Are security experts useful? Bayesian Nash equilibria for network security games with limited information

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6345 LNCS, Issue , 2010, Pages 588-606

  Johnson, Benjamin ^a   Grossklags, Jens ^b   Christin, Nicolas ^a   Chuang, John ^c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UC Berkeley School of Information   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded Rationality; Game Theory; Limited Information; Security Economics

Indexed keywords

NETWORK SECURITY;

BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIA; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; LIMITED INFORMATION; NETWORKS SECURITY; OVERALL NETWORKS; SECURITY ECONOMICS; SECURITY EXPERTS; SECURITY GAMES; SECURITY RESEARCH;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 78049362316     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_36     Document Type: Conference Paper

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