Experience and Representation

Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 57-76

  Levine, Joseph ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

character; particular; Phenomenal; Qualia; sunlight

Indexed keywords

EID: 85198961909     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0004     Document Type: Chapter

References (21)

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