Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 91, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 531-553

  Schwitzgebel, Eric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650502326     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x     Document Type: Review

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