The United States and the rise of China: Implications for the long haul

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 125, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 359-391

  Art, Robert J ^a  

^a BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 78049355092     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2010.tb00678.x     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. For a skeptical view of this happening anytime soon, see Lester Thurow, "A Chinese Century: Maybe It's the Next One," The New York Times, 19 August 2007.
2. See Clive Cookson, "China Leads World in Growth of Scientific Research," Financial Times, 26 January 2010; Keith Bradsher, "China Drawing High-Tech Research from U.S.," The New York Times, 18 March 2010.
3. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and
4. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
5. Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 188 and ff.
6. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 402.
7. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 113-114.
8. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 114-119.
9. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2009 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009), 141, 145, 148, 541, 542. The figure for China's total exports to the world is based on Chinese export data. The figure for China's exports to the United States, however, is based on U.S. import data, not China's export data. These two figures are not the same because, as the International Monetary Fund makes clear, there are discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics as reported by China and its industrial trading partners. I used U.S. import figures from China to measure China's exports to the United States because I deem the U.S. figures more accurate. Finally, in 2008, the United States exported to China, Hong Kong, and Macao $93 billion, or 7 percent, of its total exports.
10. China's GDP for 2008 is taken from the World Bank. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. The GDP figure is rounded.
11. A useful benchmark for assessing China's dependence on the U.S. market is the percentage of U.S. exports to Canada, which is America's largest trading partner. In 2008, U.S. exports to Canada amounted to $261 billion, or 20 percent of total U.S. exports (1.3 trillion) for that year (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2008), 541.
12. Richard N. Cooper, "Is 'Economic Power' a Useful and Operational Tool?" 25, accessed at http://economics.harvard.edu/faculty/cooper/papers/Economic%2Power.pdf, 10 December 2006.
13. As of March 2010, total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities were $3,884.6 trillion, of which Japan and China held $1.680 trillion. See the U.S. Treasury's International Capital Flow data at http://www.treasury.gov/tic/mfh.txt. Total U.S. treasury securities as of December 2009 amounted to $12.3 trillion. Of that total, $4.5 trillion was held by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Government accounts and the rest was privately held.
14. See United States Treasury, Table FD-1 (Summary of Federal Debt), Treasury Bulletin, March 2010, 22, accessed at http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html, 25 April 2010.
15. Daniel Drezner makes this point well. See Daniel W. Drezner, "Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics," International Security 34 (Fall 2009): 7-45, at 44.
16. See, for example, Elizabeth S. Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts," Security Studies 5 (Summer 1996): 45, 71-72;
17. Daniel W. Drezner, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?" International Organization 54 (Winter 2000): 75, 97-98.
18. Quoted in Cooper, "Economic Power," 35.
19. These three cases do not include all the great-power cases of rising-versus-dominant power dyads of the last 100 years. Most prominently and deliberately excluded is the U.S.-British case of the late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries. In Table 1, I focus on two types of competitions: those that resulted in a great-power hegemonic war or those that entailed a hostile, intense, and sustained political competition for hegemony and that involved heavy reliance on military force to fight proxy wars or to engage in arms races to achieve political hegemony. The U.S.-British case does not fall into either category, although the United States did threaten the British with a naval arms race after World War I if they did not renounce the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. By focusing on the three cases I have chosen, I have selected on the dependent variable-those cases in which the outcome is either war or a sustained political-military rivalry rather than peace or peaceful accommodation, with the result that the conclusions of this analysis are, to a degree, biased. Nonetheless, there is still analytical merit in focusing on these two types of hegemonic competitions to see what conclusions we can draw. For a slightly different list of important power transitions
20. see Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, The War Ledger (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 49.
21. For an analysis of why the U.S.- British case ended in peace, not war, see Stephen R. Rock, When Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Historical Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 2.
22. For a more general treatment of the strategies that dominant powers employ to cope with rising powers, see Randell L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), 1-32.
23. There are four distinct theories as to why wars occur between rising and dominant great powers, but in one way or another, all four revolve around perceptions or actual manifestations of fundamental power shifts between the two states. The first three theories argue that the dominant power launches the hegemonic war; the fourth, that the rising power launches the hegemonic war. Dale Copeland argues that the dominant power will launch a preventive war against a rising power when it believes that its own decline is both inevitable and steep and at a time when it believes it is still more powerful than the rising challenger. (See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, chap. 2.) Robert Gilpin argues that hegemonic wars occur between a dominant and a rising power when the governance of the system and its power distribution are in disequilibrium, in other words, when the rising power does not benefit from the system as much as its power entitles or enables it to; and although he is a little vague about which state starts the war, it is generally the declining but still dominant power that does. (See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, chap. 5.) Stephen Van Evera argues that windows of vulnerability and opportunity produce war between a declining dominant power and a rising power when the former attacks the latter. [See Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), chap. 4. Finally, the power transition school, founded by A.F.K. Organski, argues that peace obtains when the dominant state has a huge preponderance of power over any potential challenger, but that wars occur as the power disparity between the dominant and rising power narrows, and occurs just before the rising power achieves parity with the dominant power, or at the moment when it has achieved parity, or just after it has overtaken the dominant power-the time when war is initiated, depends on which version of the power transition theory is used.
24. See A.F.K. Organski, World Politics. 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), chap. 12, esp. 333; Kugler and Organski, The War Ledger, 19-22, 49-61;
25. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 1; and
26. st Century (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000), chap. 1.
27. See Art, A Grand Strategy, 66-67.
28. In 1913, 10 percent of Britain's total trade (imports and exports) was with Germany, and 12 percent of Germany's total trade was with Britain. These percentages are derived from the Correlates of War data. The data were prepared by Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1870-1985" (Ph.D. diss., Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, 1996). The dataset is at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. I am indebted to Loren Cass for arranging the data for easy use.
29. In 1938, 4 percent of Britain's total trade (imports and exports) was with Germany, and 6 percent of Germany's total trade was with Britain. See note 19 for data source.
30. In 1977, for example, during the height of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, when one would expect trade to be the highest, the United States sent 1.4 percent of its total exports to the Soviet Union and received.3 percent of its total imports from the Soviet Union. By 1983, when détente had ended and U.S.-Soviet relations were hostile, the United States sent.1 percent of its exports to, and received.1 percent of its imports from, the Soviet Union. In 1977, the Soviets exported 2.5 percent of their exports to the United States and took 8 percent of their imports from the United States. By 1983, these Soviet figures had fallen to 1 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively. See International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1984 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1984), 378, 385.
31. This is close to the argument that Dale Copeland makes about the causes of hegemonic greatpower wars. See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, chaps. 1 and 2.
32. The stability-instabilty paradox says that two nuclear-armed and hostile states will either start a conventional war with each other because they feel confident that it will not escalate to all-out nuclear war, or they will not start such a war, because they fear that it might escalate to all-out nuclear war. During the Cold War, the paradox produced the second, not the first, effect. Glenn Snyder was the first to formulate the paradox. See Glenn H. Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1965), 198-199.
33. Also see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31-33, 148-157.
34. The exception came in November 1983 with the NATO exercise "Able Archer." This was a serious crisis from the Soviets' point of view, and they briefly believed a nuclear strike from the West was imminent. At the time, however, neither the United States nor NATO was aware of Soviet concerns, making this crisis hard to classify. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 227-228.
35. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that the United States "stands on the cusp of nuclear primacy," by which they mean a disarming first-strike capability, vis-à-vis Russia. Although their analysis focuses on Russia, they argue that by extension, their conclusions have even greater validity with respect to China because the Russian nuclear arsenal is so much larger and sophisticated than China's. See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD: The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30 (Spring 2006): 7-44, at 8.
36. As of 2009, according to the Pentagon, in addition to intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles, China deployed 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); approximately 20 liquid-fueled, limited-range CSS-3 ICBMs; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs; JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on the XIA-class SSBN; and by 2010, enhanced CSS-4s and the JIN-class SSBNs, each of which will carry 12 JL-2 SLBMs. (The CSS-4s are slow to fire and highly vulnerable to a first strike; the operational status of the XIA-class submarine is questionable; the JL-2 will have a range of about 8,000 kilometers.) The Pentagon says that these qualitative and quantitative improvements will yield greater mobility and survivability and "strengthen China's deterrent and enhance its strategic strike capabilities"; see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009, 24, accessed at www.defenselink.mil, 28 April 2010; and
37. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2009, 51, accessed at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html, 25 April 2010. The International Institute of Strategic Studies reports that China had 66 deployed ICBMs in 2009, including 12 DF-31s, 24 DF-31As, and 3 SSBNs-1 XIA-class equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs and 2 JIN-class equipped with up to 12 JL-2 SLBMs.
38. See International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010), 399. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission estimated that China will have an intercontinental nuclear force of 75-100 warheads by 2015.
39. See Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong., 1st sess., November 2005, 121, accessed at http://www.uscc.gov, 10 December 2006.
40. Under the Obama administration, the United States appears to have implicitly accepted that mutual assured destruction exists between the United States and China. The administration's April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review speaks of "ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers-most notably Russia and China" (p. 4). "Strategic stability" means neither country has an incentive to strike first because both can retaliate against a first strike. See Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report April 2010, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/npr/, 27 April 2010.
41. By 2007, 82 percent of Taiwanese manufacturers' overseas investment was in mainland China, 16 percent in the United States, and 2 percent elsewhere. ("Most of Taiwan's Foreign Investment is in China," Central News Agency, 4 November 2007, accessed at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/CNA/ 2007/CNA-041107.htm, 24 April 2010). By 2010, about 40 percent of Taiwan's total exports went to Hong Kong and mainland China [Janet Ong, "China's Opening Taiwan Trade Boosts Exports, Tourism," Taiwan News Online, accessed at http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/print.php; and
42. Jonathan Adams, "Weighing the Costs in Asian Trade Talks," The New York Times, 13 May 2010, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/global/13straits.html, 26 May 2010.]
43. For example, former President Chen Shui-bian, who favors Taiwan's independence, said in a speech on 1 January 2006: "Globalization is not tantamount to China-ization. While Taiwan would never close itself off to the world, we shall also not lock in our economic lifeline and all our bargaining chips in China," quoted in Keith Bradsher, "Taiwan Chief Seeks More Arms, Not Better Ties to China," The New York Times, 2 January 2006.
44. This was reported in several news sources, but the quote comes from Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, 7 May 2003.
45. See Selig Harrison, "Inside North Korea: Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis," Financial Times, 4 May 2004. Pam Nam-soon, the Foreign Minister, also told Harrison: "Let me make clear that we denounce al-Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism and we will never transfer our nuclear material to others."
46. Jon Fox, "North Korea Hints at Nuclear Weapons Transfer," Global Security Newswire, 29 September 2006, accessed at www.nit.org/, 14 December 2006.
47. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Using Clues From Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery," The New York Times, 31 March 2005.
48. The Japanese government's preference is not to be "singularized"-not to be the only site of forward deployed U.S. forces in East Asia, because this would be, in its view, politically untenable. Nonetheless, Richard Samuels argues that if the option were no alliance with the United States or being singularized, the Japanese government would accept singularization over abandonment by the United States. Communication with Richard Samuels on 31 August 2006.
49. See Robert S. Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia," Security Studies 15 (July-September 2006): 374-379.
50. Analysts differ on why Japan continues with its non-nuclear status. Some believe it is due to the alliance with the United States. Others believe that Japan's "nuclear allergy" is strong enough to keep Japan non-nuclear should the alliance collapse. I adhere to the first view. So, also, does Richard Samuels in his excellent book on Japanese security. See Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), chap. 6.
51. China and North Korea were first named as potential threats in Japan's December 2004 New Defense Program Guidelines. See Samuels, Securing Japan, chap. 3. Also see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power (Adelphi paper 368-9, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 67-71.
52. Japan's 2007 Defense White Paper continued to express concern about China's military buildup. See David Pilling, "Japan Feels Threat of China's Military," Financial Times, 7/8 July 2007.
53. Also see Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2009, 48-64, accessed at http://www.mod.go.jp/ e/publ/w_paper/2009.html, 26 April 2010.
54. Samuels, Securing Japan, chaps. 7 and 8; Hughes, Japan's Re-emergence, conclusion; and Thom Shanker and Norimitsu Onishi, "Japan Assures Rice That It Has No Nuclear Intentions," The New York Times, 19 October, 2006.
55. The two remaining frontier disputes are with India and Bhutan. See Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," International Security 30 (Fall 2005): 55-58.
56. For example, a 1999 Japanese survey estimated that as much as 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas might lie beneath the Senkaku archipelago. The Spratlys could lie above an estimated 100 billion barrels of oil and 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas. See Agence France Press, "Japan to Explore Oil and Gas in Political Minefield with China," 13 April 2005; and Bruce Vaugh and William M. Morrison, "China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues and Implications for the United States," Congressional Research Service, updated 4 April 2006.
57. Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation," 62.
58. Ralf Emmers, "Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo" (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, September 2005), 9-14, accessed at www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS/publications/ Working Papers/WP87.pdf, 10 December 2006.
59. According to a report in the The New York Times, Chinese officials told two senior officials of the Obama administration in March 2010 that China considers the South China Sea a "core interest" of its sovereignty and would brook no interference in it. The article claimed that this was the first time China had designated the South China Sea a core interest, putting it on a par with Taiwan and Tibet. See Edward Wong, "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power," The New York Times, 24 April 2010.
60. In 2009, total U.S. exports and imports of merchandise goods and services from the Pacific Rim countries (Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, and others) equaled $787,946 billion, while the comparable figure from North America (Mexico and Canada) was $735,146 billion. North America remains the largest market for U.S. exports. Figures come from U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "FT900: U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2009," Exhibits 1 4, release date 10 February 2010, accessed at http://www.census.gov:80/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2009pr/12/, 25 April 2010.
61. Percentage figures calculated from ibid.
62. Today, some Chinese analysts, although not the majority, now see the U.S.-Japan alliance as emboldening Japan to act more aggressively in East Asia. Representative of that view is Wu Xinbo, "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance," The Washington Quarterly 29 (Winter 2005-06): 119-131.
63. China's current sea-based nuclear forces, as detailed in note 26, remain small, with two JIN-class and one XIA-class SSBNs, and its SSBN fleet is likely to be highly vulnerable for a time to America's formidable submarine detection capabilities. See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U. S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: The Federation of American Scientists and the National Resources Defense Council, 2006), 79-85 for full details on
64. China's sea-based deterrent, accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/book2006.pdf, 10 December 2006.
65. President Bush came close to saying this on 2 December 2003: "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose." Statement accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/ 20031209-2.html, 14 December 2006. In November 2007 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reassured China's President Hu Jintao that the U.S Government is "categorically" opposed to Taiwan's making any moves toward independence.
66. See Jim Mannion, "Gates Reassures Hu on Taiwan," Agence France Presse, 7 November 2007, accessed at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/AFP/ 2001/AFP-071107.htm, 26 April 2010.
67. For a succinct overview of the steps the United States has taken to enhance its security ties in East Asia, see Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," The Washington Quarterly 29 (Winter 2005-06): 148-153.
68. For the views of U.S. allies and security partners toward China's rise and their security ties with the United States, see Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman D. Levin, Julia F. Lowell, Angel Rabasa, Somi Seong, Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).
69. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006, executive summary, accessed at www.defenselink.mil, 15 December 2006.
70. 2006 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 15, 24-25; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007, 16, accessed at www.defenselink.mil, 16 December 2007.
71. Wen Wei Po, a Chinese government-backed newspaper, in March 2007, claimed that the Chinese navy would have its first aircraft carrier by 2010. See Richard Spencer, "US Unnerved by Chinese Naval Build-Up," The Telegraph, accessed at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml5/news/ 2007/03/08/wchina08.xml, 15 April 2010.
72. Quoted in Peter Ford, "Fighter Jet Signals China's Military Advances," Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 2007. A recent report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences made the case that China now had long-range maritime interests and was in the process of changing from a land power into a sea power. See "Why China Wants a Bigger Navy," The Economist, 4 January 2007, accessed at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id58497626, 16 April 2010.
73. The December 2006 China White Paper on defense stated that while "China's overall security environment remains sound, [the Navy] aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations...." See Information Office of the State Council, China, China's National Defense in 2006,3,5, accessed at www.fas.org, 14 December 2006. For a good assessment of the current state of the Chinese navy, see
74. Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, "China's Maturing Navy," Naval War College Review 69 (Spring 2006): 90-108;
75. Dennis C. Blair, "Military Power Projection in Asia," in Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble, eds. Strategic Asia 2008-09 (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), 405-410; and
76. M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Search for Military Power," The Washington Quarterly 31 (Summer 2008): 131-135.
77. Wong, "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power."
78. China's 2008 defense paper, the most recent available, is less clear than the 2006 defense paper on the ultimate objectives for China's navy. It says simply that the tasks of the navy include: "safe-guarding China's maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial waters, along with its maritime rights and interests." See Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2008, at the Federation of American Scientists' Web site (www.fas.org). For a keen analysis of the societal pressures building within China for a power projection navy centered on aircraft carriers, see Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response," International Security 34 (Fall 2009): 46-82.
79. For an analysis of the implications for the United States if China deploys aircraft carriers, see Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update," Naval War College Review 63 (Winter 2010): 13-32.
80. Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander U.S. Pacific Command before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 23, 2010," 13, 3, accessed at http://pacom.mil/web/site_pages/commander/Statements%20&%20Testimony.shtml, 25 April 2010.
81. Also see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009, 20-30, accessed at www.defenselink.mil, 25 April 2010.
82. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006, 47.
83. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 32. For a fuller discussion of this concept, see Jan Van Tol, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, 2010, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, accessed at www.csba.org, 25 May 2010.
84. For similar proposals, see Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," 161-164; and
85. Michael Schiffer, "Time for a Northeast Asian Security Initiative," PacNet, No. 59, Pacific Forum CSIS, 8 December 2006, accessed at www.pacforum.org, 26 May 2010.
86. For a more extensive discussion of institutionalizing security arrangements in Asia, see Nick Bisley, Building Asia's Security, International Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper #408 (New York: Routledge, 2009).
87. See Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chaps. 1, 3.
88. For a similar analysis, see Ross, 'China's Naval Nationalism,' 75-80.