The effects of tax competition when politicians create rents to buy political support

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 5-6, 2008, Pages 1142-1163

  Eggert, Wolfgang ^a,c   Sørensen, Peter Birch ^b,c,d  

^a Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

^d EPRU ^*  (Denmark)

Author keywords

Probabilistic voting; Rent seeking; Tax competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 40949098558     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.002     Document Type: Article

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