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Volumn 145, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 2412-2423

Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence

Author keywords

Moral hazard; Persistence; Repeated agency

Indexed keywords


EID: 78649730415     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.017     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.