Epistemic luck and the generality problem

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 139, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 353-366

  Becker, Kelly ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemic luck; Externalism; Generality problem; Reliabilism; Theory of knowledge; Veritic luck

Indexed keywords

EID: 44349113951     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9122-z     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Becker, K. (2006). Reliabilism and safety. Metaphilosophy, 37(5), 691-704.
2. Brown, J. (2004). Anti-individualism and knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies, 89, 1-29.
4. Dretske, F. (1971). Conclusive reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49(1), 1-22.
5. Feldman, R. (1985). Reliability and justification. The Monist, 68, 159-174.
6. Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (2002). Typing problems. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 98-105.
7. Goldman, Alan (1987). Nozick on knowledge: finding the right connection. In S. Luper-Foy (Ed.), The possibility of knowledge: Nozick and his critics (pp. 182-196). Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
8. Goldman, Alvin (1976). Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 73(20), 771-791.
9. Goldman, Alvin (1979). What is justified belief? In G. S. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1-23). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
10. Goldman, Alvin (1983). Review of philosophical explanations. Philosophical Review, 92(1), 81-88.
11. Goldman, Alvin (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
12. Goldman, Alvin (1988). Strong and weak justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 51-69.
13. Greco, J. (2000). Putting skeptics in their place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Luper-Foy, S. (1984). The epistemic predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian tracking, and scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62(1), 26-49.
15. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16. Pritchard, D. (2003). Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck. Metaphilosophy, 34(1/2), 106-130.
17. Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford UP.
18. Pritchard, D. (2006). Moral and epistemic luck. Metaphilosophy, 37(1), 1-25.
19. Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20. Sosa, E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 141-153.
21. Vogel, J. (1987). Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge. In S. Luper-Foy (Ed.), The possibility of knowledge: Nozick and his critics (pp. 197-215). Totawa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
22. Vogel, J. (2000). Reliabilism leveled. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(11), 602-623.
23. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
24. Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.