Determinants of donations in private nonprofit markets

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 255-272

  Okten, Cagla ^a   Weisbrod, Burton A ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Crowd out; Donations; Fundraising

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009075034     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00066-3     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Abrams B.A., Schmitz M.D. The crowding-out effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions: cross-section evidence. National Tax Journal. 37:1984;563-568. December.
2. Anderson P.W., Hsiao Cheng. Estimations of dynamic models with error components. Journal of American Statistical Association. 76:(365):1981;598-606.
3. Auten G.E., Cilke J.M., Randolph W.C. The effects of tax reform on charitable contributions. National Tax Journal. 45:(3):1992;266-290.
4. Cordes J., Weisbrod B.A. Differential taxation of nonprofits and the commercialization of nonprofit revenues. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 17:(2):1998;195-214. Also in Chapter 5 of Weisbrod 1998a, 83-104.
5. Khanna J., Sandler T. Partners in Giving: the Crowding-in Effects of UK Government Grants. 1997;Iowa State University. Working Paper.
6. Khanna J., Posnett J., Sandler T. Charity donations in the UK: new evidence based on panel data. Journal of Public Economics. 56:1995;257-272.
7. Kingma B.R. Do profits crowd out donations or vice versa? Nonprofit Management and Leadership. 6:(1):1995;21-37.
8. Nelson P. Information and consumer behaviour. Journal of Political Economy. 78:(2):1970;311-329.
9. Nelson P. Advertising as information. Journal of Political Economy. 82:(4):1974;729-754.
10. Posnett J., Sandler T. Demand for charity donations in private nonprofit markets: the case of UK. Journal of Public Economics. 40:1989;187-200.
11. Roberts R. A positive model of private charity and public transfers. Journal of Political Economy. 92:1984;136-148. February.
12. Rose-Ackerman S. Do government grants to charity reduce private donations? White M.J. Nonprofit Firms in A Three-sector Economy. 1981;45-54 Urban Institute, Washington, DC.
13. Rose-Ackerman S. Charitable giving and excessive fundraising. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 97:1982;193-212. May.
14. Segal L., Weisbrod B.A. Interdependence of commercial and donative revenues. Weisbrod B.A. To Profit Or Not To Profit. 1998;105-128 Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapter 6.
15. Steinberg R. Should donors care about fundraising. Rose-Ackerman S. The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions. 1986;347-364 Oxford University Press, New York.
16. Steinberg R., Weisbrod B.A. Pricing and rationing by nonprofit organizations. Weisbrod B.A. To Profit Or Not To Profit. 1998;65-82 Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapter 4.
17. Stevenson D.R., Pollak T.H., Lampkin L.M. State Nonprofit Almanac 1997: Profiles of Charitable Organizations. 1997;Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC.
18. Urban Institute, 1998. World Wide Web site: 〈nccs.urban.org/ntee1.htm〉.
19. Weisbrod B.A. To Profit Or Not To Profit. 1998;Cambridge University Press, New York.
20. Weisbrod B.A. Modeling the nonprofit organization as a multi-product firm: a framework for choice. Weisbrod B.A. To Profit Or Not To Profit. 1998;47-64 Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Chapter 3.
21. Weisbrod B.A., Dominguez N.D. Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior? Journal of Public Economics. 30:1986;83-95.