IMF Conditionally as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Social and Legal Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 103-131

  Kalderimis, Daniel ^a  

^a Columbia Law School ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1142276288     PISSN: 09646639     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/096466304040194     Document Type: Article

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