);
209. PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin ̈ Elektrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007);
210. Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, Partial Award 14(3) World Trade and Arb, Mat. 109 (13 September 2001).
211. NAFTA Comm'n, Note of Interpretation (31 July 2001).
212. See US Model BIT, Article 5(2) (2004); Canadian Model BIT, Article 5(2) (2004).
213. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. (TECMED) v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/00/2, para 154 (29 May 2003).
214. Contrast the Spain-Mexico BIT, Article IV(1) (1995) with the Spain-Mexico BIT, Article 2 IV(1)(2006).
215. Alvarez (2009), above n 12, at 11 and n 28 (citing Mexico-PRC BIT signed in Beijing on 11 July 2008 and on file with Transnational Dispute Management).
216. UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 87.
217. COMESA CIAA, Article 14(2).
218. India-Singapore FTA.
219. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, Award at UNCITRAL (NAFTA), 260 (8 June 2009).
220. Ali and Tallent, above n 82 (making this observation).
221. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 116, 125 (11 October 2002).
222. See e.g., ADF Group, Inc. v United States of America, 6 ICSID Reports 470 (9 January 2003);
223. Waste Management, Inc. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, para 98 (30 April 2004);
224. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Award, paras 188-90 (1 July 2004);
225. Azurix Corp. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/1/12, Award (23 June 2006).
226. Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 627 (8 June 2009).
227. L.F.H. Neer & Pauline Neer v United Mexico States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 61-2 (15 October 1926).
228. Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 268 (8 June 2009).
229. Merill & Ring v Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 213 (31 March 2010).
230. Chemtura Corp. v Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 215 (2 August 2010).
231. Ibid, at paras 123, 162, 179, 184, 215, 216, 219 and 224.
232. See e.g., Stumberg, above n 76, at 3.
233. Ibid. However, as noted above, the Glamis Tribunal's view of the scope of the MST went beyond the narrow US government position to include, not only a 'a gross denial of justice', but also 'manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons'. See above n 100. The Tribunal also noted that a breach of the customary international law MST, as codified in NAFTA's FET provision, could also be exhibited by 'the creation by the State of objective expectations in order to induce investment and the subsequent repudiation of those expectations'. Glamis, at para 627.
234. See e.g., Menghetti, above n 77, at 4.
235. Ibid.
236. See Van Harten (2007), above n 7, at 83-6; Muchlinski (2009), above n 30, at 43;
237. Sornarajah (2008), above n 40, at 62-3.
238. See e.g., NAFTA, Article 1102: National Treatment (1994) ('1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circum stances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, man agement, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments . . . ');
239. NAFTA, Article 1103: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (1994) ('1. Each Party shall accord to in vestors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circum stances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments').
240. Ibid.
241. See Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, paras 173-76 (1 July 2004).
242. Parkerings-Compagniet v Lithuania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, at Section 8.3 (11 September 2007).
243. See also Methanex Corp. v United States, Award, 44 ILM 1345, 17(6), Chapter IV B (3 August 2005).
244. Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada, Merits, Phase 2, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) para 78 (10 April 2001).
245. See also GAMI Investments, Inc. v United Mexican States, Award, 44 ILM 545, 114 (15 November 2004).
246. COMESA CIAA, Article 17(2).
247. As noted above, the draft was released for comment in 2007, but has since been withdrawn for failure to gain parliamentary approval. See above n 27.
248. Ibid at n 1.
249. See e.g., Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, Testimony Before US State Department Public Hearing on Bilateral Investment Treaty Reform, 7 (July 2009).
250. See United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para 291.
251. See GATT, Article XX: General Exceptions (1994) ('Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or un justifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . .(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;. . . (e) relating to the products of prison labour; . . . (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; . . . .'). Unlike GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV does not contain an exemption for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
252. See e.g., Armenia-Canada BIT, Article XVII (1997).
253. Model Canadian BIT, Article 10 (2004).
254. See also, Canada-Peru BIT, Article 10(c) (2007);
255. Canada-Colombia FTA, Article 2201, 3(c) (2008);
256. Peru-Singapore FTA, Chapter 10, Article 10.7(3)(c) (2008);
257. Canada-Jordan BIT, Article 10(1) (2009);
258. Canada-Peru FTA, Article 2201, 3(c) (2009).
259. See e.g., Singapore-Australia FTA, Article 19 (2003);
260. Singapore-Japan FTA, Article 83 (2007);
261. Singapore-Jordan BIT, Article 18 (2004);
262. Singapore-India FTA, Article 6.11 (2005);
263. Japan-Malaysia FTA, Article 10 (2005);
264. ASEAN FTA, Article 17 (2009);
265. China- ASEAN FTA, Article 16 (2009);
266. India-Korea FTA, Article 10.18 (2009).
267. Taiwan-Panama FTA, Article 20.02 (2003);
268. Singapore-Korea FTA, Article 21.2 (2005);
269. ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, Chapter 15, Articles 1-5 (2009).
270. China-New Zealand FTA, Article 200 (2008);
271. Japan-Malaysia FTA, Article 10 (2005);
272. Thailand-Australia FTA, Article 1601 (2005).
273. The 1999 New Zealand-Argentina BIT incorporates a general exceptions clause of this type with somewhat different format and wording. See New Zealand-Argentina BIT, Article 5(3) (1999).
274. The US also includes general exceptions clauses based on Article XX of the GATT in its IIAs, but only in relation to performance requirements. See e.g., US Model BIT, Article 8(3) (2004).
275. COMESA CIAA, Article 22.
276. Japan-Korea BIT, Article 16.1 (c) (2002).
277. Mauritius-Switzerland BIT, Article 11 (1998).
278. See e.g., Colombian Model BIT, Article 8 (2002), Text on file with WCPHD.
279. See e.g., COMESA CIAA, Article 22.
280. Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 441. The Tribunal in Continental Casualty Co. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09 Award, para 196 (5 September 2009) im ported a GATT Article XX-like weighing and balancing approach into its interpretation of a national security exception, and has been criticized for doing so.
281. See e.g., Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 441 and n 332; Kalderimis (2009), above n 12, 13-14.
282. Other suggested models include those suggested for balancing in the context of substantive obligations. See above p. 9 and ns 51-5.
283. WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161,169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para 161.
284. Ibid, at para 164.
285. See also, WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, para 210.
286. See e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, paras 306-8;
287. WTO Appellate Body Report, EC - Measures Affecting Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, paras 171-4.
288. DiMascio and Pauwelyn, above n 56, at 82-83.
289. Howard Mann, Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exceptions Clauses Create a Safe Haven for Governments?, IISD Background Papers for the Developing Country Investment Negotiators' Forum, 12 (2007).
290. Howard Mann, Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exceptions Clauses Create a Safe Haven for Governments?, IISD Background Papers for the Developing Country Investment Negotiators' Forum, 12 (2007). Ibid.
291. Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 78;
292. Federico Ortino, 'The Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements: Drafting a New BIT/MIT Model?', 7 International Law FORUM du Droit International 243 (2005).
293. UK-Argentina BIT, preamble (1990). See also e.g., US-Argentina BIT, preamble (1991);
294. Netherlands-Ukraine BIT, preamble (1994).
295. See e.g., US-Argentina BIT, preamble (1991) ('Recognizing that the development of eco nomic and business ties can contribute to the well-being of workers in both Parties and promote respect for internationally recognized worker rights') (emphasis added).
296. See also, Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 470.
297. Alvarez and Khamsi, above n 4, at 470-71.
298. The promotion of 'sustainable development' appears to be stated as an autonomous treaty objective in the preamble of the NAFTA, but the treaty's Objectives provision does not include it. See NAFTA, preamble and Article 102(2) (1994).
299. But see discussion of SD Myers v Canada, below at text accompanying fn 176-77.
300. Stiglitz (2002), above n 13, at 54-5.
301. See also, Dani Rodrik, 'How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders', 1 (2) Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 1 (2007), at 4.
302. See also, Dani Rodrik, 'How to Save Globalization from its Cheerleaders', 1 (2) Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 1 (2007), at 4. Ibid.
303. Trebilcock and Daniels, above n 13, at 4. 152 See Ortino, above n 145;
304. Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making, (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development = Institut international du de?veloppement durable, ©2004) 23-24.
305. VCLT, Article 31(1), above n 35.
306. See Brower II (2009), above n 10, at 375 and n 125.
307. See Peterson, above n 152, at 24;
308. Alvarez (2008), above n 41, at 913. Societe Génerale de Surveillance v Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 ICSID Report 518, 16(3), para 116 (29 January 2004).
309. See also, e.g., Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 44 ILM 138 at para 81 (3 August 2004);
310. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, adopted 25 May 004, para 104.
311. See e.g., Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb./01/3, Award, para 331 (22 May 2007);
312. Sempra Energy Int'l v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, para 373 (28 September 2007);
313. Canfor Corp. v United States of America, Decision on Jurisdiction, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), at para 187 (6 June 2006). A small number of tribunals have interpreted investment disciplines restrictively on the basis that treaty commitments are a derogation of sovereignty (i.e. on the basis of the principle of in dubio mitius).
314. See e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction 18 ICSID Rev 301, para 171 (6 August 2003). But the better view is that there is no such principle of restrictive interpretation of treaties.
315. See Newcombe and Paradell, above n 36, at 116 (quoting Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 1 at 25 (1923)).
316. See also, Brownlie, above n 36, at 290-91.
317. See e.g., Van Harten (2006), above n 7, 136-43;
318. Sornarajah (2008), above n 40, at 51, 73-4;
319. Sornarajah (2009), above n 40, at 278, 293.
320. See e.g., Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award para 307 (14 July 2006);
321. Saluka Investment BV v The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 18(3) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 166 para 300 (17 March 2006).
322. Ortino, above n 145, at 245. See e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada, Merits, Phase 2, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) para 78 (10 April 2001);
323. GAMI Investments, Inc. v United Mexican States, Award 44 ILM 545, 17(2), para 114 (15 November 2004).
324. Ortino, above n 145, at 245; Sornarajah (2008), above n 40, 62-63.
325. See e.g., Howard Mann, Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA's Controversial Chapter on Investment Rights 46 (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2001);
326. Alvarez and Park, above n 45;
327. UNCTAD (2003), above n 7;
328. IISD, above n 45;
329. Ortino, above n 145, at 245;
330. Peterson, above n 152, at 23-24.
331. See Stiglitz (2002), above n 13, at 54-55;
332. Trebilcock and Daniels, above n 13, at 4.
333. The most widely accepted definition of sustainable development is: 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. Bruntland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Annex, UN Doc. A/42/427 (1987).
334. See e.g., Johannesburg Declaration, in Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 26 August-4 September 2002, UN Doc. A/AC.257/32 at 5 (2002); ILA, New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, ILA Res. 3/2002, Annex, UN Doc. A/57/329 (2002).
335. Stiglitz (2002), above n 13, 54-5;
336. Rodrik (2007), above n 149, 19-25;
337. Kennedy, above n 13, at 153.
338. Kennedy, above n 13, at 153 (discussing Stiglitz's work).
339. See New Delhi Declaration, above n 165; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, 'A Real Partnership for Development? Sustainable Development as Treaty Objective in European Economic Partnership Agreements and Beyond', 13(1) Journal of International Economic Law 139 (2010), 150-52.
340. The preambles of some new-generation IIAs still assume that investment protection will automatically lead to the achievement of certain social and environmental policy objectives. However, the inclusion of reformulated provisions or general exceptions clauses in these treaties implicitly acknowledges that this may not always be the case and that investment protection may sometimes need to give way to the protection of such other objectives. See e.g., preambles to Japan-Korea BIT (2002); Canadian Model BIT (2004); Jordan-Singapore BIT (2004); Canada-Peru BIT (2007); COMESA CCIA (2007); China-New Zealand FTA (2008); ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (2009); and India-Korea FTA (2009).
341. US Model BIT, preamble (2004). See also, preambles to the US-Uruguay BIT (2005);
342. Singapore-India FTA (2005); draft Norwegian Model BIT (2007); Canada-Colombia FTA (2008); Canada-Peru FTA (2009); and Australia-Chile FTA (2009).
343. See e.g., preambles to Panama-Taiwan FTA (2003); US-Australia FTA (2004); India- Singapore CECA (2005); US-Peru TPA (2006); Draft Model Norwegian BIT (2007); China-ASEAN FTA (2009).
344. Canada-Colombia FTA, preamble (2008). See also, preambles to the Panama-Taiwan FTA (2003); US-Peru FTA (2006); draft Norwegian Model BIT (2007); Canada-Peru FTA (2009).
345. See e.g., preambles to Canada-Colombia FTA (2008); Canada-Peru FTA (2009). The promotion of 'sustainable development' appears to be stated as an autonomous treaty ob jective in the preambles of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, but those treaties' Objectives provi sions do not mention it. See NAFTA, preamble and Article 102(2) (1994); CAFTA-DR, preamble and Article 1.2 (2004).
346. But see discussion of SD Myers v. Canada, below at n 176-77.
347. Singapore-India FTA, preamble (2005). See also, preambles to the Panama-Taiwan FTA (2003); US-Peru TPA (2006); Canada-Colombia FTA (2008); China-New Zealand FTA (2008); Canada-Peru FTA (2009); China-ASEAN Investment Agreement (2009). The par ties' desire o 'preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare' is mentioned in the preambles but not the Objectives provisions of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR.
348. See e.g., preambles to draft Norwegian Model BIT (2007); Canada-Colombia FTA (2008).
349. SD Myers Inc. v Government of Canada, Merits, 8 ICSID Report 4, at para 221 (13 November 2000).
350. Ibid.
351. See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 'Integrating Social and Economic Development and Environmental Protection in World Trade Law', in Markus W. Gehring and Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 133, 134-35;
352. Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n 168, 166-67.
353. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para 153.
354. See also, WTO Panel Report, United States - Shrimp - Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, adopted 15 June 2000.
355. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 29 April 1996.
356. Ibid, at 30.
357. Ibid.
358. See Cordonier Segger (2005), above n 178, at 134.
359. VCLT, Article 31(3)(c), above n 35.
360. See Vaughan Lowe, 'Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments', in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 36;
361. Cordonier Segger (2005), above n 178, at 134.
362. See Cordonier Segger (2005), above n 178, at 466-67;
363. Lowe, above n 185, at 31.
364. See Cordonier Segger (2005), above n 178, at 466-67;
365. Lowe, above n 185, at 31 (explaining that interstitial norms function to 'push[] and pull[] the boundaries of true primary norms when they threaten to overlap or conflict with each other').
366. See Cordonier Segger (2005), above n 178, 134-5;
367. Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n 168, 148-9.
368. Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine ('Ijzeren Rijn') Railway (Belgium v Netherlands), Permanent Court of Arbitration - Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, para 59 (24 May 2005).
369. See also, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Report 7-84 (25 September 1997).
370. Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n 168, at 150.
371. Kalderimis (2009), above n 12, at 17.
372. Stone Sweet, above n 39, at 49-50.
373. Ortino, above n 145, at 245.
374. Kennedy, above n 13, at 166.
375. Of the general exceptions discussed above, only Article 22 of the COMESA CIAA, which permits a Member State to adopt 'any measure that it considers appropriate', appears to be self-judging.
376. Kennedy, above n 13, at 169.
377. Grosse Ruse-Khan, above n 168, at 156.
378. For writing that grapples with some of these issues, see the contributions regarding 'Judicial "Balancing" of Economic Law and Human Rights in Regional Courts' and 'Case Studies on Protection Standards and Specific Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration', in Dupuy et al. (eds), above n 9.
379. See Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel, 'Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to Constitutionalization?', in Dupuy et al. (eds), above n 9, at 118-36.
380. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Constitutional Theories of International Economic Adjudication and Investor-State Arbitration', in Dupuy et al. (eds), above n 9, 137-94;
381. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15 (2005).
382. See Gary B. Born and Ethan G. Shenkman, 'Confidentiality and Transparency in Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration', in Rogers and Alford (eds), above n 40, 5-42;
383. Joachim Delaney and Daniel Barstow Magraw, 'Procedural Transparency', in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 721-88; UNCTAD, WIR 2010, above n 1, at 89.
384. See Asif H. Qureshi, 'An Appellate System in International Investment Arbitration?', in Muchlinski et al. (eds), above n 201, 1154-70
385. Jacques Werner, 'Limits of Commercial Investor-State Arbitration: The Need for Appellate Review', in Dupuy et al. (eds), above n 9, 115-17;
386. Sauvant (ed) (2008), above n 11;
387. Van Harten (2008), above n 7.
388. See Lisa J. Laplante and Suzanne A. Spears, 'Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector', 11 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 69 (2008).
389. See e.g., Newcombe, above n 23, at 403-06;
390. IISD, above n 45.
391. See e.g., Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, P.L. 107-210, 19 USC. 3802 (2002);
392. Bush Administration-Congressional Bipartisan Trade Agreement (10 May 2007);
393. William Warren, Policy Director, Forum on Democracy and Trade, Testimony to US Dept. of State, Hearing on Revision of the Model US BIT (29 July 2009);
394. Stumberg, above n 76.
395. See above n 4.
396. See Newcombe, above n 23, at 357.
397. See UNCTAD (2009), above n 33;
398. Sauvant and Sachs, above n 49;
399. Vandevelde (2010), above n 12, at 90-120.
400. See Lalumiere, above n 14;
401. Parliament of Australia, above n 14;
402. UNCTAD (1999), above n 14.