Repeated moral hazard with persistence

Economic Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 831-854

  Mukoyama, Toshihiko ^a,b   Şahin, Ayşegül ^c  

^a Gina Cody School of Engineering and Computer Science   (Canada)

^b Canada H3A 2T7   (Canada)

^c PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Human capital; Persistence; Repeated moral hazard; Unemployment insurance.

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244505475     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0488-2     Document Type: Article

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