The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 475-487

  Lai, Yu Bong ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Capital mobility; Fiscal federalism; Globalization; Interest groups; Political economy; Tax competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 78049235532     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.02.001     Document Type: Article

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