Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: A study on market equilibration

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 36, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 473-488

  Kojima, Fuhito ^a   Ünver, M Utku ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Many to many matching; Pairwise stability; Random paths; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 40149107578     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0037-2     Document Type: Article

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