CEO power and firm performance: A test of the life-cycle theory

Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 35-66

  Harjoto, Maretno A ^a   Jo, Hoje ^b  

^a PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Board leadership; CEO plurality; Corporate governance; Firm value and performance; Life cycle theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957689485     PISSN: 12261165     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6156.2009.tb00007.x     Document Type: Article

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