Gradient dynamics in population games: Some basic results

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 691-707

  Friedman, Daniel ^a   Ostrov, Daniel N ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

C73; D70; Gradient dynamics; Population games; Potential games

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649630933     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.006     Document Type: Article

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