Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules

Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 915-920

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICES; MAXIMIN; MULTIPLICATIVE CONSTANTS; UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS; VOTING RULES;

TREES (MATHEMATICS);

EID: 77958517886     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

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11. Xia, L., and Conitzer, V. 2010. Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. In AAAI.