Perpetuating U.S. preeminence: The 1990 deals to "bribe the soviets out" and move NATO in

International Security

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 110-137

  Sarotte, Mary Elise ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 77956294176     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00005     Document Type: Article

References (186)

1. The enlargement of NATO in 1990 was not the first time the alliance had expanded; it had already added members, such as Spain and West Germany, in the period between its formation in 1949 and the caesura of 1989. For more information on the history of NATO.
2. see Wallace J. Thies, Why NATO Endures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
3. The newest sources used in this article are (1) the papers of the former West and East German foreign ministries, which first became available to scholars in late 2009 and are abbreviated here as GU; (2) documents on British policy overseas, published in October 2009 by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, and Stephen Robert Twigge, eds., Britain and German Unification 1989-90, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 3, Vol. 7 (London: Routledge, 2009), abbreviated here as FCO-DBPO; and (3) French sources in the Archives Nationales, which became available to the author in the summer of 2009 as a result of a successful petition for access. This article uses these materials from 2009 in combination with (1) archival sources that opened in the last few years and (2) those that have been available since the end of the Cold War, listed here with the acronyms used in the notes to identify them: BP, or the papers of James A. Baker III, Mudd Library, Princeton University; BPL, or Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas; DESE, or publishedWest German Chancellery documents, in Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hoffman, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); FOIA, or U.S. Freedom of Information Act, documents requested under, institutional source identified with each citation; KASPA, or the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung press archive, St. Augustin; and MG [MG], Mixail Gorbahev i germanskij vopros [Mikhail Gorbachev and the German question] (Moscow: Ves; Mir, 2006). Documents also come from the briefing book distributed at the Mershon Center conference "U.S.-Soviet Military Relationships at the End of the Cold War, 1988-91," October 15-17, 1999, Mershon Center, Ohio State University. Unless otherwise identified, translations from foreign-language sources are the author's. These sources, and the alternative bargains, are discussed in more detail in Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).
4. Ambassador Jack Matlock, cable from Amembassy Moscow to Secstate Washdc, May 1, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA
5. "Iz besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s V. Qruzel;skim, 13.04.1990" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Jaruzelski, April 13, 1990], MG, p. 394.
6. On the peace conference idea, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 154-155.
7. Hubert Védrine and Vice-Amiral d'Escadre Lanxade, Présidence de la République, "A/s: une proposition de défense européenne, Paris, le 10 avril 1990," in 5 AG 4, EG 170, Archives Nationales, France. Mitterrand put a handwritten and underlined note on top: "Nôte à garde FM." The relationship between the United States and France in this period was complex, not consistently adversarial as is often assumed, and the French would eventually accept NATO's continued dominance. For more on the relationship between the United States and France in this period.
8. see Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification (New York: Berghahn, 2009)
9. Frédéric Bozo, "'Winners' and 'Losers': France, the United States, and the End of the Cold War," Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 5 (November 2009), pp. 927-956.
10. "Notes from Jim Cicconi [notetaker] re: 7/3/90 pre-NATO Summit briefing at Kennebunkport," folder 3, box 109, 8c monthly files, BP
11. Sarotte, 1989, chap. 1.
12. Henry Ashby Turner Jr., Germany from Partition to Reunification (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 174-175.
13. Lawrence S.Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, Vol. 3: Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), particularly pp. 134-147.
14. Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), p. 71.
15. "From White House to Elysee Palace," telegram from Bush to Mitterrand, April 17, 1990, in 5 AG 4, EG 170, Archives Nationales, France; the file includes both the English original, from which these quotations are taken, and a French translation
16. Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand (Paris: Fayard, 1996), p. 443.
17. Hubert Védrine, email correspondence with author, June 18, 2009
18. For more on Kohl's motivation
19. see Sarotte, 1989, chaps. 4-5.
20. The twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 2009 yielded a stack of new works; among the notable new English-language titles that appeared were Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (New York: HarperCollins, 2009)
21. Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
22. Stephen Kotkin with a contribution by Jan T. Gross, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishmen
23. Michael Meyer, The Year That Changed the World: The Untold Story behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall (New York: Scribner, 2009)
24. Constantine Pleshakov, There Is No Freedom without Bread! 1989 and the Civil War That Brought Down Communism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009)
25. David Priestland, The Red Flag: A History of Communism (New York: Grove, 2009)
26. Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Pantheon, 2009). The appearance of these anniversary books also produced a number of useful review essays: in English.
27. see Timothy Garton Ash, "1989!" New York Review of Books, November 5, 2009
28. John Lloyd, "And the Wall Came Tumbling Down.. ." Financial Times, November 6, 2009.
29. Philip Zelikow, "The Suicide of the East? 1989 and the Fall of Communism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 6 (November/December 2009), pp. 130-140. Many of the works published before the fall of 2009 remain essential reading nonetheless.
30. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 5-53.
31. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 93-111.
32. Archie Brown, Seven Years That Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (New York: Oxford, 2007)
33. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1991), pp. 225-250.
34. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 74-118.
35. Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
36. Robert D. English, "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 70-92.
37. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2006)
38. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Vintage, 1993)
39. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow, eds., Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causations, and the Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
40. Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996)
41. Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford, 1994).
42. Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (October 1999), pp. 539-576.
43. Mark Kramer, "The Myth of the No-NATOEnlargement Pledge to Russia," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 39-61 (note that the journal subsequently published an online correction box informing readers that the citations to the BP in "The Myth of the No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia" came from Sarotte.
44. See http://www.twq.com/09april/index.cfm?id=336).
45. Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
46. Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
47. James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Viking, 2009)
48. Olav Njølstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
49. Gerhard Ritter, Der Preis der deutschen Einheit: Die Wiedervereinigung und die Krise des Sozialstaats (Munich: Beck, 2006)
50. Donald Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991)
51. Andreas Rödder, Deutschland Einig Vaterland (Munich: Beck, 2009)
52. Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
53. Stephen F. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).
54. Odd Arne Westad, ed., Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Routledge, 2000).
55. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The unification of Germany, in particular, was the subject of a 3,000-page study: Geschichte der deutschen Einheit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), hereafter GDE. Last but not least, many participants in events have produced informative accounts. To cite just a few American examples.
56. see Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 (Washington, D.C.:WoodrowWilson Center Press, 1997).
57. Jack F. Matlock Jr., Superpower Illusions: How Myths and False Ideologies Led America Astray-And How to Return to Reality (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010).
58. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed
59. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement," Survival, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December 2009-January 2010), p. 50 (emphasis in the original).
60. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 492.
61. Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 6.
62. Kramer, "The Myth of the No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia," p. 41. In coming to this view, Kramer and others conceive of the 2+4 talks between the two Germanies and the four occupying powers as the most important negotiating forum. This understanding of the 2+4 venue overstates its importance. The 2+4 was not the decisionmaking forum on the most significant matters, such as the future of NATO. Bilateral talks between national leaders and their foreign ministers decided the crucial issues; the 2+4 sessions subsequently worked on the details. In particular, U.S. leaders from the president down worked actively to prevent efforts to expand the scope of the 2+4 to include discussion of NATO, and were successful in doing so.
63. See "Fernschreiben, Aus: London diplo, Nr 844 vom 18.04.1990, An: Bonn AA, Betr.: Britisch-Amerikanischer Bermuda-Gipfel am 13.04.1990," and "Fernschreiben, Aus: London diplo, Nr 898 vom 27.04.1990, An: Bonn AA, Betr.: '2+4' Gespräche, Hier: Sicherheitspolitischen Fragen," both in ZA198.440E, GU; the comments of Zoellick in "Fernschreiben, Aus:Washington, Nr. 1313 vom 30.03.1990, An: Bonn AA, Betr.: USA-Reise des Koordinators fuer die deutsch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit vom 28. bis 31.03.1990," in ZA140.729E, GU; Bush's letter to Mitterrand, "From White House to Elysee Palace"; and the communications of Baker and Bush in the service of this goal, quoted in Sarotte, 1989, pp. 125-126, 261 n. 32.
64. Deudney and Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement," p. 50.
65. Gilles Andréani, "Answering Medvedev," Survival, Vol. 52, No. 1 (February-March 2010), pp. 236-244 at p. 241.
66. Quoted in Al Kamen, "West German Meets Privately with Baker,"Washington Post, February 3, 1990
67. See also "JAB notes from 2/2/90 press briefing following 21/2 hr meeting w/FRG FM Genscher, WDC," folder 14, box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), pp. 716-719.
68. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 174-177.
69. "Ministerbüro, Bonn, den 07.02.1990, Vermerk, Betr.: Gespräch BM mit britischem AM Hurd am 06. Februar 1990," in ZA 178.927E, GU.
70. See also Mary E. Sarotte, "Diplomatie in der Grauzone," Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 7-8, 2009, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/362/493707/text/.
71. Mary Elise Sarotte, "Enlarging NATO, Expanding Confusion," New York Times, November 29, 2009. In addition, Genscher's papers show that Thatcher shared his worry about the consequences of changes to established Cold War borders, both of states and alliances. As Thatcher said during a conversation on November 29, 1989, "[C]hanging the territorial status quo in Europe would mean opening Pandora's Box" and said that she was "thinking of Yugoslavia," among other places. See "London, den 30.11.1989, Auswärtiges Amt, Betr.: Besuch BM Genscher in London am 29./30.11.1989, Hier: Vermerk über das Gespräch mit PM Thatcher am 29.11.1989-17.10 bis 18.05 Uhr," ZA178.931E, GU.
72. "U.S. Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official," February 6, 1990, AV20.634E, GU.
73. See Mary Elise Sarotte, "Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990," Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 119-140.
74. for Kohl comments. See Genscher comments in "Drahterlass, 11.02.1990, Dr. Kastrup, Az.: D2-110-8 111400, Betr.: Gespräch BM mit AM Schewardnadse am 10.02.1990 im Kreml (16.00 bis 18.30 Uhr)," and the immediately following "Fortsetzung," in ZA178.928E, GU.
75. Horn, quoted in Kramer, "The Myth of the No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia," p. 42; Kramer views the comment as an election ploy.
76. Memorandum from Harvey Sicherman to S/P-Dennis Ross, and C-Robert Zoellick, 12 March 1990, in folder 14, box 176, series 12, BP
77. Interviews by the author: Baker, Houston, 2009
78. Ross, Washington, D.C., 2008.
79. Scowcroft, Washington, D.C., 2008.
80. Zelikow, via telephone, 2008
81. Zoellick, Brussels, 2008
82. "Notes from Jim Cicconi [notetaker] re: 7/3/90 pre-NATO Summit briefing at Kennebunkport."
83. See Sarotte, 1989, particularly pp. 174-175, 192.
84. Genscher's papers suggest that he held on to this opinion longer than Kohl or Baker or Bush; see ZA140.728E and ZA178.928E, GU, most notably, "Washington, den 5. April 1990, Vermerk, Betr.: Besuch BM in Washington vom 04. bis 06.04.1990, hier: Gespräch mit dem Auswärtigen Ausschuß des Senats am 04.04.1990 um 16.00 Uhr."
85. Sarotte, "Not One Inch Eastward?"
86. "Communication aux ambassadeurs des trois puissances, 28 mars 1990," in 5 AG 4, CDM 36, dossier 2, Archives Nationales, France. On Kohl's failure to bring Genscher to Camp David.
87. Sarotte, 1989, pp. 126-127.
88. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Camp David, 24. Feb. 1990," Dok. 192, DESE, pp. 868-869.
89. See also George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 253; GDE, Vol. 4, p. 269.
90. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 215. In retrospect, Bush's comment was ironic, given that Kohl's political career would end under a cloud of suspicion about a domestic political corruption scandal.
91. See Heribert Schwan and Rolf Steiniger, Helmut Kohl: Virtuose der Macht (Mannheim: Artemis und Winkler, 2010), chaps. 34-36.
92. "Moscow Embassy Cable," May 11, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA and reproduced in the Mershon Conference briefing book
93. As one U.S. analyst insultingly put it, aid could not look like "an Ethiopian relief program." Quoted anonymously in Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, p. 126. French analysts independently came to the same conclusion, using the same phrase ("sauver la face").
94. See "Jacques Attali avec Horst Teltschik, 15 mars 1990," in 5 AG 4, CDM 33, Archives Nationales, France. Teltschik told Attali at this meeting that Bush had spoken bluntly to Kohl about NATO's prerogatives in Europe and his unwillingness to accept restrictions: the American had told the West German, "no nukes, no troops."
95. See, for example, Gaddis, The Cold War; and Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind
96. Kohl explained as much to Hurd
97. See "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Außenminister Hurd, Bonn, 15. Mai 1990," Dok. 278, DESE, pp. 1119-1120.
98. Hurd, quoted in Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, p. 93.
99. "Iz dokladnoj zapiski A.S. Hernqeva M.S. Gorbahevu" [From the report by Chernyaev to Gorbachev], May 4, 1990, MG, pp. 424-425.
100. GDE, vol. 2, pp. 418-420.
101. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, p. 93.
102. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 258-259.
103. DESE, p. 165.
104. "Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Präsident Gorbatschow, Bonn, 22. Mai 1990," Dok. 284, DESE, pp. 1136-1137.
105. Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), p. 249.
106. See also "Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Präsident Gorbatschow, Bonn, 12. Juni 1990," Dok. 309, DESE, p. 1207.
107. "Schreiben des Präsidenten Gorbatschow an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 14. Juni 1990," Dok. 315, DESE, pp. 1224-1225.
108. DESE, p. 170.
109. Quoted in Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p. 352.
110. For more on the subject of the all-German election of 1990
111. see Sarotte, 1989, pp. 160, 200-201.
112. "Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn, 3. Mai 1990," Dok. 265, DESE, pp. 1076-1078.
113. See also "Telegram, from USMission USNATO, to Secstate Washdc, 17 April 1990," released by the State Department via FOIA
114. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Außenminister Baker, Bonn, 4. Mai 1990," Dok. 266, DESE, pp. 1079-1084.
115. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 132-133.
116. Hutchings, interview by author, Princeton, N.J., 2008.
117. Teltschik, telephone interview by author, 2008
118. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 130-133.
119. Quoted in Timothy Naftali, George H.W. Bush (New York: Times Books, 2007), p. 92.
120. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 259, 272; and the press clippings criticizing the Bush administration for not supporting Lithuania more strongly in folder 14, box 176, 12b chapter files, series 12, BP.
121. "Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Washington, 17. Mai 1990," Dok. 281, DESE, pp. 1126-1132.
122. See also "Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Bonn, 23. Mai 1990," Dok. 286, DESE, pp. 1143-1145.
123. "Gorby Kremlin 5/18/90," Handwritten notes, folder 1, box 109, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP
124. "Iz besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s D'. Bejkerom" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Baker], May 18, 1990, MG, pp. 437-445.
125. To make NATO more palatable, Baker told Gorbachev that the United States was willing to offer "nine assurances," including a future limitation on the size of the Bundeswehr; a prohibition against nuclear weapons in a future Germany; talks on tactical nuclear armaments; a transitional period for the withdrawal of Soviet troops; changes to NATO itself; and, finally, guarantees that the economic interests of the Soviet Union would be respected during the unification process
126. See "Iz besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s DÉ. Bejkerom" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Baker], May 18, 1990, pp. 437-445. Gorbachev sought more than just assurances, however-what he really wanted was financial support from the United States and cooperation on new security structures, but Washington would not agree to either request.
127. "Gorby Kremlin 5/18/90"; and "Iz besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s DÉ. Bejkerom" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Baker].
128. In particular, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) preparatory paper concluded that the president should "not anticipate major movement on Germany at the summit."
129. See "Theme Paper: German Unification," May 23, 1990, released by the State Department via FOIA; "Primary Objectives for the Summit," by the Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, NIC 00562/90, May 24, 1990, released by the CIA via FOIA; and "The President's Meetings with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, May 30-June 3, 1990, Washington D.C., book 1, scope paper, Secretary Baker's Memorandum to the President," in the Mershon Conference briefing book.
130. Memcon, "Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany," May 30, 1990, the White House, released via FOIA 1999-0393-F, BPL; and "Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Washington, 30. Mai 1990, 13:30-13:45," Dok. 293, DESE, pp. 1161-1162.
131. "Iz vtoroj besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s DÉ. Buwem" [From the second conversation between Gorbachev and Bush], May 31, 1990, MG, pp. 466-476; Baker's notes from the summit, in folder 1, box 109, 8c monthly files, series 8; Scowcroft, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 2008.
132. Gates, From the Shadows, p. 493.
133. See also Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 219-221.
134. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 278.
135. The "most important" interpretation is in Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 132-133; "nothing to announce" is from Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 280-281.
136. "Telegram, From Ambembassy Moscow, to Secstate Washdc, June 12, 1990," released by the State Department via FOIA
137. "Bonn, den 06. Dezember 1989, Vermerk, Betr.: Gespräch BM mit GS Gorbatschow am 05.12.1989 in Moskau (16.00 bis 17.30 Uhr)," and "Gedächtnisaufzeichnung über das Gespräch zwischen Bundesminister Genscher (BM) und dem sowjetischen Aussenminister Schewardnadse (SAM) auf der Fahrt zum Flughafen am 5.12.1989," both in ZA178.931E, GU.
138. "Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost), 25. Mai 1990," Dok. 287, DESE, pp. 1146-1147.
139. GDE, Vol. 2, pp. 420-422. For more on the issue of legal claims.
140. see A. James McAdams, Judging the Past in Unified Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
141. "Fernschreiben des Präsidenten Bush an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 21. Juni 1990," Dok. 321, pp. 1234-1237.
142. "Entwurf," Dok. 312A, pp. 1237-1241, both in DESE.
143. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), p. 433.
144. In a conversation with Mitterrand, Kohl expressed his view that Germany in NATO was primarily a domestic political problem for Gorbachev
145. See "Gespräche des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Assmannshausen und auf dem Rhein, 22. Juni 1990," Dok. 324, DESE, pp. 1247-1249.
146. DESE contains a number of documents related to this topic. See, in particular, "Vorlage des Oberstleutnants i.G. Ludwigs und des vortragenden Legationsrats Westdickenberg an Ministerialdirektor Teltschik, Bonn, 25. Juni 1990," Dok. 326, pp. 1256-1261.
147. "Schreiben des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Sicherheitsberater Scowcroft, Bonn, 28. Juni 1990," Dok. 330, p. 1276, and its attachment, "Entwurf NATO Gipfelerklärung," Dok. 330A, pp. 1276-1280, all in DESE.
148. Zelikow, telephone interview by author, 2008
149. "Gesprächsunterlagen des Bundeskanzlers Kohl für das Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Mitgliedstaaten der NATO, London, 5./6. Juli 1990," Doks. 344, 344A-I, DESE, pp. 1309-1323.
150. "Schreiben des Sicherheitsberaters Scowcroft an Ministerialdirektor Teltschik, 30. Juni 1990," Dok. 355, DESE, pp. 1285-1286.
151. "Notes from Jim Cicconi [notetaker] re: 7/3/90 pre-NATO Summit briefing at Kennebunkport." Because the notes are handwritten, some words are abbreviated or omitted, as indicated above.
152. A copy of the final communiqué is available in various languages and locations; the one cited here is in folder 3, box 109, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP
153. "Vorlage Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn, 4. Juli 1990, Betr.: Innere Lage in der Sowjetunion nach Beginn des 28. KPdSU-Parteitages," Dok. 340, DESE, pp. 1297-1299.
154. See also Ritter, Der Preis der deutschen Einheit, p. 46.
155. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, pp. 123-134.
156. Sir C. Mallaby (Bonn) to Mr Hurd, July 12, 1990, 7.21 p.m., Kohl's Visit to Moscow, Document 215 in FCO-DBPO. For a British summary of what was decided in Russia, see Document 218, FCODBPO.
157. Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990-1994 (Munich: Droemer, 2007), p. 164; and Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 318-319.
158. The description above of the July 15 talk comes both from the German and the Russian transcripts
159. See "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Gorbatschow, 15. Juli 1990," Dok. 350, DESE, pp. 1340-1348.
160. "Iz besedy Gorbaheva s G. Kolem odin na odin" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Kohl one-on-one], July 15, 1990, MG, pp. 495-503.
161. "Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Gorbatschow, Moskau, 15. Juli 1990," Dok. 352, DESE, p. 1354.
162. Both the West Germans and the Russians produced long transcripts from this meeting, but they are not always identical. I have only cited material here that appeared in both transcripts: "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Gorbatschow im erweiterten Kreis, Archys/Bezirk Stawropol, 16. Juli 1990," Dok. 353, DESE, pp. 1355-1367.
163. "Iz besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s G. Kolem" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Kohl], July 16, 1990, MG, pp. 507-524. Additional useful sources on the significance of these meetings are cited below.
164. Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990-1994, pp. 175-176.
165. Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 74-75, 172.
166. Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990-1994, pp. 180-183.
167. See, for example, the television coverage of "Im Brennpunkt," video, July 17, 1990, KASPA
168. Falin, quoted in Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, p. 135.
169. See also Valentin Falin, Konflikte im Kreml: Zur Vorgeschichte der deutschen Einheit und Auflösung der Sowjetunion (Munich: Blessing Verlag, 1997)
170. The author thanks Norman Naimark for this Falin quotation, which comes from Stanford Uni versity, Hoover Institution Archives, Gorbachev Foundation Collection, Falin Collection, box 1, p. 29.
171. Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff (New York: HarperCollins, 1994)
172. For details of the final agreements
173. see DESE, p. 1540 n. 8.
174. Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), pp. 539-551 at p. 551.
175. For more detailed analysis of these phone calls
176. see Sarotte, 1989, pp. 191-193.
177. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 370.
178. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 253.
179. Baker and Cheney, quoted in Sarotte, 1989, p. 23 (emphasis in the original Baker document).
180. For analysis of the consequences of this denial in not only Russia but also China
181. see Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 63-95. For the contemporary case in favor of integrating Russia into international institutions, particularly economic ones.
182. see Jeffrey Mankoff, "The Russian Economic Crisis," Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, April 2010, www.cfr.org/russian_economy_CSR.
183. Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 13. Also writing in 2010, Russian Sergei Karaganov was more succinct, speaking of an "unfinished Cold War.
184. "See Karaganov, "Russia's Choice," Survival, Vol. 52, No. 1 (February-March 2010), pp. 5-10 at p. 9.
185. "Iz besedy M.S. Gorbaheva s G-D. Genwerom" [From the conversation between Gorbachev and Genscher], September 12, 1990, MG, pp. 570-573.
186. Vladimir Putin, with Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President Putin, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), pp. 69-76.