A review of the implications of prospect theory for natural hazards and disaster planning

International Journal of Environmental Research

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 379-394

  Asgary, A ^a   Levy, J ^b  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision making; Disaster planning; Environmental hazards; Planning theory; Prospect theory; Risk; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD; NATURAL HAZARD; PLANNING THEORY; RISK ASSESSMENT; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

EID: 77957363915     PISSN: 17356865     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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