Who cuts back and when? The politics of delays in social expenditure cutbacks, 1980-2005

West European Politics

Volumn 33, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1214-1240

  Tepe, Markus ^a   Vanhuysse, Pieter ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ECONOMIC GROWTH; MACROECONOMICS; OECD; PARTY POLITICS; POLICY MAKING; POLITICS; PUBLIC SPENDING; UNEMPLOYMENT; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 77958562954     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: 17439655     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2010.508903     Document Type: Article

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