Board composition and nonprofit conduct: Evidence from hospitals

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 76, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 196-208

  Brickley, James A ^a   Van Horn, R Lawrence ^b   Wedig, Gerard J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Corporate governance; Hospitals; Not for profit

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957333765     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.06.008     Document Type: Article

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