Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes

Studies in American Political Development

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 72-92

  Pierson, Paul ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0001668209     PISSN: 0898588X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X00003011     Document Type: Review

References (126)

1. For useful discussions see Andrew Abbott, "Transcending General Linear Reality," Sociological Theory 6 (1988): 169-86; John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in the Social Sciences," Behavioral Science 5 (1960): 136-45; and Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
2. For useful discussions see Andrew Abbott, "Transcending General Linear Reality," Sociological Theory 6 (1988): 169-86; John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in the Social Sciences," Behavioral Science 5 (1960): 136-45; and Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
3. For useful discussions see Andrew Abbott, "Transcending General Linear Reality," Sociological Theory 6 (1988): 169-86; John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in the Social Sciences," Behavioral Science 5 (1960): 136-45; and Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
4. Terrence J. McDonald, ed., The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
5. Ruth Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112; Karen Orren and Stephen Sowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism'," in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 311-30; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
6. Ruth Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112; Karen Orren and Stephen Sowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism'," in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 311-30; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
7. Ruth Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112; Karen Orren and Stephen Sowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism'," in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 311-30; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
8. Ruth Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81-112; Karen Orren and Stephen Sowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism'," in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 311-30; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
9. Roy Aminzade, "Historical Sociology and Time," Sociological Methods and Research 20 (1992): 458.
10. Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), 14.
11. Given limits of space and expertise, I make no effort to evaluate the empirical claims made in the works investigated here. The goal is to highlight and clarify distinct claims about sequencing. I have, however, generally selected research which has received considerable attention and significant favorable comment. Because comparison across cases provides a powerful framework for identifying and examining sequences, the focus is on the field of comparative politics, with only occasional references to research in international relations and American politics. For a relevant collection of essays from the latter field, see Dodd and Jillson, The Dynamics of American Politics. Similar issues in international relations are considered in Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
12. Given limits of space and expertise, I make no effort to evaluate the empirical claims made in the works investigated here. The goal is to highlight and clarify distinct claims about sequencing. I have, however, generally selected research which has received considerable attention and significant favorable comment. Because comparison across cases provides a powerful framework for identifying and examining sequences, the focus is on the field of comparative politics, with only occasional references to research in international relations and American politics. For a relevant collection of essays from the latter field, see Dodd and Jillson, The Dynamics of American Politics. Similar issues in international relations are considered in Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
13. The limited attention paid to such questions in political science stands in striking contrast to the vibrant (if not always satisfying) discussion underway in sociology. One can get a sense of this from a quick perusal of the citations in James Mahoney, "Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macro-Causal Analysis," American Sociological Review 104 (1999): 1154-96.
14. Note that this is a distinct issue from questions of research design - of how particular historically-grounded methods may help us explore issues of causality and of the strengths and limitations of different approaches to historically-based research. For excellent discussions of those issues see Dietrich Reuschemeyer and John D. Stephens, "Comparing Historical Sequences - A Powerful Tool for Causal Analysis," Comparative Social Research 17 (1997): 55-72, and Mahoney, "Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal."
15. Note that this is a distinct issue from questions of research design - of how particular historically-grounded methods may help us explore issues of causality and of the strengths and limitations of different approaches to historically-based research. For excellent discussions of those issues see Dietrich Reuschemeyer and John D. Stephens, "Comparing Historical Sequences - A Powerful Tool for Causal Analysis," Comparative Social Research 17 (1997): 55- 72, and Mahoney, "Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal."
16. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), viii. For additional discussions see Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), chap. 1; and Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a discussion of the benefits and limits of the quest for mechanisms, see Arthur Stinchcombe, "The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science," Philosophy of Social Sciences 21 (1991): 367-88.
17. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), viii. For additional discussions see Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), chap. 1; and Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a discussion of the benefits and limits of the quest for mechanisms, see Arthur Stinchcombe, "The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science," Philosophy of Social Sciences 21 (1991): 367-88.
18. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), viii. For additional discussions see Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), chap. 1; and Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a discussion of the benefits and limits of the quest for mechanisms, see Arthur Stinchcombe, "The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science," Philosophy of Social Sciences 21 (1991): 367-88.
19. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), viii. For additional discussions see Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), chap. 1; and Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a discussion of the benefits and limits of the quest for mechanisms, see Arthur Stinchcombe, "The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science," Philosophy of Social Sciences 21 (1991): 367-88.
20. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 29.
21. A much more extensive discussion, including a defense of this relatively narrow definition of path dependence, is presented in Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, forthcoming. For partly complementary, partly contrasting perspectives, see James Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," Theory and Society, forthcoming; and Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999).
22. A much more extensive discussion, including a defense of this relatively narrow definition of path dependence, is presented in Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, forthcoming. For partly complementary, partly contrasting perspectives, see James Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," Theory and Society, forthcoming; and Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999).
23. A much more extensive discussion, including a defense of this relatively narrow definition of path dependence, is presented in Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, forthcoming. For partly complementary, partly contrasting perspectives, see James Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," Theory and Society, forthcoming; and Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999).
24. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
25. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1968, pp. 101-29. See also Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, chap. 1.
26. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1968, pp. 101-29. See also Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, chap. 1.
27. For detailed discussions of this point, see Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology"; and Andrew Abbott, "On the Concept of Turning Point," Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 85-105.
28. For detailed discussions of this point, see Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology"; and Andrew Abbott, "On the Concept of Turning Point," Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 85-105.
29. Although analyses invoking the language of "critical junctures" sometimes focus on large-scale, dramatic events, those qualities are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate path dependent dynamics. In fact, the point in path dependent analyses is that "causes" may often seem relatively small compared with their effects. What makes a particular juncture "critical" is that it triggers a process of positive feedback.
30. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics," 385.
31. An infinite number of equilibria may be a feature of some highly stylized formal models of path dependence processes, as with the Polya Urn illustration outlined in Brian Arthur's Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). It is equally possible to build a formal path dependent model with only two equilibria. See Greg Hill, "History, Necessity, and Rational Choice Theory," Rationality and Society 9 (1997): 189-213.
32. An infinite number of equilibria may be a feature of some highly stylized formal models of path dependence processes, as with the Polya Urn illustration outlined in Brian Arthur's Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). It is equally possible to build a formal path dependent model with only two equilibria. See Greg Hill, "History, Necessity, and Rational Choice Theory," Rationality and Society 9 (1997): 189-213.
33. Abbott, "Transcending Linear Reality."
34. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 98-99.
35. Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology"; Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics."
36. Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology"; Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics."
37. For more on each of these three stages see the discussion in Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, chap. 1.
38. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics." Stinchcombe made the same basic point thirty-five years ago: It is considerably more difficult to explain why many types of organizations retain structural peculiarities after their foundation without falling into tautologous statements about "tradition," "vested interests," or "folkways" not being changeable by formal regulation. The problem is to specify who it is that carries "tradition" and why they carry it, whose "interests" become "vested," under what conditions, by what devices, whose "folkways" cannot be changed by regulation, and why. This problem is at the very center of sociological theory.
39. (Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in James March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 167)
40. Arthur, Increasing Returns, 112-13.
41. Historical institutionalists have often claimed that their analyses are more sensitive to issues of power than those of much mainstream social science. It is worth underlining how the exploration of path dependent dynamics can help sharpen fuzzy claims that the investigation of power requires the analysis of temporal processes. In the famous community power debate of the 1960s and 1970s, Bachrach and Baratz and Lukes argued persuasively that power asymmetries are often hidden from view; where power is most unequal, it often does not need to be employed openly. Pluralists critics essentially countered that it was impossible to systematically evaluate such claims. Although he did not frame the issue quite this way, Gaventa demonstrated that positive feedback processes operating over substantial periods of time can lead from relatively even conflict, in which one set of actors must openly impose their preferences on another set ("the first face of power") to one in which power relations become so uneven that anticipated reactions ("the second face of power") and ideological manipulation ("the third face") make open political conflict unnecessary. Positive feedback over time simultaneously increases power asymmetries and renders them less visible. John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1980).
42. Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence." There may be other types of self-reinforcing processes as well. Mahoney, for instance, argues that we should see "functionalism" as an additional source of path dependence, where a particular "institution is reproduced because it serves a function for an overall system." However, it is not evident that this represents a distinct type of process with a clearly identified feedback loop.
43. Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United Stales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
44. Ibid., 112. It is probably more accurate to say that there are two mechanisms at work here, one of legitimation (enforcing standards of appropriateness) and the other involving the specific institution of legal precedent, which has obvious positive feedback qualities. Indeed, the central role of precedent makes the field of law a prominent site for path dependent sequences.
45. Of course, more than one mechanism of reproduction may be at work. Indeed, highly resilient arrangements often rest on this kind of "redundancy," so that even if one mechanism is disrupted the equilibrium may not be. It is also possible for the principal mechanism of reproduction to change over time. For instance, an institution which initially rests on its capacity to foster coordination among actors may give rise to powerful groups which then act to protect the institution even when its coordinating role deteriorates. See Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology" (forthcoming).
46. "If increasing returns were to be admitted, the economist, John Hicks, warned, 'the threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of economic theory.'" Hill, "Rational Choice Theory," 211. On the havoc path dependent processes generate for dominant modes of statistical analysis in political science, see John E. Jackson, "Political Methodology: An Overview," in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 717-48.
47. "If increasing returns were to be admitted, the economist, John Hicks, warned, 'the threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of economic theory.'" Hill, "Rational Choice Theory," 211. On the havoc path dependent processes generate for dominant modes of statistical analysis in political science, see John E. Jackson, "Political Methodology: An Overview," in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 717-48.
48. For a review see Pierson, "Path Dependence."
49. North, Institutions, 95. For a recent contribution to the growing literature on varieties of capitalism see Herbert Kitschelt et al., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
50. North, Institutions, 95. For a recent contribution to the growing literature on varieties of capitalism see Herbert Kitschelt et al., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
51. "Threshold" models of collective action are well-known in sociology, but only recently has there been more sophisticated incorporation of the type of dynamic outlined here. See Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
52. On the general point, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organization." Recent work by Theda Skocpol reveals striking organizational persistence once large scale collective mobilization has been achieved. Skocpol has identified all voluntary organizations in the United States which ever enrolled 1 percent of the American population (or half that amount for single-gender groups) at one time, and tracking these organizations over time. The results, covering 58 such organizations from the 1810s to the 1990s, reveal remarkable organizational persistence. Nineteen of the 41 organizations which ever crossed the 1 percent threshold are still above it today. Of the twenty-six extensive voluntary associations currently in place, sixteen had already reached the 1 percent mark by the 1940s, and a number of them stretch back much further. A large number of the organizations that have fallen off Skocpol's list nonetheless stayed above it for many decades, and many were large organizations (although below the 1 percent threshold) for much longer than that. In short, despite massive social, economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing processes mean that existing organizations will have a strong tendency to persist. Theda Skocpol, "How Americans Became Civic," in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fionna, eds., Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 27-80.
53. On the general point, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organization." Recent work by Theda Skocpol reveals striking organizational persistence once large scale collective mobilization has been achieved. Skocpol has identified all voluntary organizations in the United States which ever enrolled 1 percent of the American population (or half that amount for single- gender groups) at one time, and tracking these organizations over time. The results, covering 58 such organizations from the 1810s to the 1990s, reveal remarkable organizational persistence. Nineteen of the 41 organizations which ever crossed the 1 percent threshold are still above it today. Of the twenty-six extensive voluntary associations currently in place, sixteen had already reached the 1 percent mark by the 1940s, and a number of them stretch back much further. A large number of the organizations that have fallen off Skocpol's list nonetheless stayed above it for many decades, and many were large organizations (although below the 1 percent threshold) for much longer than that. In short, despite massive social, economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing processes mean that existing organizations will have a strong tendency to persist. Theda Skocpol, "How Americans Became Civic," in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fionna, eds., Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 27-80.
54. Arthur D. Denzau and Douglass C. North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, 47: 3-31.
55. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
56. Karl, Paradox of Plenty, 197, emphasis added.
57. It should be noted that Karl does complicate the analysis in a fruitful way by situating this path dependent argument within a broader historical framework. Investigating the case of Norway, she is able to argue plausibly that sequencing does in fact matter: that it is critical whether oil is discovered before or after a country experiences sustained state-building. If oil is discovered first, then state-building itself will be petroleum-driven, producing the political pathologies that are Karl's primary concern. Where state-building occurs first, however, political leaders may be in a position to successfully manage the petro-boom, avoiding the destructive self-reinforcing dynamic experienced by most petro-states. This raises an important issue for the investigation of sequences, however. Any comparative investigation of, say, Libya and Norway would obviously take variation in state capacities seriously; it is not clear that attention to temporal ordering gives one extra analytical leverage. For a critique of much historical analysis along these lines, see George Homans, The Nature of Social Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), 92-93.
58. Martin Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," Politics and Society 7 (1977): 403-52.
59. Shefter, "Party and Patronage," 414-15.
60. Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
61. Ibid., 26.
62. Ibid., 28.
63. For a blunt but telling illustration of the relational nature of political competition, and the brutal and enduring consequences of being "too late," see Jared Diamond's discussion of the initial clashes between Europeans and Native Americans: Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). Such arguments are common for those studying interstate competition. Perry Anderson, for instance, makes a similar argument about the development of Eastern European absolutism in the shadow of powerful absolutist states in Western Europe (Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State [London: Verso, 1974]).
64. For a blunt but telling illustration of the relational nature of political competition, and the brutal and enduring consequences of being "too late," see Jared Diamond's discussion of the initial clashes between Europeans and Native Americans: Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). Such arguments are common for those studying interstate competition. Perry Anderson, for instance, makes a similar argument about the development of Eastern European absolutism in the shadow of powerful absolutist states in Western Europe (Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State [London: Verso, 1974]).
65. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An introduction," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64;
66. Colin Crouch, "Sharing Public Space: States and Organized Interests in Western Europe," in States in History, ed. John Hall (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 177-210.
67. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics," 390.
68. The point here is, I think, close to what Skowronek intends with the concept of secular time employed in The Politics Presidents Make. The place of a particular presidency in a cyclical emergence and erosion of a dominant regime must also acknowledge that [t]he resources available to presidents in getting things done have changed dramatically over the course of American history . . . [This] parallels the development of a political universe which is in every way more fully organized and more densely inhabited. It is not just that the presidency has gradually become more powerful and independence over the course of American history, but that the institutions and interests surrounding it have as well. (Steven Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994], 30-31).
69. Again, Stinchcombe saw this a long time ago: The organizational inventions that can be made at a particular time in history depend on the social technology available at the time. Organizations which have purposes that can be efficiently reached with the socially possible organizational forms tend to be founded during the period in which they become possible. Then, both because they can function effectively with those organizational forms and because the forms tend to become institutionalized, the basic structure of the organization tends to remain relatively stable. (Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," 153)
70. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
71. James Kurth, "Political Consequences of the Product Cycle," International Organization 33 (1979): 1-34. Note that Kurth's provocative analysis involves the interaction of two sets of sequences. There are sequences of products, which emerge at different historical moments; there are also sequences within each product cycle, from early producers to later producers.
72. Jacob Hacker, "The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy," Studies in American Political Development 12 (1998): 127-28.
73. Of course, path dependent sequencing arguments can be applied to more micro-phenomena. One can fruitfully use such arguments for investigating such things as particular collective action processes, the development of specific public policies, or more temporally constrained processes such as transitions to democracy. But a focus on path dependent sequences can be extremely helpful in drawing our attention to social processes that take place on a broad temporal scale, or that involve the interaction of processes operating on different temporal scales. On the importance and difficulties of incorporating processes with different "time horizons" (that is, rates at which meaningful changes take place) into the same analysis, see Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods," Historical Methods 23: 144-46.
74. Jervis, System Effects, chap. 4. One of the prominent claims about the merits of historical institutionalist work is that it attends to the interconnectedness of distinct social domains. Rather than investigating small components of social systems as hermetically sealed units of analysis, historical institutionalists have frequently sought to treat them as part of the same "regime" or "configuration." It is no accident that many of the contributions to this literature come from political sociologists (and to a lesser extent from political economists), who seek to identify connections between transformations of politics and broader processes of social change.
75. Aminzade, "Historical Sociology and Time," 466-67. For a related discussion see Orren and Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order."
76. Aminzade, "Historical Sociology and Time," 466-67. For a related discussion see Orren and Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order."
77. Even such limited generalizations are unlikely to be possible unless the analyst can demonstrate why developments in one realm systematically affect those in the other. Given the establishment of clear connections, the essential issue is simply one of how outcomes depend on the relative timing of the two processes. As discussed in section III below, if we are instead dealing with "Cournot effects" - conjunctures where generally disconnected realms accidentally converge - then there would seem to be no prospect for even limited generalizations.
78. William Sewell, "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in The Historic Turn, 262-63.
79. James Mahoney, "Radical, Reformist, and Aborted Liberalism: Origins of National Regimes in Central America," unpub. ms. See also Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence."
80. James Mahoney, "Radical, Reformist, and Aborted Liberalism: Origins of National Regimes in Central America," unpub. ms. See also Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence."
81. Compare Collier and Collier: There often occurs a significant interval between the critical juncture and the period of continuity that is explained by these mechanisms of reproduction. To the extent that the critical juncture is a polarizing event that produces intense political reactions and counterreactions, the crystallization of the legacy does not necessarily occur immediately, but rather may consist of a sequence of intervening steps that respond to these reactions and counterreactions. (Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 37)
82. Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 75 (1985): 332.
83. Jervis, System Effects, 128.
84. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.
85. Indeed, this case provides a good illustration of Thelen's claim that in order to analyze change in institutionalized settings, we should identify "mechanisms of reproduction" and then look for possible sources of disruption. Despite its initial vibrancy, Civil War pensions failed to "lock in" for two reasons. First, the system literally failed to reproduce its constituents, a fixed stock of veterans that gradually died off. Second, as emphasized by Richard Bensel, Civil War pensions depended on a particular politico-economic configuration in which tariffs provided a steady flow of funds which needed to be spent. The declining emphasis of business on tariffs over time weakened both the revenue base and political support for generous pensions. Richard Franklin Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), chap. 3.
86. For an analysis of international relations along these lines, see Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
87. Evelyn Huber Stephens, "Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America," Politics and Society 17 (1989): 331.
88. Ibid., 288.
89. Mahoney's investigation of regime dynamics in Central America also argues that it is counter mobilizations that are often critical in event sequences. Mahoney, "Radical, Reformist, and Aborted Liberalism."
90. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 8.
91. Ibid., 34.
92. This applies to cases of "state incorporation." Because it proved to be impossible to depoliticize workers permanently, state incorporation [which depoliticized workers] in some important respects created a greater opportunity for future polarization. This occurred for several reasons, among them that many of the legal controls of unions broke down with the competitive bidding for workers' votes under a subsequent democratic regime, and that state incorporation left unresolved the partisan affiliation of workers and unions, leaving them available for mobilization by other actors in later periods. (Ibid., 9) Compare this with Harvey's discussion analyzed below: initially empowered actors may be locked in and unable to adapt when circumstances change, producing a loss of power at a later point in the sequence.
93. Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10-11.
94. "In the face of this reaction and of the counterreaction it often produced, the ultimate legacy of incorporation commonly entailed outcomes quite divergent from the goals of the leaders of the original incorporation period" (Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 8).
95. Scharpf refers to these as quasi groups, in contrast to composite actors. This distinction is explored in section IV below.
96. See Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978).
97. In this last instance, we see once again the particularly favorable circumstances for sequence analysis that are available to comparativists. Scholars likes Huber Stephens, Luebbert, and the Colliers have good opportunities to examine alternative sequences that actually occur rather than relying exclusively on counterfactuals.
98. Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), 16-17. The next few paragraphs draw heavily on the discussion on this issue in Peter Knapp, "Can Social Theory Escape from History? Views of History in Social Science," History and Theory 23 (1983): 34-52. See also the discussion in Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence."
99. Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), 16-17. The next few paragraphs draw heavily on the discussion on this issue in Peter Knapp, "Can Social Theory Escape from History? Views of History in Social Science," History and Theory 23 (1983): 34-52. See also the discussion in Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence."
100. Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), 16-17. The next few paragraphs draw heavily on the discussion on this issue in Peter Knapp, "Can Social Theory Escape from History? Views of History in Social Science," History and Theory 23 (1983): 34-52. See also the discussion in Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence."
101. Aristide R. Zolberg, "How Many Exceptionalisms?" in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 397-455.
102. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 49.
103. A number of sociologists are wrestling with these issues. See for example LarryJ. Griffin, "Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction," Sociological Methods and Research, 20, 403-27; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terence J. McDonald, ed., The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 245-80; and Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Casual and Narrative Approaches," Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-50.
104. A number of sociologists are wrestling with these issues. See for example LarryJ. Griffin, "Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction," Sociological Methods and Research, 20, 403-27; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terence J. McDonald, ed., The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 245-80; and Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Casual and Narrative Approaches," Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-50.
105. A number of sociologists are wrestling with these issues. See for example LarryJ. Griffin, "Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology: An Introduction," Sociological Methods and Research, 20, 403-27; William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terence J. McDonald, ed., The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 245-80; and Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Casual and Narrative Approaches," Historical Methods 23 (1990): 140-50.
106. Ruth Berins Collier, "Combining Alternative Perspectives: Internal Trajectories versus External Influences as Explanations of Latin American Politics in the 1940s," Comparative Politics 26 (1993): 1-29.
107. Berins Collier concludes that these in this instance the external events influenced the timing and intensity of internal developments but did not deflect the trajectories that one would have anticipated based on an analysis of internal sequences.
108. Knapp, "Can Social Theory Escape From History?," 46.
109. More common in comparative politics are studies in which events that "hit" a number of countries are seen as themselves triggering a critical juncture, and the analysis centers on how this juncture plays out in different countries. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). In this case, the event itself is not treated as disrupting or diverting some on-going sequence in the countries under review.
110. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 19.
111. For a similar discussion of World War I's impact on working-class formation see Zolberg, "How Many Exceptionalisms?" 406-8.
112. Aminzade, "Historical Sociology and Time."
113. Robert Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 18.
114. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 115.
115. The following draws heavily on the thoughtful commentary of Fritz Scharpf, who strongly and persuasively advocates the employment of game theory for many social science purposes.
116. Ibid., 73. Indeed, in a different publication Bates and his co-authors make the same basic point: Game theorists often fail to acknowledge that their approach requires a complete political anthropology . . . Game-theoretic accounts require detailed and fine-grained knowledge of the precise features of the political and social environment within which individuals make choices and devise political strategies. (Robert Bates, R.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Barry R. Weingast, "The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition," Politics and Society 26 (1998): 628)
117. Although note that analytic narratives can be employed (e.g., in the chapters by Bates, Levi, and Weingast) to specify the implications of a particular event (or other change in background conditions) for strategic interaction. The event marks the end of the first game, and initiates a new game with changed payoff structures. This comparative statics framework may provide a useful technique for incorporating events into explanations, although it does not directly address issues of sequences.
118. The arguments about timing and political space discussed above often focus on how the early emergence of certain kinds of players forecloses the emergence of other kinds of players (e.g., alternative organizational forms). Game theorists generally take the existence of the players as given and focus on their strategic interaction. I am grateful to Kathleen Thelen for drawing this distinction to my attention.
119. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 105. He goes on to argue that even if game theory cannot generate predictions in other contexts, it may be useful for explanation because knowing if a particular outcome constitutes a Nash equilibrium should influence our expectations regarding its stability, even if it is not the only possible outcome.
120. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play, 31-34.
121. Arguably, game theory can make a significant contribution to one form of sequencing analysis which has been prominent in comparative politics - namely, sequences involved in transitions to democracy. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The "transitology" literature focuses on relatively short time-frames and, often, on strategic interaction among composite actors. To the extent that this captures the principal dynamics of the transition process (and this is contested) game theoretical approaches to sequences in democratic transitions are likely to have much to offer.
122. Compare Scharpf's balanced discussion to that offered in James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). After a lengthy and careful introduction to game theory for political scientists, Morrow finally concludes with a section on "the weaknesses of game theory." By this, however, he only means to highlight "cutting edge" issues (like bounded rationality) where animated debates among game theorists are underway. He sees no need to discuss the prospect that on some matters which social scientists might wish to pursue game theory can offer limited help.
123. And, though this goes beyond the bounds of the current article, rational choice may have a lot to say about other issues related to the role of time in political processes. Rational choice theorists, for instance, have devoted far more attention than most social scientists to the important question of how actors' time horizons affect political outcomes.
124. Although arguments about asset specificity, which bear a strong family resemblance, are becoming more prevalent. James E. Alt, Jeffery Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski, "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry," Comparative Political Studies 29 (1996): 689-717.
125. Anna L. Harvey, Voters without Leverage: Women in American Electoral Politics, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
126. See the excellent discussion in Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics."