Vice into virtue? Progressive politics and welfare reform in continental Europe

Politics and Society

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 239-273

  Levy, Jonah D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; ETHNOLOGY; EUROPE; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HISTORY; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE; POLICY; POLITICS; PSYCHOLOGY; PUBLIC HEALTH; PUBLIC OPINION; SOCIAL CHANGE; SOCIAL WELFARE; SOCIOECONOMICS;

EUROPE; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE REFORM; HISTORY, 20TH CENTURY; NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS; POLITICS; PUBLIC OPINION; PUBLIC POLICY; SOCIAL CHANGE; SOCIAL WELFARE; SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS;

EID: 0033239763     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329299027002004     Document Type: Article

References (145)

1. Andrea Boltho, ed., The European Economy: Growth and Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Andrew Shonfield, Modem Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) .
2. Andrea Boltho, ed., The European Economy: Growth and Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Andrew Shonfield, Modem Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) .
3. R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (1991): 539-56; John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
4. R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (1991): 539-56; John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
5. Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Torben Iversen, "The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion: Trade, Openness, Deindustrialization" (Paper presented to the conference on the New Politics of the Welfare State, Harvard Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA, 4-7 December 1997); Dani Rodrik, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Larger Governments?" NBER Working Paper Series no. 5537, 1997.
6. Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Torben Iversen, "The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion: Trade, Openness, Deindustrialization" (Paper presented to the conference on the New Politics of the Welfare State, Harvard Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA, 4-7 December 1997); Dani Rodrik, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Larger Governments?" NBER Working Paper Series no. 5537, 1997.
7. Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Torben Iversen, "The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion: Trade, Openness, Deindustrialization" (Paper presented to the conference on the New Politics of the Welfare State, Harvard Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA, 4-7 December 1997); Dani Rodrik, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Larger Governments?" NBER Working Paper Series no. 5537, 1997.
8. Paul Pierson, "Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States" (Paper presented to the conference on the New Politics of the Welfare State, Harvard Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA, 4-7 December 1997); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in a Global Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 1-31; Martin Rhodes, '"Subversive Liberalism': Market Integration, Globalization, and the European Welfare State," Journal of European Public Policy 2, no. 3 (1995): 384-406.
9. Paul Pierson, "Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States" (Paper presented to the conference on the New Politics of the Welfare State, Harvard Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA, 4-7 December 1997); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in a Global Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 1-31; Martin Rhodes, '"Subversive Liberalism': Market Integration, Globalization, and the European Welfare State," Journal of European Public Policy 2, no. 3 (1995): 384-406.
10. Paul Pierson, "Post-industrial Pressures on the Mature Welfare States" (Paper presented to the conference on the New Politics of the Welfare State, Harvard Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA, 4-7 December 1997); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global Economy," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in a Global Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 1-31; Martin Rhodes, '"Subversive Liberalism': Market Integration, Globalization, and the European Welfare State," Journal of European Public Policy 2, no. 3 (1995): 384-406.
11. The Christian Democratic welfare regime goes under a number of labels, including conservative Catholic, Catholic corporatist, conservative continental,and continental European. For purposes of clarity and simplicity, this essay uses the term Christian Democratic only.
12. See notably Gøsta Esping-Andersen, "Welfare States without Work: The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social policy," in Esping-Andersen, Welfare in Transition, 66-87.
13. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
14. Other leading analyses of the Christian Democratic welfare world include Harold Wilensky, "Leftism, Catholicism, and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Development," in Peter Flora and A. J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 345-92; Evelyn Huber, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 3 (1993): 711-49; and Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (New York: Routledge, 1995).
15. Other leading analyses of the Christian Democratic welfare world include Harold Wilensky, "Leftism, Catholicism, and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Development," in Peter Flora and A. J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 345-92; Evelyn Huber, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 3 (1993): 711-49; and Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (New York: Routledge, 1995).
16. Other leading analyses of the Christian Democratic welfare world include Harold Wilensky, "Leftism, Catholicism, and Democratic Corporatism: The Role of Political Parties in Recent Welfare State Development," in Peter Flora and A. J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 345-92; Evelyn Huber, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens, "Social Democracy Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State," American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 3 (1993): 711-49; and Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (New York: Routledge, 1995).
17. For a discussion of the distinction between Beveridgean and Bismarckian welfare states, see Giuliano Bonoli, "Classifying Welfare States: A Two-Dimension Approach," Journal of Social Policy 26, no. 3 (1997): 351-72.
18. Esping-Andersen uses a variety of labels interchangeably (see n. 5). In an important recent essay, Esping-Andersen writes of the "continental European welfare state," rather than the Christian Democratic welfare state; Esping-Andersen, "Welfare without Work". To avoid confusion, this article employs the term Christian Democratic in all instances, even when Esping-Andersen himself uses a different phrase.
19. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds; Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age"; Torben Iversen and Ann Wren, "Equality, Employment, and Fiscal Discipline: The Trilemma of the Service Economy," World Politics 50, no. 4 (1998): 507-46.
20. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds; Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age"; Torben Iversen and Ann Wren, "Equality, Employment, and Fiscal Discipline: The Trilemma of the Service Economy," World Politics 50, no. 4 (1998): 507-46.
21. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds; Esping-Andersen, "After the Golden Age"; Torben Iversen and Ann Wren, "Equality, Employment, and Fiscal Discipline: The Trilemma of the Service Economy," World Politics 50, no. 4 (1998): 507-46.
22. Evelyn Huber and John Stephens, "Internationalization and the Social Democratic Model-Crisis and Future Prospects," Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 353-97; John Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Esping-Andersen, Welfare in Transition, 32-65.
23. Evelyn Huber and John Stephens, "Internationalization and the Social Democratic Model-Crisis and Future Prospects," Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 353-97; John Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Esping-Andersen, Welfare in Transition, 32-65.
24. Esping-Andersen, "Welfare without Work."
25. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Unemployment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); OECD, The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies (Paris: OECD, 1994); Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
26. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Unemployment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); OECD, The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies (Paris: OECD, 1994); Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
27. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Unemployment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); OECD, The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies (Paris: OECD, 1994); Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
28. Esping-Andersen, "Welfare without Work," 79-80.
29. Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Beyond Keynesianism (Worcester: Edward Elgar, 1991), 21-61; David Soskice, "The Institutional Infrastructure for International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and Germany," in Anthony Atkinson and Renato Brunetta, eds., Economics for the New Europe (New York: NYU Press, 1992), 45-66; Michel Albert, Capitalism versus Capitalism (New York: Four Wall Eight Windows, 1993).
30. Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Beyond Keynesianism (Worcester: Edward Elgar, 1991), 21-61; David Soskice, "The Institutional Infrastructure for International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and Germany," in Anthony Atkinson and Renato Brunetta, eds., Economics for the New Europe (New York: NYU Press, 1992), 45-66; Michel Albert, Capitalism versus Capitalism (New York: Four Wall Eight Windows, 1993).
31. Wolfgang Streeck, "On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production," in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Beyond Keynesianism (Worcester: Edward Elgar, 1991), 21-61; David Soskice, "The Institutional Infrastructure for International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the UK and Germany," in Anthony Atkinson and Renato Brunetta, eds., Economics for the New Europe (New York: NYU Press, 1992), 45-66; Michel Albert, Capitalism versus Capitalism (New York: Four Wall Eight Windows, 1993).
32. Lucio Baccaro and Richard Locke, "Public Sector Reform and Union Participation: The Case of the Italian Pension Reform," working paper no. 3922-96-BPS, Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA, 1996; Marco Mira de Ercole and Flavia Terribile, "Pension Spending: Developments in 1996 and 1997," in L. Bardi and Martin Rhodes, eds., Politica in Italia: I fatti dell'anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: II Mulino/Instituto Cattanea, 1998).
33. Lucio Baccaro and Richard Locke, "Public Sector Reform and Union Participation: The Case of the Italian Pension Reform," working paper no. 3922-96-BPS, Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA, 1996; Marco Mira de Ercole and Flavia Terribile, "Pension Spending: Developments in 1996 and 1997," in L. Bardi and Martin Rhodes, eds., Politica in Italia: I fatti dell'anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: II Mulino/Instituto Cattanea, 1998).
34. Marino Regini and Ida Regalia, "Employers, Unions, and the State: The Resurgence of Concertation in Italy?" in Martin Bull and Martin Rhodes, eds., Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 210-30.
35. Martin Rhodes, "Globalisation, Labour Markets, and Welfare States: A Future of 'Competitive Corporatism?"' in Martin Rhodes and Yves Mény, eds., The Future of the European Welfare State: A New Social Contract? (London: Macmillan, 1998).
36. OECD, Netherlands, 1997-1998 (Paris: OECD, 1998); Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, 'A Dutch Miracle ': Job Growth, Welfare Reform, and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997).
37. OECD, Netherlands, 1997-1998 (Paris: OECD, 1998); Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, 'A Dutch Miracle ': Job Growth, Welfare Reform, and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997).
38. Richard Locke, "Eppure Si Tocca: The Abolition of the Scala Mobile," in Carole Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds., Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 185-96; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation"; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
39. Richard Locke, "Eppure Si Tocca: The Abolition of the Scala Mobile," in Carole Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds., Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 185-96; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation"; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
40. Richard Locke, "Eppure Si Tocca: The Abolition of the Scala Mobile," in Carole Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds., Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 185-96; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation"; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
41. Le Monde, 18 September 1997.
42. In this essay, I use the phrase means testing to denote eligibility criteria designed to target low-income or impoverished groups while excluding the middle classes and the well-to-do. I use the phrase income testing to denote eligibility criteria designed to exclude the affluent only, with the middle classes as well as low-income groups continuing to receive benefits. In practice, both kinds of programs determine eligibility primarily on the basis of income rather than assets.
43. Marie-Thérèse Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1997).
44. Susan Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914-1915 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
45. Jacques Bichot, Les politiques sociales en France au XXe siècle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), 52.
46. Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 560
47. Numa Murard, La protection sociale (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), 61.
48. Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 560.
49. Bichot, Politiques sociales; Rémi Lenoir, "Family Policy in France Since 1938," in John Ambler, ed., The French Welfare State: Surviving Social and Ideological Change (New York: NYU Press, 1990), 144-86.
50. Bichot, Politiques sociales; Rémi Lenoir, "Family Policy in France Since 1938," in John Ambler, ed., The French Welfare State: Surviving Social and Ideological Change (New York: NYU Press, 1990), 144-86.
51. Jacques Commaille, "La politique française àl'égard de la famille," Regards sur l'actualité January 1998, 12-24.
52. Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 550.
53. Commaille, "Politique de la famille," 21.
54. Although job placement is one of the objectives of the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, the program has no employment search requirement. For many recipients - older, unskilled workers or persons suffering from psychological problems, alcoholism, and/or chemical dependency - job placement is a remote possibility, at best. That said, the idea of introducing some kind of workfare obligation has received considerable attention of late.
55. Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 636-38.
56. Five reports on French family policy were delivered to the government and to the French parliament in May-June 1998: Irène Théry, Couple, filiation et parent, aujourd'hui; Dominique Gillot, Pour une politique de la famille rénovée; Michèle André, La vie quotidienne des familles; Claude Thélot, Bilan et perspectives de la politique familiale; and Marisol Touraine, Pour une politique familiale de la gauche.
57. Five reports on French family policy were delivered to the government and to the French parliament in May-June 1998: Irène Théry, Couple, filiation et parent, aujourd'hui; Dominique Gillot, Pour une politique de la famille rénovée; Michèle André, La vie quotidienne des familles; Claude Thélot, Bilan et perspectives de la politique familiale; and Marisol Touraine, Pour une politique familiale de la gauche.
58. Five reports on French family policy were delivered to the government and to the French parliament in May-June 1998: Irène Théry, Couple, filiation et parent, aujourd'hui; Dominique Gillot, Pour une politique de la famille rénovée; Michèle André, La vie quotidienne des familles; Claude Thélot, Bilan et perspectives de la politique familiale; and Marisol Touraine, Pour une politique familiale de la gauche.
59. Five reports on French family policy were delivered to the government and to the French parliament in May-June 1998: Irène Théry, Couple, filiation et parent, aujourd'hui; Dominique Gillot, Pour une politique de la famille rénovée; Michèle André, La vie quotidienne des familles; Claude Thélot, Bilan et perspectives de la politique familiale; and Marisol Touraine, Pour une politique familiale de la gauche.
60. Five reports on French family policy were delivered to the government and to the French parliament in May-June 1998: Irène Théry, Couple, filiation et parent, aujourd'hui; Dominique Gillot, Pour une politique de la famille rénovée; Michèle André, La vie quotidienne des familles; Claude Thélot, Bilan et perspectives de la politique familiale; and Marisol Touraine, Pour une politique familiale de la gauche.
61. The French child tax credit system is both unusual and highly regressive; Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 566-67; Gille Huteau and Eric Le Bont, Sécurité sociale et politiques sociales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), 345-49. In most countries, parents receive a fixed-sum tax credit for each dependent child. Under the French system (shared only by Luxembourg and Belgium among OECD nations), the size of the credit is variable and increases with household income. To determine a household's income tax bracket, gross income is divided by the number of family members, with adults counting as one person and children as one-half. Thus, the child tax credit tends to be much greater for high-income households, which are pushed into lower tax brackets, than for low-income households, which pay little or no income tax in the first place. As one French expert on this so-called family quotient system put it, "If one wished to generalize the principle of the family quotient to the entire [family allowance] system, then the amount of family allowances would have to increase with the income of the parents"; Libération, 2 October 1998, 4. The left did introduce a ceiling on the maximum allowable child tax credit in 1981, but the cap was raised in subsequent years, most sharply under conservative governments. In the 1999 budget, Jospin lowered the cap by one-third, from 16,380 francs to 11,000 francs annually. Even so, the cost of the family quotient is still equal to more than one-half the total expenditures of the family allowance fund. As a number of French tax and family policy specialists have pointed out, further cap reductions designed to eliminate the vice of regressive family quotients could bring in significant tax revenues with which to fund virtuous family programs targeted at the truly needy.
62. The French child tax credit system is both unusual and highly regressive; Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 566-67; Gille Huteau and Eric Le Bont, Sécurité sociale et politiques sociales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), 345-49. In most countries, parents receive a fixed-sum tax credit for each dependent child. Under the French system (shared only by Luxembourg and Belgium among OECD nations), the size of the credit is variable and increases with household income. To determine a household's income tax bracket, gross income is divided by the number of family members, with adults counting as one person and children as one-half. Thus, the child tax credit tends to be much greater for high-income households, which are pushed into lower tax brackets, than for low-income households, which pay little or no income tax in the first place. As one French expert on this so-called family quotient system put it, "If one wished to generalize the principle of the family quotient to the entire [family allowance] system, then the amount of family allowances would have to increase with the income of the parents"; Libération, 2 October 1998, 4. The left did introduce a ceiling on the maximum allowable child tax credit in 1981, but the cap was raised in subsequent years, most sharply under conservative governments. In the 1999 budget, Jospin lowered the cap by one-third, from 16,380 francs to 11,000 francs annually. Even so, the cost of the family quotient is still equal to more than one-half the total expenditures of the family allowance fund. As a number of French tax and family policy specialists have pointed out, further cap reductions designed to eliminate the vice of regressive family quotients could bring in significant tax revenues with which to fund virtuous family programs targeted at the truly needy.
63. The French child tax credit system is both unusual and highly regressive; Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales, 566-67; Gille Huteau and Eric Le Bont, Sécurité sociale et politiques sociales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), 345-49. In most countries, parents receive a fixed-sum tax credit for each dependent child. Under the French system (shared only by Luxembourg and Belgium among OECD nations), the size of the credit is variable and increases with household income. To determine a household's income tax bracket, gross income is divided by the number of family members, with adults counting as one person and children as one-half. Thus, the child tax credit tends to be much greater for high-income households, which are pushed into lower tax brackets, than for low-income households, which pay little or no income tax in the first place. As one French expert on this so-called family quotient system put it, "If one wished to generalize the principle of the family quotient to the entire [family allowance] system, then the amount of family allowances would have to increase with the income of the parents"; Libération, 2 October 1998, 4. The left did introduce a ceiling on the maximum allowable child tax credit in 1981, but the cap was raised in subsequent years, most sharply under conservative governments. In the 1999 budget, Jospin lowered the cap by one-third, from 16,380 francs to 11,000 francs annually. Even so, the cost of the family quotient is still equal to more than one-half the total expenditures of the family allowance fund. As a number of French tax and family policy specialists have pointed out, further cap reductions designed to eliminate the vice of regressive family quotients could bring in significant tax revenues with which to fund virtuous family programs targeted at the truly needy.
64. Bonoli, "Classifying Welfare States"; Giuliano Bonoli and Bruno Palier, "Reclaiming Welfare: The Politics of French Social Protection Reform," in Martin Rhodes, ed., Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 240-59; Martin Hirsch, Les enjeux de la protection sociale (Paris: Monchrestien, 1994); Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales.
65. Bonoli, "Classifying Welfare States"; Giuliano Bonoli and Bruno Palier, "Reclaiming Welfare: The Politics of French Social Protection Reform," in Martin Rhodes, ed., Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 240-59; Martin Hirsch, Les enjeux de la protection sociale (Paris: Monchrestien, 1994); Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales.
66. Bonoli, "Classifying Welfare States"; Giuliano Bonoli and Bruno Palier, "Reclaiming Welfare: The Politics of French Social Protection Reform," in Martin Rhodes, ed., Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 240-59; Martin Hirsch, Les enjeux de la protection sociale (Paris: Monchrestien, 1994); Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales.
67. Bonoli, "Classifying Welfare States"; Giuliano Bonoli and Bruno Palier, "Reclaiming Welfare: The Politics of French Social Protection Reform," in Martin Rhodes, ed., Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 240-59; Martin Hirsch, Les enjeux de la protection sociale (Paris: Monchrestien, 1994); Joint-Lambert et al., Politiques sociales.
68. Huteau and Le Bont, Sécurité sociale, 125.
69. "Le budget de l'Etat," Cahiers français, no. 261 (1993): 14.
70. Ibid., 58.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 123.
73. Ibid.
74. Although the fiscalization of worker health insurance payments lightened the burden on wage earners, it did nothing to address the problem of employer contributions to the social security system. In other words, fiscal redistribution (to low-income groups) took precedence over labor market considerations (reducing employment-dampening social security charges at the bottom of the pay scale).
75. French Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Industry, Répartition des prélèvements obligatoires en pourcentage, Ministry Web site (www.finances.gouv.fr), consulted 22 December 1998.
76. Francis Castles and Maurizio Ferrera, "Home Ownership and the Welfare State: Is Southern Europe Different?" South European Society and Politics 1, no. 2 (1996): 163-85; Maurizio Ferrera, "The Uncertain Future of the Italian Welfare State," in Bull and Rhodes, Crisis and Transition, 231-49; Martin Rhodes, "Southern European Welfare States: Identity, Problems, and Prospects for Reform," in Rhodes, Southern European Welfare, 1-22.
77. Francis Castles and Maurizio Ferrera, "Home Ownership and the Welfare State: Is Southern Europe Different?" South European Society and Politics 1, no. 2 (1996): 163-85; Maurizio Ferrera, "The Uncertain Future of the Italian Welfare State," in Bull and Rhodes, Crisis and Transition, 231-49; Martin Rhodes, "Southern European Welfare States: Identity, Problems, and Prospects for Reform," in Rhodes, Southern European Welfare, 1-22.
78. Francis Castles and Maurizio Ferrera, "Home Ownership and the Welfare State: Is Southern Europe Different?" South European Society and Politics 1, no. 2 (1996): 163-85; Maurizio Ferrera, "The Uncertain Future of the Italian Welfare State," in Bull and Rhodes, Crisis and Transition, 231-49; Martin Rhodes, "Southern European Welfare States: Identity, Problems, and Prospects for Reform," in Rhodes, Southern European Welfare, 1-22.
79. Maurizio Ferrera, "The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe," Journal of European Social Policy 6, no. 1 (1996): 17-37; Ferrera, "Uncertain Future."
80. Maurizio Ferrera, "The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe," Journal of European Social Policy 6, no. 1 (1996): 17-37; Ferrera, "Uncertain Future."
81. Ferrera, "Uncertain Future."
82. Castles and Ferrera, "Home Ownership," 177.
83. Ibid.; Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending."
84. Ibid.; Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending."
85. Ferrera, "Southern Model," 26.
86. Ferrera, "Uncertain Future," 233.
87. Mimmo Carrieri, "Industrial Relations and the Labour Movement," in Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker, eds., The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi (London: Routledge, 1994), 301.
88. OECD, Italy, 1996-1997 (Paris: OECD, 1997), 62.
89. Stephen Hellman, "Politics Almost as Usual: The Formation of the Amato Government," in Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, eds., The End of Postwar Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Elections (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 141-59; Patrick McCarthy, The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi (New York: Saint Martin's, 1995) ; Gianfranco Pasquino and Salvatore Vassallo, "The Government of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi," in Mershon and Pasquino, Ending First Republic, 55-73.
90. Stephen Hellman, "Politics Almost as Usual: The Formation of the Amato Government," in Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, eds., The End of Postwar Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Elections (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 141-59; Patrick McCarthy, The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi (New York: Saint Martin's, 1995) ; Gianfranco Pasquino and Salvatore Vassallo, "The Government of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi," in Mershon and Pasquino, Ending First Republic, 55-73.
91. Stephen Hellman, "Politics Almost as Usual: The Formation of the Amato Government," in Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, eds., The End of Postwar Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Elections (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 141-59; Patrick McCarthy, The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi (New York: Saint Martin's, 1995) ; Gianfranco Pasquino and Salvatore Vassallo, "The Government of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi," in Mershon and Pasquino, Ending First Republic, 55-73.
92. The Amato government falls less clearly under the label of technician than do the governments of Ciampi and Dini. Amato was vice-chairman of Craxi's Socialist party. Furthermore, in March 1993, he attempted to whitewash the mani pulite affair through a general amnesty decree, a decree that was never implemented but that fatally discredited his government. That said, Amato himself has never been implicated in any corruption investigation. He is indeed a technocrat, a public policy academic, and when the mani pulite investigation began forcing the resignation of his cabinet members (seven in less than one year), he appointed a number of nonpartisan, honest academics or technocrats in their place. Amato was the first Italian leader to implement serious economic reforms, and he did so through careful negotiations with the unions. Thus, if close to Craxi in party politics, in matters of economic governance, Amato behaved much like Ciampi and Dini.
93. Baccaro and Locke, "Italian Pension Reform"; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation."
94. Baccaro and Locke, "Italian Pension Reform"; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation."
95. Carrieri, "Industrial Relations"; Tiziano Treu, "Procedures and Institutions of Income Policies in Italy," in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer, and Zoe Mars, eds., The Return to Incomes Policy (London: Pinter, 1994), 161-74.
96. Carrieri, "Industrial Relations"; Tiziano Treu, "Procedures and Institutions of Income Policies in Italy," in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer, and Zoe Mars, eds., The Return to Incomes Policy (London: Pinter, 1994), 161-74.
97. Locke, "Eppure Si Tocca"; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation"; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
98. Locke, "Eppure Si Tocca"; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation"; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
99. Locke, "Eppure Si Tocca"; Regini and Regalia, "Resurgence of Concertation"; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
100. Baccaro and Locke, "Italian Pension Reform."
101. Ibid.; Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending"; Ferrera, "Uncertain Future."
102. Ibid.; Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending"; Ferrera, "Uncertain Future."
103. Ibid.; Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending"; Ferrera, "Uncertain Future."
104. Baccaro and Locke, "Italian Pension Reform."
105. Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending."
106. The shift from a defined-benefit to a less generous defined-contribution system does not apply to existing retirees or to workers with eighteen or more years of contributions. The pensions of employees who have paid into the system for fewer than eighteen years are determined by a combination of the pre-1995 rules for the years already worked and the new rules for subsequent earnings. As for post-1995 hires, their pensions are determined entirely by the new formula. In intergenerational terms, the grandfathering of pension reform increases the amount that the young must pay to cover the unfinanced benefits of the old (and the not so old).
107. Ercole and Terribile, "Pension Spending."
108. Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism."
109. My account of Dutch developments draws heavily from OECD, Netherlands, and especially Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
110. My account of Dutch developments draws heavily from OECD, Netherlands, and especially Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
111. OECD, Netherlands, 134.
112. Economist, 19 December 1998, 148.
113. Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle, 24.
114. Catherine Bruno and Valérie Chauvin, "Les Pays-Bas: Une société à flexibilité limitée," Revue de l'Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques, no. 64 (1998): 97-127; OECD, Netherlands; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
115. Catherine Bruno and Valérie Chauvin, "Les Pays-Bas: Une société à flexibilité limitée," Revue de l'Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques, no. 64 (1998): 97-127; OECD, Netherlands; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
116. Catherine Bruno and Valérie Chauvin, "Les Pays-Bas: Une société à flexibilité limitée," Revue de l'Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques, no. 64 (1998): 97-127; OECD, Netherlands; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
117. OECD, Netherlands.
118. Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle, 41.
119. Ibid., 101.
120. Bruno and Chauvin, "Pays-Bas"; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
121. Bruno and Chauvin, "Pays-Bas"; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
122. OECD, Netherlands, 83.
123. Ibid., 90-91.
124. Ibid., 85.
125. Ibid., 92-94.
126. Ibid.
127. Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle, 111.
128. Since 1996, the government has also subsidized low-wage employment. From 1996 to 1998, companies hiring workers at less than 115 percent of the legal minimum wage received a subsidy equal to 5 percent of their labor costs. In 1998, the subsidy was doubled to 10 percent; OECD, Netherlands.
129. Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle, 43.
130. The flexibility and security agreements of 1995-1996 did involve some give and take; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism"; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle. The agreements narrowed the gap in status between full-time and part-time workers by bolstering the rights and protections of the latter but also by reducing some of the privileges of the former. Part-time workers gained access to pension and social security benefits along with the right to permanent employment status at the end of two years. In exchange, the agreements relaxed restrictions on the dismissal of permanent employees (although cushioned by enhanced opportunities for legal appeals) and introduced a probationary period for new hires.
131. The flexibility and security agreements of 1995-1996 did involve some give and take; Rhodes, "Competitive Corporatism"; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle. The agreements narrowed the gap in status between full-time and part-time workers by bolstering the rights and protections of the latter but also by reducing some of the privileges of the former. Part-time workers gained access to pension and social security benefits along with the right to permanent employment status at the end of two years. In exchange, the agreements relaxed restrictions on the dismissal of permanent employees (although cushioned by enhanced opportunities for legal appeals) and introduced a probationary period for new hires.
132. Jet Bussemaker, "Rationales of Care in Contemporary Welfare States: The Case of Childcare in the Netherlands," Social Politics 5, no. 1 (1998): 70-96
133. Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle, 24-26.
134. Ibid., 33.
135. Bruno and Chauvin, "Pays-Bas"; OECD, Netherlands; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
136. Bruno and Chauvin, "Pays-Bas"; OECD, Netherlands; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
137. Bruno and Chauvin, "Pays-Bas"; OECD, Netherlands; Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle.
138. Even liberalized, post-Thatcher Britain relies much less on part-time jobs, which account for between 20 percent and 25 percent of total employment.
139. Visser and Hemerijck, Dutch Miracle, 33
140. OECD, Netherlands, 36.
141. Ibid.
142. Bussemaker, "Rationales of Care."
143. Survey cited in OECD, Netherlands, 36.
144. That said, the expressed preference of Dutch women for part-time work reflects, at least to some extent, the underdevelopment of subsidized child care facilities that would make full-time work more attractive.
145. Green parties are present in both the French and Italian governing coalitions, but these parties are quite small and have a very limited impact on social and economic policy.